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CHAPTJ!R I

HISTaUCAL ASPECT OF THE BOYCOTT

The tera "bo.ycott" belongs to contemporary historr but the practice
and use was tamiliar to ancient civilization.

The word "boycott" today is

frequently used in association with disputes between labor and management but
the method was well known, in uany variations, to the societies ot old.

An

example thereof was the Pharisees shunning the Publicans as being socially
After the rule ot Clisthenes ot Greece, unsuccessful political

:tnrerior.

claimants were ostracized by the l'>4tople as a method ot indicating party
preference.

In a sense, those who were excommunicated fro. the Roman Church

during the middle ages were also boycotted. 1 A boycott was imposed in the
year 1.327 by the people residing in Canterbury', England, against the local
monks, be ing determined not to frequent or 1nbabit the prior t s home nor to
purchase any of the food or drink sold upon mODBste1"7 propert)". 2

B.1 traCing the earlier forms ot the contemporary boycott beck to
the beginning ot modern lndustl."Y, it can be readily noted that the pu..'''1ishment
inflicted upon masters, journe)'Jl8n and apprentices tor the viola tiona ot
guUd rules was similar to the present day boycott.

It a master was guUty

1 Harry W. Laidler, BoYcotts and the Labor Struggle, New York,
1914, 27-.30.

1910, 16.

2 Leo Volan, The BoYcott in American Trade Unions, Baltimore,

1

2

•

ot breaking a guild rule, the hired help was forbidden to labor tor him. The
master was denied the privilege to appear at meetings and was forced to sell
his Products at a dietlnce trom the other members in good standing.

If jour-

neymen were tound guilty of rule infractions, they could not be employed and
vere pursued by circulars (or untair lists) announcing the breaohes ot rules,
thus preventing the offenders from obtaining gainful employment.:3

It should

be noted that the boycott was used to maintain discipline within the guild

wheress the modern day weapon i8 used to benefit the hired hand.
From about 1700 to the nineteenth century, in northern France, the
boy-cott was a popular weapon of the termer to be reckoned with.

Farm

tenants in the Picardy area would pay the landlords a premium as rental, and
because ot the increased rent, olaimed the privtlege to occupy and 8ell the
occupancy right at will.

The landlords were denied the right to lease, sell,

or evict tenants against their will.

Although this right vas in conflict

with French law, the tarm tenants felt justified because they paid certain
premiums tor the land, many times against the desires ot the owners.

It the

landlord refused to recognize the unwritten law, the aggrieved renter would
inform allot his neighbors and the farm vas boycotted by the entire countryside.

Farms could not be rented and a new tenant vas denounced

grabber.

S8

a land-

In many instances, physical attacks were made upon the property.

:3

lW.,

4

17.

4 R. E. Prothero, "French Boycott and Its Cure", Nineteenth
Ceptm, XXVIII, November, 1890, 778-785.
"Boycott", Thp New Larned History, Springfield, Mass., 1922, 11,
1109-1112.

.. 3
There are reports of boycotts in tQe early history of the United
states alld examples thereof are the Bostoa Tea Party, slave __ de products
marketed bT the abolitioaists, teaperaace societies and cOllsumer leagult8.
The origia ot the term "boycott" is interesting.

For -1l7 years,

the peasant population of Ireland had bee. unjustly and hee.i1,. burdened by'
the British .obilit,. and land owing class.

The land conti.catiol'lS al'ld

settlemel'lts in Ireland which followed the revolutions of 1640 and 1688 lett
the landlord. ia Irelaad the absolute _sters of the soil.

There being

DO

mode ot livelihood but agriculture open to the working papuletio., they were
glad to get a farm at allY rel'lt without the legal bel'lerit of the usual
covenant. protecting the lessee ia accordsDce with established British precedent.

HoldiDg as a teunt... t""",,1ll, the occupant was completel,. at the

merc,. of the landlord or his ap.t.

He was cOllstaDtl,. subjected to -117

rule. which controlled his lire, tall117 relatiol'l!, land el'lclosure aad other
arbitrary dogma i. which he had little or

l'1O

.oic8.

The Irish stock had

furl'lished British politics and the Briti.h civil aDd military .erTice with

'118.,. capable and

hard-vorking sernllts.

Yet, prior to the Boycott mcidel'lt,

no improvement had bee. _de in the condition ot the Irish Catholics since
the use ot "Moll,. Maguiriam" aad the aedsaiDatio. of landlorda alld bailifra.'
'l'he fundamental derect of the Irish land teaure ves that it placed the greet
bulk of Ireland under the arbitrary govermaent of a .-11 class ot citizens

,

437-38.

"The Genesis of Boycotting", %be Natio., XXXI, December 23, lSSO,

.. 4
who had no responsibility to the peasant by custom or law.

Me.,. terms were confiscated,

the payment or starvation wages a

common practice and homes taken ava,. b,. legal sanction.
there was an a\Ferage ot 500 e\Fictions a year.

From 1872 to 1877,

During 1879, the total

doubled and 1,000 people were driTen trom their homes and liTelihood without
an,. other industr,. available that could absorb this economic group.

The

n1ight of those concerned, born to the soil and without the necessary education to pursue another occupation, linked together with the inertia ot
society in general showing little desire to move, was intense.
famia. of 1S78 gaT. the land-owning class an

o'Pport~it,.

And the

to clear their

estates ot the occupants, especially the peasant who was outspoken.
With such historical backgroUlld b m.ind, one can rationally explain
the conduct ot Captain Boycott with greater UDderstanding and clarity.

He

has become a figure representing unjust exploitation and yet he is merely a
symbol tor thought and action whioh had existed

Oil

a natioll8l 1eTel.

Captain

Boyoott was a land agent for Lord Erne in County Mayo, Ireland, in the district ot Connemara. 6 He is described as beiag brutal, toul....,uthed and
arrogant.

All of his tenaBts were compelled to stand with hats in their hand

when passiag on a road.

Inside his ottlce, the worker

\I&S

told to stand as

tar as possible trom Boycott's desk. 7 Evidently, the Oaptain held the peasant

6 Barr,. W. Laidler, 0R.cit., 33-36.
7 Arthur D. Vinton, liThe History of Boycotttngtt, Magaziae or
Western RistoU', V, December, 1886, 2ll-224.

s
in utter conteapt.
During the summer of 1880, th.e prevailing market wage for faM
labor was sixty-two cents per day for the male and thirty-seven cents for
the fe.le.

CaptaiJl Boycott offered the wage of thirty-two cents tor the

male and twenty-four cents for the female.

The peasantry refused to accept

and for all practical purposes forced Captain Boycott together with his
family and servants to attempt the harvest of the crops prior to spoilage.
With but a ffJW hours of labor, the newly recruited farm hands were exhausted
and forced to quit since the rigorous labor was tar too diffioult, es~eially
for those not conditioned by physical 1abor. 8 Mrs. B07cott, who vas respected
by the teunts and raM hands, pleaded with them and the peasants were

finally induced to return to the fields.

On the very next dS7, the tenants

were presented with notices of evictioD by a formidable array of eighteen
constables.

With enthusiaSM, the constabulary managed to serve three

notices of eviction, after which the outraged tenants called
lIeeting to stop Captain Boycott. aad his legal aids.

8

large mass

The leaders of the

peasantry managed to iDduce the servants, herders and drivers for the Captaia
to dessert, probably indicating that their ecoaomic interests were one aDd
the _me and that force would be used it necessar:r.
Because of the iaf1uence of the landed geatry, the British government sent a relief expedition consistiDg of seven regiments of troops and an
additioR81 group of fifty hands were hired at the request of Boycott.

SHarry W. Laidler, Bonott, and the Labor Struggle, 23-26.

Thus,

6

.

the orop was harvested at a oost I18ny times in excess of the actual cash
vslue.
To aid the cause, local storekeepers vere enlisted in

su~rt

ot

the peasants. For e:xample, vhen Mrs. Bo)"Cott veDt into tow to purchase
bread, the storekeeoer refused to make the sale because the people could not
stand that "baste of a husbaDd of hers aay longer." 9 Thus the early development of aidiDg the principles engaged in the controversy through secondar,r
souroes (the local storekeepers) can be readily seeD.
It is interesting to note that only the influence of an Irish
nriest, Father JOM O'Malley, kept Ca;:>t&1n Boycott trom death at the hands
of the peasants. Father OIMally managed to coDceal Boycott at his perish
until the necessary arrangements were made to secretly remove the latter.

10

James Red'P8th and the same Father 0'*1ley are credited with being
the first to use ftbo)"Cott" as a descriptive term. 11 While the two were in
e horse and carriage duriDg the year 1880, Father O'Malley, in casual conver-

sation, mentioned that social ostraciSll, as a'P1)lied to a ltuld-grabber, was
not a fitting descriotive nhrase.

He supposedly stated that the action taken

against land-grabbers should be called a ftbo)"Cott."

Thus, a word

was~oined

that has since become famous in labor annals, although originally intended
to apply to the land-ovning groU1'.

9 Arthur D. Vinton, Magazine of Western Histon, 214.

10 Ibid, 215.
11

~,

215-16.

Redpath appears to be the first
in vriti~g.

p~r80~

• 7
to use "boycott" as a noUB

He deseribed the use thereof as follows.

It a landgrabber comes to town and wnts to sell a!l7thing, don't
do him any bodUy harm. If you see a landgrahber going to a shop
to buy- bread, or clothing, or eyen whiskey, go you to the shopkeeper at o~ce, do~'t threaten him - J.st 8ay to him that under
British law he has the undoubted right to sell his goods to anyone, but that there is DO British law to compel you to buy
another penny's worth from him, a~d that ;rou vill Myer do it as
lo~g as you liye. 12
The famous Panell gaye similar sdyice to other groups duri.J1g the same historical period. 13
The mechanics of the boycott vere simple.
perso~

weB placed under a

ba~

The so-called obnoxious

and sel"'Y8Jlts and other types of laborers refused

to toil for the guilty person.

He couldn't get liyery serYices, herders nor

blacksmiths. Cattle and other types of stock vere sometimes driYen from his
land.

Another aid to the boycott proper took shape in the form of threaten-

ing and abusiye letters making lite miserable and intolerable for the landowner, sometimes requiring legal protection. Police can often dispel Yiolence
but they obviously caBot farm the land. 14
Shortly after the dispute with Captain Boycott, the weapon
by

the Irish tend League and it

1188

W88

used

contemplated that there would be diffi-

culty in controlling this tactic. 15

12

1!d4, 213.

13 Richard Barry O'Brien, Life of Parnell,

Londo~,

1899, 236-37.

14 "'l'he Genesis of Boycotting", The Nation, XXXI, 4.37-.3S.
15 nid., 438.

•

8

In ISS5, on the American scene, the first reports are available
concerning secondary boycotts after the origin of the term.

M8~

concerns

doing business with the New York Tribune were boycotted during the year to
force them to desist from advertising in the Tribune.

Amongst those concern.

boycotted were Rogers, Feet and Compall1, R. H. Macy and
Baking Powder

Compe~

Compa~,

and many others too numerous to mention.

the Royal
In Pittsburgh,

the boycott took an opposite tura when sundry newspapers were boycotted for
publishing advertisements of J. Keutmsn and Brothers, with whom the union
had a dispute.

The Fifth Avenue Hotel was boycotted when disinterested third

persons were waylaid and re'4uested to go elsewhere at the penalty of belag
boycotted in their various businesses.

Ia addition, circulars were allO

distributed. 16
The primary boycott has been permitted whereas the secondary bo)rcott has been restrained and declared illegal by courts.
tion betweea the two is difficult.

Often the distinc-

Essentially, the primary boycott ia

directed against the employer with whom the union has a dispute whereas the
secondary boycott is used against companies who engage in commerce with the
primary elIl'Ployer.

For the sake of clarity and common understanding, it is

noW' Decesaary to define a secondary boycott.

Charles O. Gregory has stated

that, "A secondary boycott occurs when a group of e.'Ployees refuse to remain
at work for an employer, DOt because of any complaint o'\'er their standards

16

Ihe NatioD, XXIV, December 24, lSS5, 526-27.

9
under him but bee.uee he persists in
'!r1hom they have some grievance." 17

d.elin~with

a third person against

Millis and Montgomery have said that,

"The primery or ai-tlmle boycott is one in which the aggrieved party resolves

not to patronize a firm or firms or its product and appeals to its triends
The usuel boycott is one in which, in addition

to withhold their patronage.

t.o the above, coercion, loss of bus:J,nes8, etc., are resorted to or threatened
to cause third ~rties to sever business relations." IS Websters International Dictionary (2nd Edition, Unabridged) t defines s secondary boycott
es, "'l'he boycott of (t.) by an orgea:Jsed group (8) to compel a third perty
(C) to abstain trom doing
Seli~n

II!

thing for which (A) has no direct responsibility."

ssys, ttA boycott in labor disputes may be defined as a combination

of workmen to cease all dealings with another, an employer or, at times, a
fellow worker, and, ususlly, also to induce or coerce third parties to cease
such dealings, the purpose being to persuade or force such others to comply
with 80me demand or to punish him for non-comnliance in the past." 19
Wolun calls

8

secondary boycott, Ita combination to ",ithdraw pstronage tro.

a nerson in order to force that person in turn to withdraw petronage from a
person or firm with who1l the union was primerily at odds." 20

Rothenberg

17 Charles O. Gregory, Labor and the Law, New York, 1946, 120.
IS Harry A. Millis and Royal E. Montgomery, Organized Labor, III,
New York, 1945, 5g3.

440.

19 Edwin R. A. Seligman, Princiu1es of Economic!, New York, 1929,
20 teo Wolman, The

~!tt

in American Trade Unio.", 14.

10

eta tes that a secondary boycott is "a movement by which an individuel or
group or persons seeks to compel an ellU'>loyer to whom they mayor may not stand
in the proximate relationship ot employees, to accede to their demands in
matters affecting or arising from. the reciprocal relations or dealings
between the employer, employees and demandants by seeking to induce persons
dsaling with the employer to discontinue their commerce with him." 21 Miny
times, the secondary boycott is similar to other industrial weapons used by
labor organizations, such ae the sym:path)r strike.

There isn't any olear

distinction between a syDlpStby strike and a secondary boycott when there

~s

a sympathy strike being conducted against an employer having no direct
interest in the dispute and a secondary boycott prosecllted by pickets who
are not ellployees of the primary employer.
Miny secondary boycotts are waged by picketing.

Under such con-

ditions, one can disoover human picket lines, sometimes public rallies, an
occasional meeting, many sips, posters and other siJRilar devices being used.
Should a group ot employees walk out against an employer being picketed to
a Id another laboring group, this would be correctly termed a sym:pa thy str i'<e.
Thus, it becomes important to correctly derine the exact type of union
pressure being invoked.
Boycotts, in early Allerioan history, appear to be e device used as
B

supplement to strikes who success were in doubt.

21
1949, 96-97.

In 1809, a cordwainers

I. Herbert Rothenberg, Rothenberg on Labor Relatlo!l§, Buffalo,

.. 11
strike in New York

W58

precipitated by employers who attempted to have their

goods manufactured in other shops and consequently there were many strikes
instigated by the employees of other employers who had refused to oerform
serTice. upon the "unfair" good •• 22 In Philadelphia, during the year 1827,
the tailors called a strike, causing the master tsilors to subcontract their
work to others.

In sheer desperation, the strikers managed to persuade the

employees of other master tailors to reruse to perform any services upon the
orders received from "unfair" firms. 23 The journeymen stonecutters of
New York in la30 imposed a boycott upon convict-cut stone when they refused
to work upon such material. 24 A boycott was used against the master batters
of Baltimore in the year 1833 because of a cut in wages, although this was a
pr~~ry boycott imposed upon a particular commodity. 25

Prior to the year lS80, the use of the boycott was snoradie and of
minute importance.

The first concentration

8a

an effective wesnon of labor

was under the sponsorship of the Knights of Labor. 26 From 1880, the
popularity of the weapon greW' by leaps and bounds because of many neW' labor
ga ins.

First, there

was

solidarity within the Knights of Labor

so

the.t the

22 Leo Wolman, The Bgycott in Amerioan Trade UnioW!, 43-72.

23 "Third Annual Report of the United states Commissioner of Labor"
House Executive Dooument" IIIII, 10. 1, Part 5, 50th Oongress, 1st Session,
1122.

24 New York Sentinel and Workins!!n's

!d~ocate,

July

3, lS30, 3.

2~ J. R. Commons, H. L. Summer and others, Dooumentary History of
Amerioan Industrial Sooiety, VI, Cleveland, 1910, 100.

26 Leo Wolman, The Borcott in American Trade Unionl, 24.

.. 12
boycott could be applied extensiTely and by' a large group.

On a semi-

political leTel, within the various unions, leaders were hesitant to call a
strike since dues eollected froll members bad to be 1lsed to support a strike
which vas distasteful to the rank and f'Ue.

Then again,

8

boycott was

becoming simple to administer because of the growing urbanization.

In

addition, there vas an increasing division of' labor making it easier for
employers to replace strikers - semi-skilled and unskilled workers could be
emoloyed as skilled hands were no longer in such grest need.
lack of' choice, the boycott was brought to the front

8S

Thus, through

an eff'ectivs weapon.

On the dramatic plane, attention was drawn to the power wielded by labor

through solidarity by disclosing the effectiveness or the boycott.

And last

but not least, the cost of a boycott was negligible in comparison to a
strike.
During the year 1880, boycotts were called by local organivations
belonging to the Knights of tabor. 27 Recognizing the power of such an
industrial weapon, the Knights of' tabor convened in

t~e

year lS85, and adopted

two rulee granting local, district and state assemblies the right to initiate
boycotts that did not .trect other areas.

If other localities vere affected,

tha Executive Board of the Knights of Labor could initiate the boycott.
the year

U~~7

the r.nights of Labor established e. separate entity within its

framework to exclusively develop matters concerning the boycott.

27

In

~,

27-2A.

Although

•
no tangible written proof oan be found, the
boycott

8S

~nights

13

probably employed the

their principle m.eans of Aggression.

The New York Bureau of Labor statistics recorded 1,352 bo,ycotts
between the years lSSS to 1892. 28 It appears that most of these boycotts
were called by the Knights of Labor with a high degree of success.
From 1892 to 1900, the Knights ot Labor, aa an orgenizetion, lost
muoh of its power and as a result the use of the boycott wanot as extensive.
After 1892, organized labor had obtained a substantial following and fou:rd
it necessary to wield the weapon with caution as oourts were generally
enjoining its use.

Although the boyoott was not used as frequently against

the usual adversaries, a new foe had arisen and boycotts were im:posed upon
products made by trade unions affiliated with the American Federation ot
Labor.
dispute.

Here, we find the forerunner of the present day jurisdictional
Thus, the Knights of Labor, h lSSS, boycotted the Fuller, Warren

Stove Company because the employees belonged to the Iron Molders t Union.

A

dispute al.o arose between the Knights and the Cigar Makers International
Union in

l8~

when the Knights ordered all cigar makers who were members of

the Knights of Labor to withdraw from the Cigar Maker' 8 Union. 30 After the
order, the Cigar Maker's Union boycotted the cigars bearing the label of the
Knights of Labor and the Knights retaliated by boycotting the cigars which

28 :the Rev Larned Hilton, II, 1109-1112.

29 teo Wolman, The Boycott i9 American Trade UniOnS, 29-30.
30 E. R. S,edden, "The Trade Union Label", John Hopkins University
Studies, II, sere XXVIII, no. 2, 17-19.

.. 14
bore the label of the Cigar Makers. When

8

cutters belonging to the Knights of

with members of the Garment Workers

r~bor

elothing firm in 1896 replaced

Union, the Knights of Labor imposed a boycott upon the J'l"oducts manufactured
by the clothing concern. 31 When the Brewery Workmen's Union boycotted a
Roohester brewery because the company employed members of the Knights of
tabor, the Knights, in 1887, boycotted those breweries employing members of'
the Brewery Workmen's Union. 32
The boycott vas made use of in the railroad industry during the
years 1885 to 1895. 33

In le85, the Knights of Labor refused to move any of

the rolling stock belonging to the Union Pacific.

In 1894, during the

famous strike of the American Railway Union, Dehs, the leader, was imprisoned.
The union vas an organization consisting of all branches of employees in
the railway service. "hen the employees of the Pullman Palace Car Company
went on strike, the American Railway Union supported the strike, liind ordered
all of its members not to york upon any train where & Pullman car waa
attached.

Soon, strikes arose in other companies because of contracts to

haul Pullman trains.

When Debs was imprisoned, the union was shortly there-

sfter dissolved and the railroad boycott became an inconspicuous weapon.
From 19S1 to 1890, the

Am~rican

Federation of Labor played a minor

31 Journal of Knights of lAbor, April 9, 1896, 2.
32 Ibid, April 29, 1887.
33 Leo Wolman, The Boycott in American Trade unions, 32-33.
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role in the use of the boycott.

34

Arter

1890,

the AFt spearheaded the

drive that forced the Knights of Labor into oblivion using the boycott as
a principle means ot aggression.

With the virtual disappearance ot the

Knights ot tabor in lA95, the boycott was seldom used.
major influence and

WI'!

The AFT.. was now e

extremely conservative :1.n the use of the boycott.

In tact, the Executive Council of the AFt during the 1995 convention, noted
the shortcomings of the boycott. 35

The AF14 foresaw a marked loss in the

effectiveness of the boycott if it remained uncontrolled because of the
incressed onDosition to the lIse thereof by the (Jublie and adverse court
decisions.
strike statistics available in the United states betysen lSSl and

1905 disclose en lncrease in the total number of strikes during thi.s period
but a slower increase in pronortion to the growth of industry in general. 36
As the boycott is often an auxiliary weapon to tht" etri.ke, it can. be assumed
that the use of the boycott increased when the number of strikes increased.
From the data available, severel conclllsi.on!'! et'.n be drE!'t:Tn with
reference to the historical Bsnects of the boycott.

Where unions 9rperienced

difficulty :In gaining new memhl'!rs or ",here e wst supply of non-un1on lebor

34

~,

35

Proeeedings of the Fourteenth Annual Convention,

33-35.
1~4,

25.

36 "The statistical Aspect of the Strike," Bureau of Labor Statistic •• 'l'velfth Report, Wisconsin, 1905-1906, 75.
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is available and a strike is called, the boyc:ott vas also used.

With the

inability of unions to regulate conditions conoerning the employees ot
manufacturers, the boycott was applied to prevent the sale ot the product.
The boyoott historically emerged when the organiUition of the labor toroe

was difficult and wben the breaking of a strike woe s1mole.

CBAP!.ER II
AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EVALUATION OF 'l'HE BOYCOft

The boycott, as conducted by organised labor, bas been practised
almost exclusi'Yely in the United States.

A study of the boycott in Germany

disclosed that it vas JIlOst frequently used tor political pUl'J)Oses.

'or

example, inns were boycotted because rooms were refused tor meetings to the
Social DeDlOcratic party.

In England and Switzerland "unfair lists" were

published in labor disputes. 1 A1thoUCh there are instanc •• ot secondary
boycotts in Europe, the weapon became an American institutioD because
frequent

UN

.r

the

b7 labor. Due to iJImIature union leadership, indi'Yidualistic

peoples, and ada.nt emplG)"ers, one can understand wbT the boycott became 8
l'8rt ot the American heritage.

Matur1t,', in labor relations, was and is tar

more e'Yident upon the continent than here.
A.

Qhara9ter~,t19s

ot the S,oondaa Boyoott

"!'he bo7cott was seldom used in the United States in such channels

ot industry 8s engineering, iron 1I8nutaoturing or in tho•• trade. which
ohiefly concerned themsel...e. with oontacts and were not tor the general or

1

teo Wol1lan, Tht Bono," ia Amtrioan Trad, tlptoH, 41.
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retail market.

According to available

evide~ce,

practised in the fields ot mass consumption.

most of the boycotts were

And since the boycott could

only be eftectively used where large populations gathered, most ot the
action occurred in the highly industrialized areas.

During the year 188S,

one hundred and ninety-six bO,yootts were recorded ot which the state of New
York alone had t1fty-nine. 2 '!'he boycott is definitely an urban characteristic.
To be etfective, the working population must be well organized
(except when used tor organiza tiona 1 purposes), numerous, and a s already
indicated, highly localized.

Where the laboring community is a closely knit

intimate assembly, the boycott is waged by collective efforts motivated by
a colleotive conscience.

ot course, this is an ideal situation and such

homogeneity ot purpose is seldom attained.

Where labor is scattered, the

secondary boycott is characterized by weak individual eftort and is seldom
successful.

For example, mining towns contain a large peroentage of organized

labor composed ot people in close contact with one another.

One can see such

solidarity by noting the strong demand tor products with union labels.

Here,

a secondary boyoott would be successful. 3
To etfectively promote the secondary boyoott, unions, in many
instanoes, will appeal to specialized groups tor their aid.

In 1895, in a

2 John Burnett, "The Boycott as an Element in Trade Disputes",
tconoll!c Journal I, 1894, 163-173.
3

Aaerican Federationist, June, 1900, 172.
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dispute il'lVol..,ing the Rand-Mc1lall,. Printing Qom.p8.D7, the union concerned
discovered that the largest -purchasing class of the com.pany's products vere
public officials and educational institutions.

4 A bo,ycott appealing to

the public appeared to be useless, thus foroing the union officials to exert
pressure upon the political organizations who had the necessary influence or
were doing business with Band-McNal1.7.

Upon occ.sion, the labor movement

will seek the aid of organised farmers a. great service CBn be rendered
against such firms as the International Harvester C0Jll,)8221 who manufacture
farm. implements.

When a boycott was deolared against the Studebaker Manuf'ac-

turing Company, engaged in esseablillg wagons used on tarms, it

VIlS

suggested

that farmers could aid br demanding tair wages for those empleyed br the
compliD7. 5 foday, the appeal br unions would possibq be _t with resutance.
The intonatioD cited leads to the conclusion that bo7Cotts, in
general, are ItOst etteoti..,e when a lar,a portion ot the products produced br
the primary or secondary e.ployer are consumed b.r communities ot labarer.
and where there are lar,a special groups ot

CODtJWIft1"8

vho teel that labor caD

bring eftecti",e nre.sure ot a political or econoaio na ture

lIpOll

thea.

A further 8aaqsis of the character of the market i. neces_17

explain when the bo7cott can be used sucoes.tully.

4 l.l'!W, June, 1895, 64.

s

~,June,

1895, 63.

It the market or

to
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consumers consist primarily of union people and s,ympathisers, the secondary
boycott has a grellter chance of success.

Thus merchandisers selling bread,

newspapers, hats, cigars, beer, clothing and other necessities and

108X-

pens i.e lururies to the public ha.e been frequently and effectiTely
boycotted. 6 Commodities primarily sold to the upper middle classes and the
higher income echelon ere generally

~ssed

because there can be little

sympathy for others unless the action taken has publicity or is considered a
soc ial duty.
Another market characteristic to be considered is whether the
article is purchased by the male or the female member of a household..

It

has been said that women, being closer to the home and not directly engaged
in the business world, would not have as great emotional solidarity as that
found among

lIS

les who are "in the same boll t." 7

The proof of this theor.y

would be difficult as many more women today, even those married, are supplementing family income in the business area and education is accorded in
almost equal doses to both sexes, which was not in eTidence in earlier years.
Another element to consider is the frequency and regularity with
whioh the unfa 1r articles are consumed.

If an article ot popular consumption

enters into daily conversation, there wUl soon emerge a strong support by
the general "public for the union cause, since the oonsumers are generally

6

Harry W. Laidler, Boycotts and the Labor Struc«le, 160.

7

lh!!I!,

161.
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people in the

economic status and

S8me

recep~ive to pleae froa unions. 8

The monopolistic characteristic of the unfair product i. another
element to be accounted for as part of the market analysis.

If there is

difticulty in obtaining a duplicate of the article made or lll8rketed by the
primary or secondary employer, it becomes difficult to appeal to the sympathy
of the general public, especially if the article is a necessity. 9
An additional aspect is the packaging and distinguishing features
of the article in question.

If a product does not carry the name or brand

of the organization with which the union bas the primary dispute, it beoomes
more difficult to trace the goods and obtain public sym.pattv.
should a union have

8

For exslllple,

dispute with the 'Whirlpool Oompany, manufaoturers of

washing machinss, secondary pioketing of the
the Whirlpool washer under the

S88rs~oebuok

Sears~oebuok

stores, who carry

trade name ot Kenmore, might be

ineftective.
The final market oharacteristic indicated herein concerns the type
of eompetitive products.

If there are two producers of the 88me item, one

made by the unfair enrployer with whom there is a labor dispute and the other,
tor example, by prison labor, the general public many be reluctant to purchese
the alternate product made by the prisoners.
important f'ector.

1~~5,

334.

Here again, -prioe is an

Prison-m.ade products, today, are of' little importance and

g

Nev York Bu1"!!U of' Statistics of Labor, Third Annual Report,

9

Harry W. Laidler, Boxcotts and the Labor Struggle, 163.

•
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hence there is little necessity to explore $he problem further and the
example was only intended to indicate that an acoeptable substitute must be
offered to the publio before the boyoott will have a possibility of succeS8.
otherwise, the public may oontinue to purohase the boyootted article.
There are many other factors to be reckoned with when oonsidering
the use of a seoondary boycott. First, the union must be strong. As a
tactical problem, the union leader must oonsider his strength as compared
with the opponent as does any professional soldier. As an example, witness
the success of secondary boyootts oonducted by the powerful building trades
unions upon items not sold directly to the masses of working people.
Here, suocess can only be aohieved if the union is powerful
involved are not directly consumed b.Y the general public.

8S

10

the products

Then, the union

leader must oonsider the sympathies of the secondary employer.

It, for

example, the secondary boyoott is being conducted against the use of child
labor, the neutral employer would have to capitulate more quickly to union
demands because the s,ympathy of the public would lie with the union.

Should

the boycott be conducted for e reduction in working hours trom eight to five
a day, the secondary employer will find public opinion against the union
goal and he will tend to hold out longer before acoeding to the demands made
~

organized labor.

Another item to consider is the general business condi-

tions at the time the secondary' action is being contemplated.

10

n14,

161.

If there is a

· 2,
ready or expanding market, the secondary emplO1er is not conoerned with one
eustomer and seeks to

pro~uoe

and sell as much as possible.

Thus, he WIlnta

no union interference and is more psychologically ready to comply with
union demands.

If business is bad and there is no ready market for his

product, the neutral employer can financially afford to wait longer before
capitulating to union demands.

Another factor is whether there is favorable

pnblieity for the secondary boycott.

Using child labor again as an example,

newepapers, radio end television, even though generally prejudiced in favor
of employers and nrosnective advertisors, would be more sympethetic :In the
reporting.

The attitude of courts and legislators is an imnortant element

and this problem vi11 be more thoroughly reviewed in later,ohapters.

Then,

the longer a boycott lasts, the less possibility there is for success. 11
After a lengthy period of time has elapsed, sUpporters become lukeWllrm.
especially if there i. a personal inconvenience attached

to the union aotion.

The last faotor oonsidered concerns the strength of employers assooiations.
For eXEmple, the stove Founder's National Defense Association agreed that,
amongst its member:!, !lOne would give employment to another member of • union
originating

8

boyoott. 12 There ere also other means and methode available

to capital to control the devestating effects of boycotts.
Hbtoriea1ly, unions were weak and the threat of or an actual

11

Ibid, 165.

12 Leo Wolman, The Boyoott in Ameriean 'I'rRde Unions, 39.
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strike failed to disturb the serenity of manY. an enrployer.
called, it was generally
employees,.

8

If a strike vas

simple problem to replace the strikers with new

Slowly, labor organizations realized that they had utterly

neglected to use their 'Powers

8S

consumers and the effect of pressure upon

persons and industry not direotly involved in the dispute.
calling a strike to improve legitimate working conditions is
and tactually placed in the hands of labor.

The burden of
p~chologically

Thus, all public repercussion

snd rancor will be let loose upon union organizations, though nossibly not
at fault.

If pr:lmery boycotts are resorted t.o, the employers' profits can

usually be reduced without publlc resentment against unions.

The secondary

boycott involves the same form of' argument, although in all probability,
there will be greater resentment than that found when 8 union conducts a
prim&ry boycott.
Organized labor,
cost.

In comparison to

8

813

any other type of' enterprise, ieI cognizant of'

strike, which otten involves union membership sub-

sidy and loss of' dues, the boycott is 8n inexnensive weanon, having 8S good

or better en ef'f'ect than the strike.

During en economic crisis, il"respectlve

of' the cost, the boycott is a better choice than a strike since unions are
generally less T)owerf'ul than during periods ot economic prosperity and the
employees will not have fear of' the loss of' their jobs should the boycott
tail.

MAny Atrikes faU because neither the union nor its members can atford

to continue a lengthy period of unemployment or possibly could not even
financially afford the initial monetary outlay to promote the strike.

In a

boycott, the union members oontinue to work

~nd

the union 'has le8s expense

and les8 antagonism from the rank and file union member.

Today, under the

Taft-Hartley, there are speoific circumstances under whioh the union would
be guilty of an unfair labor praotice should +trike or bo;ycott be u8ed.
orten, the advice ot legal cOUDsel will guide a union in the determination
of whether to use a strike or boycott, the salient feature being which tactic
would pOssibly be permissable under the federal law.

There are also many

state lavs to consider in the deoision as to when to boycott or when to use
8

strike.

B.

The Ne,d tor the Stgondsty Boycott
Most industry is oonducted beoau.e ot

8

soo1.81 need, real or stim-

ulated by advertisement. 'When persons supplying such demands violate •
social lav having greater importance than the manufactured article, then,
upon occasion, the demand ceases and society attempts to put the ottender in
place.

Thus, the public is a partially etfective damper upon offensive or

greedy organizations. 13

The boycott, primary or secondary, in such

instances, has an eduoational aspect, acquainting people vith the issues or
the infringement of rights.

The seoondary boycott, in most instanoe., must

be carefully used as an advertising medium because the press general1:r
advances the employer's position and the faots vill be portra:red sympatheti-

453.

13 "Boycotts", Illinois Bureau ot §tat18tiol of Labor, 1886, 446-

cally to picture the invasion of the rights of an innocent neutral employer,
not a party to the dispute, who has been greatly wronged.
The seconda17 boycott is essentially the same as the blacklist which
had been used b,y employers to keep union men or women from securing renumerative employment with other business concerns than that which the union
had a dispute with. 14 Although the blaCklist is of little ilIportanee today,
it va s onee an employers weapon to be reckoned with and superior to the
seeondary boycott because

at

its secrecy, whereas the boyeott is more or lellls

dependent upon favorable publio opinion.
boycott may be malielous in

t~t

Furthermore, although the secondary

the union is seeking revenge for a real or

fancied wrong, experience, as indicated in legal decisions, has found such a
motive exceptional.

Not seldom, the objective 1s a legitimate labor achieve-

ment, although the means used, the secondary action,mB.Y be Ulegal.

WMn

the employer uses the blacklist, the purpose is to drive the worker out of
industry as a lesson to the individual or more often as an e.mple to other
workmen.

'The element of malice is perhsns more prevalent in the blacklist

than in the secondary boycott.
Many studies have advanced the theory that when nevspapers were
few and the coverage given to labors point of view scant, the use of pickets,
primary or secondary, served a usefulourpose by informing the public that
there was a dispute, maintained group morale and aided strikers in keeping

14 Millis and Montgomery, Organized Labor, Vol. III, 596.
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their jobs.' 15

It is currently argued that Qoverage by newspapers, radios

and t$levision are today unbiased and fair to labor making the use of picketing an obsolete labor maneuver, especially where the action 1s secondary_
A recent investigation, conducted b,y the Federal Communications Commission
for almost four years, disclosed great room for doubt as to the unbiased
reporting b.Y the advertising media. 16 When a radio license is issued, there
ere anecitic stirmlations made, one being the im-oert1el preserrtatlon of news.
The lete G. A. R.ichards, who died several weeks before the Oommission renderad a decision concerning the revocation of his radio licenses, owned three
50,000 wett stations in
8

news commentator,

W8S

1.08

Angeles,

o1 eve land and Detroit. 01ete Roberts,

appointed head of the KMPO newsroom in Los Angeles

in 1947 and was subsequently fired because he had stated that Ganersl Douglas

MacArthur had a tremor in his hands at a time when the General was being
boomed as a presidential candidate.

A charge was brought by Roberts that

Richards had always issued instructions to slant and distort the news in order

to 'Oromote his tl-riwte views.

Evidence disclosed that Richerds once wrote to

one of his station managers that the 010 vas

8

menace to society.

Should

there be a depress ion or a gree t change in nolit1ca 1 ph ilosonhy , there is

8

strong possibil1,ty that unions vill be even more unfairly blasted by a large

15 ~rerman Feldman and Harry P. Bell, "Picketing: Its Use and Abuse"
Annals of the American AcademY Vol. 248, November, 1946, 97-109.
16 Edmund Lawrence, "Radio and the Richards Case", H!tper l

.!!D!, July, lQ'52,

~2-ff7.

,

Mae-

segment of the agencies pruveying -unbiased" ,news.

Under such conditions,

only time viII tell whether the secondary boycott should be outlawed as
being an obsolete tactic and no longer necessary to the welfare of unions.

g. M!lterial or Cg1Dlllodik §ecop.dan Action!
Secondary
actions.

~ycotts

can be classifed as material or commodity

The essential difference between boycotts on materials And that on

commodities is that the tormer can be used effectively by organh;ed labor
whereas the latter is essentially an

8~peal

to heterogenoue

as~emblies

of

consumers. 17 The salient ehlinctfllristie of the boycott on materials is its
appeal to unions, the 'Purpose being the organized disa'Ooroval of certain
implements and materiels with which men and women work, supposedly constituting a menace to the weltare ot 1a bor.

Here, union men vUl refuse to use,

handle, or work uoon unfair material",. For example, those enmloyed in the
construction industry will frequently refuse to install certain articles
menufaetured by non-union shops.

The boycott, in such an instance, helns to

proTide 'Work for union members or Is in synroathy with fellow workmen.

His-

torically, the material boyoott manitested itself in such fields of commeroe
88

prieon-lIIflde goods, goods or tasks made or finished by new Dl8ch1nery and

in embargos unon products made by

oo~titive

unions or imported from foreign

17 teo Wolman, The BOIcott in American Trade

nnio»~,

73-74.
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countries. 18 The boycott on commoditie. is-applied when the articl. is
ready for consumption by the general public and is not intended for further
producti.... us..

As a practical matter, mst of the latter VPe boycotts

until the ArL-CIO schism, were of little importance since law8 w.re passed
regulating the use and sale of prison-made products; the strength of unions
aud education has, in mluJ;Y instances, disclosed a more liberal attitude
toward the adoption ot Jl8chinery; and the growth ot the national union has
done away. to some degre., with boundar,- lines when -.terial is transported
from another localit,y.
However, not all of the material boycotts can be traced to these
sources.

Frequently, union mUlbers will boycott articles -.nutactured by

workmen recei... ing low wages and who are unorsanized.

In New York Cit7,

oarpenters employed in the building trade industry are complete orsanized
and ususlly vell-peld and protected.

The woodwork shops, on the other band,

until recentl,.. vere tar trom being completel,. unionized.

If a general

oontraotor purchased doors and window trames trom a non-union mill, the
building trade union ofticials would not1t,y the contractor that the nonunion product would not be installed.

Because of union strength and the

general vork-together poliC7, the contractors would capitulate to union
demands.

The woodwork mill can onl;y preserve its established market by

18

lk1a, 44-47.
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employing union help and the general contractor fac •• business diffioulties
should he resist the union.

The carpenters union, oould show that the non-

union mill, by operating on lower than union standards, presented a continuous competitive haurd to unionized woodwork IlUls snd employees directly
engaged in the building trades beoause of a wage ditterentisl, fringe
benefit., hours, etc.

In most instances, wages and benetits al';"e less in the

unorganized shops than tho.e which are unionized.

The union then concludes

that the contraotor who purchases non-union trim profits by supporting subunion labor standards.

A further economic interest is indicated since ma!l7

of' the older carpenters vill seek employment in the woodwork shops for suoh
rea sons a s less travel, vea ther, year round employment, eto.

These rea sons

are frequently cited by the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners to
justifY seoondary action. 19
It is only fair to note that the building trades unions have used
material boycotts for such diversified reasons as a display ot power, union
expansion and a tear ot competitive organiutions.

For example, the pre-

fabricated home which is made piecemeal in a factory and shipped and
assembled at the construction site, presents a probln ot loss ot work tor
the established AP'L building trades unions and a shift in power, in some
instances, to another competitive union.

By politically controlling buUd-

ing codes, the use of prefabricated homes has been stopped in many large

19 Charles O. Gregory, tabor and the Law, 123.

cities where the need for housing remains acute.

ot course, local builders

seeking to keep competition outot the market aid the unions in their
etrorts.

In Chicago, dry-wal1 construction is limited and the plastered

wall remains in use though the former process is successtully used throu,hout
other perts ot the United States, including suburbs of Chicago.

Thul, the

union is able to keep its members employed and another competitive

or~ni-

zation is k.,t from gaining power and membership.
Unions sometime. request other labor
ID8terial boycott.

or~nizations

to use the

The International Cooper. Union requested the Painters

and Decorators Union and typographical Union to bar the use ot paint., oila
and inks contained in non-union barrels. 20 The Metal Polishers Union in
1911 requested the American Federation ot MUsicians to ule instruments
bearing the union label. 21

The Textile Workers of Deuville, Virginia,

requested unionized garment vorkers in overall and shirt factories to boycott
the products ot an unfah- southern Dd11. 22 However, allot these request.
vere disregarded and it appears that the boycott only flourishes between
unions whose work 1s more or less intimately connected, such as in the construction trad'., or i f the other union will be in a similar position to

20 tzoeeedings ot the Nineteenth Annual Convention of the A. F ..
ot L., 1899, 99.
II·

21

the JourMl (Metal Polishers), NOTober, 1911, 17.

22 the Gament WorkE, Augast, 1901, 17.

I
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extend suoh aid at a later date. 23

-

D.

The Community of Interest Between the Primary and Seoondary Emplmr
Another probleM to eonsider in evaluating the use of the boyeott

is the eommunity of interest between the prineipal and seoondary employer.
It should be noted that the fortheoming discussion is one of economics and
legal detinition and precedent is not being weighed.

In the examples cited

below, oourts would possibly not find a sufficient relationship and degree
of oontrol between the primary and so-called neutral employers so ttet a
secondary boycott eould not be justified.
The Allis-Chalmers foundry, in an attempt to dereat a strike called
by its molders, subcontracted many molding jobs to different roundries in

the Middle West.

Employees or the subcontractors, members or the same inter-

national union to which the strikers belonged, retused to 'Work on any of the
items sublet by the Allie-Chalmers Company.

It has been argued that the

action ot the union should not be classified as a typical secondary boycott
because there is a real community or interest since the labor standards
adopted by' the 'Drincipal employer was being promoted by' the subcontractors. 24
Furthermore, the subcontractors become primary employers in the dispute by'

23

Leo Wolman, The Boycott

in American Trade Unions, 57.

24 Charles O. Gregory, Labor and the Law, 125.

completing the molding jobs.

An organization as large

8S

Allls-Chalmers, in

its negotlations, tends to aftect the wages of others in the same indust1'7
employed by other concerns.
A similar situation might exist when a large non-union printing
establishment such as the Donnelly Printing Company' in Chicago would seek
the aid ot unionized oompetitors in completing contracts during the seasonal
peaks.

It the union ordered its members in unionized shops not to complete

the work sublet by Donnelly's, one could present a valid argument tor the
justification of a boycott.

Donnelly has, for many years, avoided unioniza-

tion by many means although meny people employed are union members.

There

is an obvious threat to the veIl-being of all union printing members should
an organized shop accept contracts from Donnelly_

During -periods ot

depression, with work being scaro. and unemployment high, there is a definite
corollation between the amount of work let to non-unionized shops, increased
because of substandard employment conditions, and the number ot unemployed or
part-time workers in the union plant.
E.

C09pm~3-on

Between UnioR'

Another category ot secondary pressure ineluded in the realm of the
secondary boycott is that action undertaken by labor-union councils. 2S

2S ,I2M, 127.

The

building trade. oounoils, such

8.
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found in Dc!inver, Colorado, oomposed ot all

of the craft unions ordinarily engaged in the building industry, ino1uding
brioklayers, e1eotrio fane, plumbers, painters. m.etal workers, etc., are a
good example ot the labor-union oouncil.

Although eaoh is genera11,. ..

separate oraft entity, by agreem.ent, should the eleotrioians call a strike,
the other assooiated orafts will not work if a strike is csl1ed or should
non-union e1eotricians be employed.

The tactic described 1s not the conven-

tional type of secondary boycott a8 the action called by the counoil i.
sim.ilar to a aympath;y strike.

Courts have prevented such action by union

counoils on the theory that all of the unions composing the building trades
councils

he".

no economic interest of their own to promote.

In theory and

in oractioe, there is a definite oommunity of interest between the oraft
unions in the building trade. sinoe any .ing1e grouo may be in need of
similar aid at a later date and are orten engaged in labor upon the same
site.

Today, it 1s true that most building trade unions are organized on

fl

craft basis but there is always a possibility that at a future date a reorganbation may take p1aoe on an industrial basis.

Suppose that a C.I.O.

industrial union oontrolled the labor market in the building trades and the
electrioians were in"ol"ed in

8

dispute

0"81"

a legitimate labor ga in.

Then,

the dispute would involve all construction workers trresl'eotive of the
partioular skill sinoe all would belong to the same union.

Then, 8n1 boyoott

action taken at the oonstruction site would be primary and hence permi.sable
in various jurisdictione.

For the sake of argument, assume

th~t

an electrioians strike was

called to prevent the general contractor from installing electrical fixtures
made b.r

8

non-unioD plant.

Such action would, in most jurisdictions, be

contrary to law or public policy_

Yet the interest of the building trades

electricians to which the shop electrioians belong could justit,y the union',
use of economic pressure.

As long as unions in the building tndes remain

associated along craft lines in councils, lt would be difficuit to legally
justify the use of'

II!

boycott.

Yet, using the industrial form of organization,

the Bame type of union coercion ",ould be permissable as being primar:,y
activity_

Eft

The Labor Trend ape! the S.copdan Bonott
An investigation of the trend of industrial disputes is necessary

to f'ull.v explain the secondary boycott.

During the years 1916 to 1921, an

average of 105,625 persons annlJslly out of each million of our industrial
wage earning nopulation either struck or was locked out by employers.

1926 to 1930, the number was reduced to ll,S4l

~er

million persons.

From
?he

explanation for the reduction 1s !imple - the prosperity betveen the years
of 1923 to 1929 was accompanied by relative price stability and an increase
in real wages.

In addition, the 20's saw the emergence of

form of industrial relations.

8

new and subtle

For exsmple, witness the growth of company

unions, old-age pension plans, stock ownership by employees, recreational
aetiviM.es end many other such similar devices.
labor movement itself was less aggressive.

During this decade, the

The direct organizational activity
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of the Art had slowed down and unions, generally, were content to merely
hold that which they had achieved.

In fact, it apttesrs that prosperity and

oompaDT progl"ams had robbed the labor movement of its emotloDfll1 appeal.

On

the opposite aide of the ledger, the 1920's disclosed a highly concentrated
business drive gl"eatly enhancing the power of capital with relative 1e8S
importance being attached to the labor movement.

In addition, laws govern-

ing the various jurisdictions and the federal government were more favorable

to capital and it became apparent that labor giants were necessary to or.nize workmen in similar gigantiC structures. 26 The secondar)" boycott became
necessary to permit unions to grow and equal the power wielded by industry.
From 1930 to the effective reorganisation undertaken by the
Roosevelt administration, both industry and labor suffered.

The Norris-

LaGuardia and Wagner Acts greatly aided labor and the membership increased
tremendously.

ilJith the advent of the CIO, many of the basic industries and

industrial giants were organized tor the first time.
by necessity, labor difficulty was at a m1n1mUlll.

When World War II came,

There were so fev active

labor disputes that they are hardly worth mentioning.

Although John L. Lewi.

and his coal miners were involved in one fracas which reoebed a great deal
of unfavorable publicity, most of' the unions and their leaders cooperated.
After the war, due to many factors, the truce between lebor and lMD8gemant

26 H. M. Dot,., II The Trend of Industria 1 Disputes", J ollt'pal
berican Statisticsl Association, XlVII, June, 1932, 16g-172.

or

tht

• )7

vas at an end and the secondary boycott vas used, in many instances, unwlse17.
with the 1947 amendments to the Wagner Act, a new era in labor history had
begtUl and the secondary boycotts were now prohibited as being an unfair
praotice in industries effecting interstate commerce.

MBn.y states passed

similar and even more restrictive regulations.
The necessity for labor legislation, including the regulation of
secondary action, wes an indioation of the tremendous gains made by labor.
Economioally, it became questionable if labor needed the use of such a tactic
88

the secondary boycott.

In most instances, it was argued, there appeared

to be other means available to unions to achieve legitimate labor gains with
greater social acceptability than secondary aotion. With faTOrable laws and
fair administration, there appears, in most instances, little need for the
unregulated secondary boyoott.

However, should there be a less favorable

administration and an economi.c crisis, it is possible that labor could again
find itself in the 88me position it oooupied prior to the Wagner Aot.

Under

such conditions, there mray again be need to eqU61ize the power between labor
and management and the secondary boycott would become sooially desirable to
aid the union cause and generally inorease purchasing power.

CRAP'l'D. III
S1'A.TE A.NI> FEDERAL LAWS AND DECISIOlfS

-A.

Inkoduetiop
The change in sooial conduct during the past tev gefterations hal

been great and became necessary 'because ot nUlHrous technologieal develop.ents.

Although machiDe improvement WIle rapid and eOllstant, sooial dnel-

opment tended to be slover and

ma~

communities were confronted with the

neceseit)" ot formulating new rule. ot conduct.

!here was and remelns a

definite lag between teehnolo.,. and the .ocial scienoes.
As a general prop.sition, .ociety-, as observed in world history,
has been able to control the behavior ot its members 'h1 the tormation and
develoDment ot informal regulations.

The bod,.. of rule., otten called

custom, has been large and the division between intormal regulation and the
law has often been imperceptible.

So rapid has the rate of change been

during the past tev generstions that the communities have been unable to
await the development of informal controls and customa as a method ot
trolling hu.n behavior and business relations.

oon~

Consequent17, an enormous

development of tormalised legal codes became neeesaa1"1 whioh, in turn,
inoreased the number ot court decisions and their influence.

38

!he tirst halt

·)9

ot the twentieth century bas been one ot the -great law-making periods iD
history.

The United States, being a young country by comparison with others,

would naturally be in the forefront in the total sum of statutory regulation.

However, it is important to note a change from previous historical

eras.

Instead of laws developing from accepted custom, which is the usual

procedure, many statutes were enacted before society had time to reach an
opinion as to the necessity for control and the most acceptable mean8.

The

tield of labor law in general has been one specific area in which such
hurried and irrational action is most evident.

Earlier theory, generall,.

tormulated by economists and accepted by the legal profession, was laisles
taire, the thought being that the groups or individuals concerned would best
provide for themselve8 and a strict Ithands-otp peli.". would achieve the best
results.

With union growth through the span ot years, the thought \188 that

collective bargaining would provide the neoessary intormal regulation and
control so that legislatures continued with the "hands-otP poli."..

A Tery

important tactor often oTerlooked or ignored vas that collective bargaining
could not develop a code of equality and moral jWltice untU the bargainers
themselves had some standard criteria developed as a guide which in turn
must become generally accentable in the community.
Turning trom abstract thought, society, otten overlooked by the
contestant8, has a definite interest in labor disputes and particularl,. in
boycotts since the settlement of disputes i8 often at public expense.

Thus,

formalized control became necessar,y since adequate social controls in the

•
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field of labor relations, and specifically of secondary oo)"Cotts, were neTer
developed or eTen attempted in some instences.
today

i~

Although the general pulse

one of informal regulation OTer labor difficulties b.f allowing the

develo?Ment of collectiTe bargaining, bf necessity, many areas in labor must
be controlled through legialation and court decisions.

Since Americana are

considered to be aD individualistic group, it is a paradox that such aversion
to regulation necessitated the deYelop.ent of stronger controls, OTer such
labor tactics as the boycott, then are found in le88 individualistic nations.
By

necessity, state and federal legislatures stepped into the arena early in

American history and controls were attempted oyer many weapons used bf
unions, amongst them being the secondary boycott.
Many individuals have telt that the "hodge-podge" known 88 labor

law could have been more realistic had the courts ot law attempted to understand the problems ot labor economics instead of using formalistic theory in
rendering opinions.

As an example, _ny courts tormerly denied the existence

of trade unions through the use of established legal dogma and suits had to
be brought aga inst individual members.

EYen today, the courts and legisla-

tors conTenientl,. forget or deny the basic conflict between management and
labor.

Neither side has been very scrupulous in the choice of weapons

during an open conflict and periods of peace are nothing more than an armed
truce.

Employers have used such instruments of persuasion as the blacklist,

the lockout and anertising against employees and their unions.

The unions,

in turn, have their fev ineffectual newspapers and radio stations, the
iil!]l.

l·

'.11111.'1

II~I
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strike and the boycott.

Unfortunately, the courts failed to understand the

basic cause of the diffioulty and instead of reaohing the carcinoma through
radical surgery, it was allowed to metastisize.
B.

---

The DoctrYae of CORSRV!OY

The laws governing boycott. can be traoed back to English law, as
1s true in all legal jurisdictions in the United States with the exception

of Louisiana and California.

From necessity, the following discussion will

annly to general lepl principles and labor problems and not the boycott
proper although the same rules apply.

The doctrine of conspiracy vas used

as a method of controlling union growth.

The theory nrcwides that acts,

lawful when done by an individual, could become iUegal when committed by

tv. or more persons.

The 'basic idea behind this dootrine was that concerted

action by an organi,..ed group m.ight have an ill effeot U'DGn sooiet,..

In

several cases that arose in the tailoring industry, individuals were indicted
for criminal conspiracy against a master tailor and the 111egal combination
Wls the gist of action. 1

The courts in effect held that every man may work

It what "rice he pleases but a com.bination setting the price was a crime.

1

Xing v. Eccles, 1 Lea Cr. Cas. 274, 1783.
Rex v. Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge, 8 Mod. 10, 1721.
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!he Engliah Parliament in 1799 and '1f\OO ressed the C()mb1nstions
Acts which clearly embodied the -principles ot criminal conspiracy. 2 Due
to the change in the industrial climate and the doctrine or labaes taire,

the Englbh laws relating to trade and labor associations were ohanged
during the years 1824 and 1825.:3

The 1824 legislation 4 re'Pealed the

Combinations Acts and permitted workmen to organize without the resr or
nrosecution ror conspiracy.

Due to a series of strikes, the Act or 1825

restored the oommon law dootrines, although not all of the controls, aDd
etiminal law conspiracy charges vere again being fUed. 5

In the case or

King v. Bykerdike, 6 a charge or conspiracy vas made in that injury vas intended to the ovners ot a colliery and employees were m"tn'ented from wrking.
The vorkers, it appears, had threatened a strike unless certain men were
discharged from the mine.

The court held that the action taken by the

employees was a criminal conspiracy and persons had been deprived of their
nrivilege to remain gainfully employed.
In summe.ry, the English 18v, prior to 1824, held that comb1ne.tions

2 39 George III, Chapter Sl.

)

6 George IV, Chapter 129.

4 A. G. Taylor, Labor Problems and Labor Law, New York, 1950, 374.
5 6 George IV, Chapter 129.

,I
,I.

,I
.1

6 I M& Rob. 179, 18)2.

il
I

of workers for legit11ll8te union purpose. was .11legal and crimil1al.
1824, unions were legitimate.

From

A. conspiracy at common law being a combine-

tion of two or more to effect an 11legal purpose, the illegality of such
purpose or means being found in the cooperati.... effort of the laboring
element.

Since 1825, the statutory law has not specifically stated that

attempts to better working conditions were illegal.

However, such acts

remained illegal in the purpOse before 1825 and in the means used from 1825.
The reasons generally advanced for the illegality of concerted action by

organized groups was that these were a violation of personal rights; a direct
injury to society, trade was restrained; and the use of large numbers coerced

others to agree to

DUlY

unfair stl-oulations.

There apnears little doubt that

the use of a secondary boycott would have been criminal because the combinetion and then the means would not have been permissible.
Legislation in England sponsored during 1859 legalized the peacelul persuasion of others to abstain from or to cease work.

The law in 1871

provided that combinations were not illegal merely because of a restraint ot
trade and the act of 1875 held that the test of illegality of a combination
was whether the acts, if done, would be 111egal if committed by an. individual. 7

Thua, unions could no longer be held criminall,. liable although civil

suits were permitted. 8

7 Clifford Brigham, "Strikes and Boycotts as Indietable Conspiracies at Common Law", American Ley RevtIY, January-February, lSS?, 41-69.
A.

c.

8 Taff-Va1e Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Society or Railwy Servants,
426, 1901.

The English common law also developed the doctrine of restraint of
trade as certain agreements were held to be illegal if they restrained
competition or created a monopoly.

Such contracts vere generally held to be

against the best interests ot society and eventually the theory was applied
This concept va s embod ied in the sta tutes ot a number of sta tes

to unions.
8S

ve11 as in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in the United States,
2,

United State.

In the United States, legal decisions followed the English common
lav

closely.

In People v.Melvin at al, 9 the state of New York convicted

the defendants under the doctrine of conspiracy when a combination of journey
men cordwainers agreed not to work for an,. person who would employ non-union
members.

A strike had been threatened and the court mede a finding of a

criminal conspiracy.

In People v. Trequier, 10 journeymen hatters were held

criminally liable on the charge of conspiracy because a single hatter was
prevented from working and because of a refusal to vork tor an employer
unless a non-union batter vas discharged.

Forceful opinions concerning con-

spiracy were written in the cases ot Master Stevedores Association v. Walsh 11
and State

T.

Donaldson. 12 In Commonwealth

T.

Hunt the tirst important

9 2 Wheeler's Cr. Cas. 262, lSlO.
10 1 Whee1er's Cr. Cas. 142, New York, IS23.
11 2 Daly 1, New York, 1887.

12 32 N.J. 1;1, 1867.

decision was rendered holding that associations of workmen were not
inal conspiracy per see 13

8

crim-

However, the means and the end result attained

bad to be justified legally.

In 1872 and 1876, statutes were enacted in the state of Pennsyl-

vania which did away with the theory of criminal conspiracy. 14 In 18Sl,
the state of Illinois as part of the penal code stated that it was a crime
to oommit any act injurious to c01llDlerce and the boycott, if used, would be
a crime. 15

At this particular period of history, boycotts were specifically

outlawed 8s a cOmllOn law conspiracy.

Other courts bad admitted that the

ultimate object ot the boycott might be legal but the immediate result was
injury so that the law could not go beyond the immediate effect.

judges pronounced the boycott illegal not merely because

Other

ot injury but

because the injury was accompanied by malice without justifiable cause.

It

was argued that a combination of two or more greatly increased the power for
evil and made malicious action possible. 16

The first case in which the

word "boycott" was used in an American legal decision 'Was that of state v.

3.

13

4 Met.

14

~ightlyts

III

(Mass), 1842.
Purdon's Dil!!l, I, Section 213, and II, Section

15 Digest Laws, Chapter 69, Section 13, l8Sl.
16 Commonwealth v. Judd. 2 Mass. 329, IS07.
State v. Glidden, 8 Atl. S90 (Conn), lSS7.
State v. Rowley, 12 Conn. 101, 1837.

Glidden, decided by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. 17 The
defendants were members of a printers union and had attempted to compel a
publishing company to discharge certain nonunion men so that there was a
strict union shop.
of patronage.

Other unions aided and the complainant lost a great deel

The court held that the union invaded the right of a person

to engage in a business and vas, in addition, an unlawful infringement upon
the rights of non-union workmen
laboring element of employment.

s:tnc~

the defendants action deprived the

The law of criminal conspiracy was applied

because actual force or threats or intimidation was used.
Because of irreparable injury, a suit for damages could be brought
or a court of equity could issue an injunction or both remedies were available.

In

8

parallel caee to state v. Glidden, the defendants had circulated

hendbills requesting all persons to withdraw patronage from the plaintiff's
newspaper and, in addition, sent letters to patrons requesting them to withdraw all advertisements. IS The court permitted a suit because the action
taken constituted a conspiracy.
In the case of Hopkins v. Oxley stave Compan,y, the defendants,
members of a coopers' union, requested a manufacturer ot barrels and casks
used to pack meats and other commodities to stop using a certain machine for

17 S Atl. 890, 1881.
18 Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical tJnion No • .3, 45 Fed. Rep. 1.35,
1891.

•

47

leoping barrels. 19 When the request was re~used, the defendants, together
with other members of the Trades Assembly, a federated labor organization in
Kansas City, boycotted the manufacturer.

The news of the boycott ws pub-

Bshed and Swift and Company ws given notice.

The court held that action

taken by the union ws a cons-piracy and issued an injunction because an
attemot to stop the use of machinery was illegal since progress was hindered.
The elements of combination and malicious intent were necessary to
hold a boycott illegal

8S

a criminal conspiracy.

To establish the element

of malice, the desire to injure the boycotted business should be legally
conspicuous and -perhaps the -primary' moM.ve.

Here, the court had to look to

the intent ot the union although it was otten admitted that there was present
an element to better working conditions.

In the Glidden and Oxley Stave

cases, the respective courts found elements ot malice even though questions
of improving the conditions of labor were involved, the courts holding that
the nrimary objectives were to destroy going concerns.

Obviously, it is

difficult to decide in any particu18r ease whether the element of malice was
present and es-pecially whether it was paramount to the legitimate motive ot
bettering working conditions.
C,

Coercion
Another condition which caused the courts embarrassment vas that

19 83 Fed. Rep. 912, lA97.

of coercion.

A man's business is a property Tight aDd entitled to the

T>r0-

taction of' the law. 20 Thus, a person can carry on a business in a lawf'ul
manner a s he sees fit.

And if a person is "Out in rea eoM ble fear of' his

business, the law allows him redress i f an unlawf'ul action was perpetrated
or three tened.
MOst of the earlier decisions found the use of violence, threats
of violenoe or phy'sical foree.

However, it was not necessary to orove actual

violence - intimidation was present if good reasoning b.r the ordinary person
in a similar situation was overcome. 21 Some courts held that an actual
threat need not be made i f the attitude assumed b.r s union was intimidating
and could be established b.r the circumstances. 22 The use of' the word
"boycott" was held to be sufficient evidence ot coercion. 23

Other courts

have gone so far as to hold that the imposition of f'ines upon union members
who refuse to engage in

8,

secondary boycott 'I.ras coercion. 24

Because unions

800n discovered that courts would not tolerate violence and force, they
attempted to resort to intimidation and coercion without

1894.
1898

a~

use of' force and

20 Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 30 Atl. Rep. S8l (New Jersey),
21

Beck v. Railway Protective Teamsters Union, 77 N. W. 13 (Mich),
Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 1900.

22 roster v. Retail Clerks International Protective Assn., 78 N.Y.
SUPPa 860, 1902.
23

Brace v. Evans, 5 Pa. Co. Ct. 163, 171, l8g8.

24 Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vt. 1,

1m.

peaoeful boycotts were substituted.

As

the person boycotted

\ISS

oompelled

beoause of a fear of injury to his business to accede to terms, the Courts
held that coeroion and intimidation supplied the illegal mesns.

In a sense,

coeroion was present but it was of the type which oompelled one merchant to
low his prices in order to meet the competition of his competitor.

It

\ISS

not the type of force which, under the law of consPiraoy, was regarded as an
II

illegal means" in reference to boycotts because the best legal authority

considered such means illegal only when the acts were a tort per se. 25
It has already been stated that the mere aot of oombining constituted an illegal means beoeuse the old or imina 1 law oases held that the mere
combination was the gist of the action.
committed b.Y

8

Although it was true that sots when

combination of persons may change their character to the

extent of making them more offensive and harder to resist, it was also true
that the individual worker was ineffective and, under some circumstances,
one individual could cause more harm than any number of persons combined for
that purpose.

However, in neither oase is legal coercion or intimidation

present and there was no reason to find a combination ipso faota changing the
character of an sct which would be legs 1 if done b.Y one person.

178.

Many author-

25 Joel Bishop, Bishop's Qriminal Law, I, 1913, Chicago, Section

Hon. o. M. Hilton, Wharton's Criminal Evidence, III, 1912,
Rochester, Section 1337.

Ities held that the mere e::dstance of' a comb1hation was not a conspiracy. 26
In Vegelahn v. Guntner, 27 Justice Holmes, piior to his elevation to the
united States Supreme Court, stated in a dissenting opinion:
It Is plain from the slightest consideration of' practical af'fairs,
or the most superficial reading of industrial history, that free
competItion means combination and that the organization of the
world, now going on so fast, means an ever increasing might and
scope of combination. It seems to me rutile to set our faces
against this tendency. Whether beneficial on the whole, as I
thil'lk, or detrimental, it is inevitable, unless the fundamental
axiom of society, and even the fundamental conditions of llfe,
ere to be changed. One of the eternal conflicts out of which
life is made un is that between the effort of every man to get
the most he can for his services, and that of society, disguised
under the name of capital, to get his services for the least
possible return. Combination on the other is necessary and
desirable counterpart, if the battle 1s to be carried on in a
fair and equal way.
In New York, a court refused to issue an injunction against the distribution
of circulars when there vas no proof of violence 28 although the use of
violenoe could be enjoined. 29

D. The Constitutional ProtectiOn of Business
Thus, the gradual di8apt>earance of the illegal combination theory

26

BOM *nutacturing Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 1S93.
Ert£ v. Produce Exchange of Minneapolis, 79 Minn. 140, 1900.
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 1996.

27 167 Mess. 92, 1896.

1901

28 Cohen v. United Germent Workers ot America, 72 N. Y. Supple 341,

29 Rourke v. Elk Drug Co., 77 N. Y. Supp. 373, 1902.

~1

led the courts to further search tor a new method ot controlling the boycott,
vhich could injure business.

It is interesting to compere such doctrines as

caveat emptor and tree eompetition with the 1av controlling the labor boycott
at this period.

Although unrestricted business and the purchase at one's

risk short ot legal traud could spell ruin to a business man, the courts
accepted thBt

8S

being healthy tor the national economy, vhereas the general

va1fere of the masses, who are generally the

~orking ~opulation

and in need

of protection, could not use the secondary boycott because it ruined business.
Mgny casual observors llPOn the American scene,

ot foreign extraotion, have

noted that 'lie Amerioans have an aristocracy of business men who are generally

, !

worshipped and protected whereas an aristocracy ot hereditary nobility, often

no different, i8 trovaed upon.

The decisions rendered by courts to the end

of the nineteenth century would generally bear out such a contention.

Dictum

began to appear in a number of cases exoressing the thought that property

was entjt1ed to protection as guaranteed by the constitution and the courts
owed a duty to protect this right. 30 Thus, although the unions vere no
longer illegal as an entity, the notion deve100ed that the end to be attained
vas not socially desirable.

Although it can be conceded that a right to property and the
corresponding need tor protection does exist, it never did follow that the

30 Davis T. Zimmerman, 36 N. Y. Supp. 303, 1895.
Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 1903.

"
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right was absolute.

Any business suffers injury through competition and

hence to show that a union inflicted injury upon a business, it should have
been shown that the means used or the end sought was not justified by trade
competition.

If a person exercises his rights properly, his action is

legally permissab1e although another person may suffer a loss thereby.

On

this ground, "trade boycotts· used by business men and corporations were
regarded as lawful.

There are many instances in which a wholesaler or an

association of manufacturers refused to supply good to a retail dealer for
one reason or another. 31

The same reasoning should have applied to boycotts

at this turbulent period of history when benefits were being secured for
members and unions were fighting for their existence.

Although third persons

vere requested to aid, this alone should not have been outlawed, because,
using an analogy, business men are always taking away customers from. another
and the boycott had the same effect.
In addition, many business men filed complaints in courts of equity
requesting injunctions.

In most jurisdictions, a request for extraordinary

relief was to be denied without looking at the merits of the case if the
olaintifr did not come to court with "e1een handsn and there was no irreparable injury.

31

As many concerns used any Ileana available to stop the organi~-

Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, 1893 •
.Macaulay v. Tierney, 19 R. I. 255, 1S95.
Brewster v. Miller's Sons Co., 101 Ky. 36S, lS97.
Webb v. Drake, 52 La. Ann. Rep. 290,

1m.

tion of their employees, including violence,

~t

seems inconceivable that the

complainant should have "clean hands".
The law, as it generally existed in 19m, was that the rights of
business were not absolute and any damage done as the result of a boycott
\l8S

not unlawful per se • .32 However, such orotection disappeared when un-

lawful means were used and a cause of action accrued to the person or corporation suffering a 10ss • .33 When there was no legitimate labor interest but
a boycott was used malioiously, an action could be brought by the injured

party regardless of the use of legal means.
E.

The Anti-'l"ru,tLaw.
With the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust 18w in 1890, another

phase had begun in labor relations which has been thoroughly reviewed
experts.

~J

many

However, some discussion is necessary as the secondary boycott was

legally stopped by a doctrine which 1s generally conceded today was intended
for large business organizations who stifled the competitive sales market.
'l'he first attempt to enforce the Sherman Act against a union came before the

.32 MUrdock, Kerr & Co. v. Walker, 152 Pat st. 595, 1~3.
My Maryland Lodge No. 186 v. Adt, 59 Atl. 721, 1905.
Meyer v. Journeymen stonecutterts Asstn., 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 1S90
Karges Furniture Coo, v. Amalgamated W. L. U. No. 131, 75 N. E.
877 (Ind.), 1905.
33 Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, lS7l.
Ertz v. Products Exohange of Minneapolis, 79 Minn. 140, 1900.
Dickson v. Dickson, 33 La. Ann. Rep. 1261, 1981.
Graham v. st. Charles Street Ry. Co., 47 La. Ann. Rep. 214, 1895
Doremus T. Hennessy, 176 III 60S, 1898.
Lowe v. California State Fed. of tabor, 139 Fed. 71, 1905.
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federal court in Boston. 34 The court deoid.a thet Congress did not intend
to suppress boycotts and strikes through the Anti-Trust law.
most famous oases, the Danbury Batters, 35

In one of the

the unanimous opinion was deliv-

ered by Chief Justice Fuller, to the effect that labor unions came within
the uurview of the Sherman .lot.

The decision has been legally analyzed many

times but the social aspeot has been often negleoted. D. E. Loewe and Company
were manufaoturers of

hat~.

The proprietor, Mr. Loewe, had risen in social

prestige from that of a wage earner to that of a small business operator,
His factory was not unionized but union men were supposedly employed on the
same basis as non-union help.
shop.

Technically, such polioy is termed an open

When the union unsuccessfully demanded a olosed shop, Loewe and

Company was boycotted and other oonoerns, beeeuse of union pressure, refused

to engage in business with Loewe's.

The Amerioan Anti-Boycott Assooiation,

organized in 1902 for the purpose of stopping the use of boyeotte, finanoed
the court expenses to bring the case before a legal tribunal. 36 After the
court held the union liable under the Sherman Anti-Trust law, Lyman Beeoher
stowe visited Danbury, Oonnectieut, and interviewed ten ot the men who were
found guilty of a restraint of trade. 37 One elderly person, whose home had

34

u.

S. v. Patterson, 55 Fed. Rep. 605, 1993.

35 Loewe v. Lawlor, 200 TJS 274, 1908.
36 The

Out1oo~,

Vol. 75, Sept., 1903, 191-193.

37 Stowe, "Paying the Penalty in Danbury", The Outlook, Vol. 110,
July 14, 1915, 616.

i"
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been attached to satisfy the judgment, could not raise sufficient funds to
send his daughter away for tubercular treatment.
the union men selected

8S

t.,rhen the sui.t was brought,

defendants vere those who owned some property and

consisted mainly of the older members who were more industrious and frugal.

It is interesting to note that the bank aocounts and prooerty of the defendants were attached for

8

period of twelve years before the final deoision was

render~d.

When Woodrow Wilson was nominated as the Democratlc candidate for
president of the UnUed states, one of his campaign pledges was to modify
the Sherman Act so that labor unions would not fall within the restraint of
trade law.

The result was the Clayton Act passed in 1914 which was hailed

by labor leaders as the emanci;::l8tion of lmions from legal shackles.

joy, however, was short-lived.

In the

OSSEl

The

of Duplex Print:fng Press Company

v. Deering, 38 the Machinists union was held to heve violated the Sherman
Anti-Trust law irrespect.ive of the Clayton Act.

The plaintiff sought

injunct:tve relief and was one of four companies manufacturing printing
nresses in direct competition with one another.

Three of these concerns had

accepted the terms proposed by the union, granting a closed shop, whereas the
plaintiff continued to operate an open shop, with the employees working longer
hours than those who had been employed in the closed union shops.

3S

254 US 443, 1921.

Because ot

the unequal oompetitive features, two of the -companies who had agreed to the
closed-shop and other union terms served notioe that the contract would be
terminated unless the plaintiff was forced to accept the same terms.

The

union called a strike against the plaintiff but only fourteen employees
heeded the call.

The union then declared a boycott in New York ctty and

customers were warned that the plaintiffs products should not be purchased,
threatened a trucking company not to haul the plaintiff's products and
notified repair companies not to repair the plaintiff's presses.

In 1914,

the plaintiff requested an injunction and was denied equitable relief by the
lower oourt and the Circuit Court of Ar,-088.ls.

These courts made a specific

finding that secondary boycotts and other labor disputes no longer came under
the Sherman Act because of Section 20 of the Clayton Act passed in 1914.
Sup~eme

The

Court reversed the decisions given by the lower courts, holding that

secondary boycotts were illegal and not protected by the Clayton Act.
Brandeis, in a

di~senting

Justice

opinion oonourred with by Justioes Holmes and

Clarke, held that the Clayton Aot was intended to aid working people by
equalizing the power between the unions and the employers.

Justice Brandeis

noted that those with a common interest can band together and refuse to
support any business whioh attacks their standard of living.

He was careful

to distinguish between illegal boycotts which were conducted against a person
and not a product and not united by a common interest but only by sympathy
and those in which all _embers of a union by whomeyer employed refuse to
handle materials which production weakens the union.
The view that the Sherman Act applied to unions irrespeotive of the
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Clayton Act continued until the Apex decision when the court held that labor
activity did not constitute a violation of the Anti-Trust law unless competition was suppressed or national markets controlled. 39 Here, the court
found that the union activity could not possibly have a SUbstantial effect
upon the entire industry.

United States v. Hutcheson also held that the

Sherman Act did not apply to uniens. 40
For purposes of organization, several union officials ordered the
use of violence against three tur-dye1ng firms whose place of business was
in New Jersey although the violence was directed against customers residing
in New York. 41 Although the union activit,. vas admittedly illegal, the
indictment under the Sherman Act was dismissed because the operators of the
New Jersey firms
effect commerce.

~id

not bave a sufficient amount of business to substantially

The government had contended that all secondary boycotts

were prohibited under the Sherman Aet and reference was made to the Danbury
Hatter and Duplex cases. Since the union ordered the use of violence, the
prosecution contended that the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts did not
apply_

However, the court rejected t?is view and followed the reasoning set

forth in the Apex Case.

Thus, there seems to be required a substantial

39 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 US 469, 1940.
40 U. S. v. Hutcheson, 312 US 219, 1941.
41 U. S. v. Gold, 11S F.(2) 236, 1940.

effect upon the market should the courts

eve~

abandon the findings in the

Apex and Hutcheson cases that unions were not intended to come within the
laws restricting trade.

The cases under Section 8 (b) (4) of the Taft·

Hartley, later reviewed, such as in the construction industry where the "de
minimis" rule has been east aside. would be contrary to the Gold case in
the consideration of federal jurisdiction.

The principal objection to deci-

sions of this type is that a judicial or administrative tribunal decides
whether there haa been an effect upon interstate commerce and such a determination is often an empirical question inYolving such variables as markets,
prices, number of competitors, average amount of business done before and
after competition, public pressure and the personal views of the judiciary.
For sake of uniformity, it appears that a more definite standard should be
created that will apnly to all labor problems.
F. state Lay
Most of the state courts prior to the Wagner Act declared that the
secondary boycott was unlawful either upon the ground that the means constituted coercion or upon the broad prinCiple that one not a party to industrial
strife cannot, against his will, be made an ally of the union for the purpoae
of destroying the primary employer. 42 The rule so enunciated vas not

1918.

42 Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389, 1908.
Haverhill Strand Theatre Inc., v. Gillen, 118 N. E. 671 (MBss),
Purvis v. Local No. 500, U. B. C. J., 63 Atl. 585 (Fa), 1906.

affected by the Clayton Act which only applied to interstate commerce.
The minority rule permitted a peaceful secondary boycott holding
that those on strike have a right to induce others to withhold their business patronage from the employer by threatening a boycott against those who
fail to do so. 43

In the Empire theatre case, the court held lawful a

publication stating that all who patronize a theatre in defiance of a boycott
would themselves be classed as unfriendly and subjected to a boycott in turn.
Most of the strikes against secondary employers have occurred in
three general types of situations.

In the first category, there are those

strikes against the UBe of non-union materials in the same or related crafts.
The great majority of the cases falling under this classification have held
that striking against "unfair" materials (not made by organized labor) by
union members in the same or related crafts are contrary to law. 44 These

43 Empire Theatre Co. v. Cloke, 163 Pac. 107 (Montana), 1917.
Lindsay &: Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, 96 'ac. 127
(Montana), 1908.
44 Anderson &: Lind Mfg. Co. v. The Carpenters District Council,
1923.
Mears Slayton Lumber Co. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenter Ie
Joiners Union, 156 Ill. App. 327, 1910.
Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 157 N. E. 82 (Mass), 1927.
Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 114 S. W. 997 (Mo.), 1908.
Booth Ie Bros. v. Burgess, 65 At1. 226 (N. J.), 1906.
Purvis v. Local No. 500, U. B. C. J., 63 Atl. 585 CPa), 1906.
Pacific Typesetting Co. v. International Typographieal Union,
216 Pac. 358 (Wash), 1923.
Huttig Sash &: Door Co. v. Fuelle, 143 Fed. 363, 1006.
Shine v. Fox Bros. fd.fg. Co., 156 Fed. 357, 1907.
Irving v. Joint District Council, 180 Fed. 896, 1910.

30B Ill.

48~,
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courts have concluded that the strike sunposedly called against non-union
material was rather a strike against a neutral who wes only remotely connected with the controversy.

It should be noted that the primary employer, more

often than not, brought suit - the neutral seldom comnlained.

There are a

few jurisdictions which have classified such secondary pressure as being
legelly permis8sble recognizing the close aconomic relationship and unity of
interest between members in the same or related crafts. 45
Another classification concerns strikes against an intermediate
emnloyer because of the presence of a non-union contractor on the site.

To-·

day, with industrial unions, there is a right to strike regardless of the
occunatlon because all employees belong to the same union.

But where member-

shin is on a craft basis, such as in the construction trades, most of the
courts permitted such strikes. 46

There are, as usual, opinions to the con-

trary. 47 The New York Courts have been the leaders in permitting cooperative

45 Meier v. Speer, 132 S. W. 9S9 (Ark), 1910.
Parkinson v. Building Trades Council of Santa Clara County, 154
Cal. 581, 1900.
state v. Van Pelt, 136 N. C. 633, 1904.

46 Grant Construction Co. v. st. Paul Building Trades Council, 161
520 (Minn), 1917.
Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayer's rrnion, 101 ATL 659
(Conn), 1917.
Jett.on-Delke Lumber Co. v. Mather, 43 so. 590 (Fla), 1907.
Seymour-Ruff & Sons, Inc. v. Bricklayer's TJnion No. 41, 164 Atl.
752 (Md.), 1933.
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 (F) (2) 2S4, 1934.
N.

w.

47 Lehigh structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic Smelting & Refining
Works, 111 Atl. 376 (N. J.), 1920.
Snow Iron Works v. Chadwick, 116 N. E. SOl (Mass), 1917.
19S (
R. R. Kitchen & CQ.v. Local Union No. 141, I.B.E.W., 112 S. E.
W.Va.),1922.
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activity amongst trade unions in closely allied crafts.

For exemp1e, in

Willson and Adams Company v. Pearce, the building trades unions joined the
teamsters in refusing to work on materials transported to the job by nonunion teamsters. 4~
loadin~

in the

The

8~pply

court, by sanctioning the strike, held that the

yard and the unloading at the point where the building

was being constructed was a

ne~e8sary

pert of the construction work.

The third category of strikes are those against a secondary
emnloyer by union members in unrelated crafts.

Here, there is almost unan-

imous opinion that such strikes are contrary to law and good policy.

In the

Auburn case, 49 the Teall.sters had placed the plaintiff on an "unfair list"
when it had refused to agree to a closed shop.

The customers reached as

secondary aids were such diverse groups as packers, butchers, ice dealers,
plumbers, etc.

The court held that a united front of unrelated unions will

not be tolerated, the mere advantage to all of unionism was not a sufficient
relationship.

However, if there are direct dealings with the employees of

the unfair manufacturer or contractor, boycott is pertdssable.
With respect to secondary picketing, labor unions in the past,
engaged in controversies with the primary employer, have found it necessary

to secure public support and extend activities beyond the premises of the
employer.

The innumerable legel problems which stem from the racognition of

48 191 N. E. 545 reNe Y.), 1934.
49 Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 124 N. E. 97 (N. Y.), 1919.

labors right to strike and bargain collectivefl.y has caused legal conft'lsion
and many social problems. When labor has the right to strike, it follows
that labor may picket to publicize its noint of view and gain popular support
for the end result contemplated.

But with the right to picket, such con-

troversial questions have arisen as against whom may the picketing be
directed, what Is the area protected by the constitutional guarantee of free
speech, and what are the rights of third parties?

Thus, unions, especially

in New York state, have picketed retailers who have no other interest in
the dispute than the selling, amongst other products, those items produced
by

the urimary employer.

Often, the picketing will be directed against e.

neutral employer without calling a strike at the plant of the primary
employer and the New York courts have sanctioned such picketing. 50 In
Bossert v. Dhuy, 51 two e~loyers doing business with one another in the same
industry, found the union employees of one employer refUSing to handle the
goods nroduced by the non-union shop.

The refusal to work did not extend to

the employer of the unionized shop but only to the non-union product.

The

court held that under the circumstances, the refusal to handle tee non-union
material

\0188

not directed against the neutral employer but at the specific

product and, therefore, permisssble.

In another case, there was a cessation

of business doalings between the primary and secondary employers i.n which the

50 Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 157 N. E. 130 (N. I.), 1927.
51 117 N. E. 582 (N. Y.), 1917.
'I

il
,~

union activity was not limited to the product of the primary emn10yer but the
picketing extended to all of the neutrals business. 52 The oourt enjoined
the picketing, stating that the action was secondary.

These two C8ses would

seem to illustrate the general rule in New York that if picketing and other
methods of union pressure is limited to the product of the primary employer,
then suoh pressure is legally condoned.

If the secondary employer is

picketed o~therwise harrassed by union nressure without specific 1L~itation
to the produot of the nrimary emn1oyer, then the action taken is secondary
and not permissable.

In the case of Commeroial Window Cleaning Company v. Awerkin, 53
the union nicketed various theatres whioh had entered into a contraot to use
the plaintiff's window cleaning servioes.

The court enjoined the pioketing

becBuse it 'Was secondary and the adverse publicity might result in forcing
the theatres to break a oontract with the plaintiff.

In Stuhmer v. Korman, 54

the union picketed with the placerds carried omitting the name of the secondary employer.

The union had attempted to induce the neutral dealer to stop

purchasing bread made at the boycotted bakery and appealed to the public for
support by nosting pickets 1.n front of the non-complying stores.
in several earlier cases had held that

~icketing

The decision

the produots of an unfair

52 Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 1'4 N. E. 947 (N. Y.), 1919.
53 240 N. Y. 797, 1930.
54 193 N. E. 281 (N. Y.), 1934.

emnloyer

W89

nermissable when the placards m&rely extol the merits of union-

made goods and ask patrons to look for the union label and avoid the nurchaee
of non-union products. 55 '!'he stuhmer csse d1dn(t fall witMn the category
of nerm1ssab1e picketing beoause the street meetings and union attitude,
contended the

C01~t,

indicated that the whole proceeding vas not directed at

the nrimary employer but rather
ee~es,

56

a~8inst

the neutral stores.

In the Blumenthal

the court found that the union activity vas direoted against the

nroduct and not the dealer against whom the union had picketed.

Since the

union has the right to nersuade the dealer to discontinue relations with the
primary employer, said the court, then there 1s no reason why peaceful
pi~ketlng

should be enjoined since the union is merely

usin~

means to persuade

prospective customers and generally that is the only effective means available

to the union.
In the finel 8Mlysis, both the employer and the union must turn
for support to the public and specifically the consumer of the produot in-

volved in the dispute.

Therefore, if picketing is to be successful, it must

be 8np1ted at the critical point, the place of sale.

But when the nicketinO'
~

1s turned so as to cause havoc aga.inst one with whom the union has no just
dispute, then the aetion is unnecessary and l"hould be restrained.

55

Publie Baking Co. v. stern, 215 N. Y. Supp. 537, 1926.
Englemeyer v. Simon, 265 N. Y. Supp. 636, 1933.

56 Blumenthal v. Fe1ntuch, 273 N. Y. Supp. 660, 1934.
Blumenthal v. We:ikman, 277 N. Y. Sum>.

~5,

1934.
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A novel and interesting situation

wes

presented in the now famous

case of Goldfinger v. Feintuoh. 57 The union had not been sucoessful in
organizing the poorly paid workers of a New York concern manufacturing the
~~~orn

meat products.

The union began to picket the retail distributor of

these nroducts, the banners only referring to the tlUkor" products.

The

manufncturer had attempted to get a restraining order but the oourt denied
equitable relief.
sought

an

The osse arose when Goldfinger, a retail distributor,

injunction.

The Court of Appeals of

New

York held in favor of the

union stating that:
Within t~e limits of peaoeful ?icketing ••• pioketing may be carried
on not only against the manufacturer but against a non-union
produot sold by one in unity of interest 'With the manufacturer who
is in the saMe business for profit. Where a manufacturer nays
less th8n union wages both it ilind the retailers 'Who sell its produots are in a position to undersell oomuetltors and this may
result in an tmfair reduotion of the wages of union members. Where
the manufacturer disposes of the produot through retailers in unity
of interest with it, unless the union may follow the product to the
place where it is sold and oeacefully ask the public to refrain
from purchasing it, the union ",ould be deurived of a fair and
proper means of hri.nging its plea to the attention of the public.
Here, the boyoott ",as held to be allowable a8 only the "Ulcor" meats was
."laced on the "unfairlt advertisements.

Although it

\ISs

admitted thFt the

nieketing would injure other parts of the retailers business, the boycott
itself was not extended to the entire business of the nlaintiff and that was
• risk that he took.

57 276 N. Y.

2~1,

1937.

'!'he law of Nev York appears to allow the use of banners carried bT
oickets it merely directed against the unfair product; but if the retaUer
himself is called untair, then the courts have enjoined the picketing.
As previously noted, IIOst jurisdictions are contrary and lIOuld call
the picketing ot a retailer with whom there was no dispute an enjotnable
secondary action, inespaetb'e of what vas said upon the banners carried by
the pickets.

In addition, Nev York is one of the fev states in which the

"unity of interest" test has been applied.

the only other states which have

paid "lip service" to the viev as expressed by the Hew York Court ot Appeals
were nlinois, 58 Louisiana, 59 and Pennsylvania. 60 However, the California
courts have taken a DlOst liberal attitude in the use of the boycott.
early 08se, the plaintiff operated
mill. 61

8

In an

hardware store and a building materials

the unions, because of labor difficulty, boycotted the mill and

hardware store.

the court held tbs. t the refusal to use the pla intiff' 8 build-

ing _teria1s, though already contracted for, was lawful.
the California Superior Court permitted the csrrying

In a later case,

ot banners by 'Piokets

I
,III
I'"

Ii

I
II

58 Wagner v. Milk 'Wagon Driver's Union, Local 753,50 N. E. (2)
865, 1943.
59 Johnson v. Milk Drivers
195 So. 791 (ta.), 1940.

& Dairy Employees Union, Local Ho. 854,

60 Alliance Auto Servioe v. Cohen, 19 At1. (2) 152, (Penn.), 1941.
61 Parkinson Co.
154 Cal. 5S1, 1908.

Y.

Building '1'l"ade. COWlell of Santa Clara County,
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whioh oa11ed the distributor "unfair." 62 The oourt pointed out that a
retailer could not be an innooent third party because through the purchase
of DOn-union goods, he was placed at a oompetitive advantage.
wasn't helpless in a situation such

8S

The retailer

indicated since he could merely

refuse to handle the disputed product.
Even though the New York courts have been liberal in their interpretation of a secondary labor dispute, there is often criticisM in light ot
stare deoisis.

In the case ot stubmer v. Korman, previously reviewed, 1500

bakeries had been selling "unfair" bread.
with the International Union Label."

The banner stated, "Demand Bread

The Court granted an injunction stoppin

the Dickating because ot coeroion and the overall intent appeared to be the
destruction of the plaintiff's business.

This decision appears to be con-

trary to New York law as the coercion was not violent or fraudulent and the
banner merely requested the plaintiff's customers to purchase bread carrJing
a union label.

The sole purpose of the picketing was to organize the non-

union bakeries about the city of New York which is a legitimate purpose.
In People v. Mueller, the Electrical Worker's Union Local Number 3,
was involved in a labor dispute with a firm specializing in the installation
of burglar alarm systems. 63

The complainant operated a retail men's turnish-

62 Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 106 Pac. (2) 411 (Cal), 1940.

63

36 N. F.. (2) 206 (N. Y.), 1941.

ing store and leased the alarm system from the firm with which the union ws
hSving labor difficulty_

The union picketed the haberdashery shop and in a

four to three decision, the court held that there ws a legitinBte labor
disoute and the picketing ws not secondary.

The issue was whether a retail-

er who lesses a burglary alarm system from a manufacturer becomes a perty in
interest to the labor dispute?

The court found the necessary nunity of

interest" because of the maintenance cont.ract between the store keeper and
the manufaoturer.

The court found that the system had always been serviced

by union help and peaceful picketing was guaranteed by the constitution

regardless of the degree of intereat of the secondary party being picketed.
It must be admitted that the New York court was gOing .fer to find a "unity
of interest."
In a sailer oase, there was a sale plus a servicing agreement of
8

non-union t>roduot.

64

The court did not find the necessary dunity of

interest" and differentiated this case from the Mueller decision beoause there
the atan system vas only leased whereas in the present case the "unfair"
~roduct

was Bold outright.

It appears that the pBssage of title 1s sufficient

to take away any claim of "unity of interest" between the primary end neutral
ellployers though services r.re subsequently performed by the primary elll'ployer
tor the disinterested party_

64

People v. Bellows, 22 N. E. (2) 238 (N.

I.), 1939.

In a more recent case, the union concerned, during the year 1933,
wss nermanently enjoined from picketing the customers of a firm which operated a non-union window cleaning service. 65 Fourteen years leter, the
union sought to have the injunction vacated because the law of picketing had
changed.

The New York Court of Appeals dissolved the order quoting the

eases of Goldfinger v. Feintuch and People v. Mueller, indicating that it
would enlerge the area of picketing when there was evidence disclosing that
the picketing of the primary employer at his place of business was ineffective
This case extended the principle to include third persons who are more
loosely connected with the primary employer than found in most of the "unity
of interest" cases because the original theory required that the two
be in the same line of business.

~rties

There seems to be little if any common

bond between a window washing concern and a building under contract that needs
its windows va shed.
Although most writers have given credit for the development of the
"unity of interest" doctrine to the state of New York, the expression had
been used by Mr'. Justice Brandeis in the Duplex Printing Company decision
concerning the anti-trust law.

The difficulty with the theory 1s defining

the area of union activity and applying the doctrine to a given set cf facts.
It is obvious that many different conclusions can be reached.

65 Enterprise Window Cleaning Co. v. Slovsta, 86 N. E. (2) 750
(H. Y.), 1949.
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A new view has been presented by the

Califo~nia

Courts which may

snread to other jurisdiotions and tends to show the regressive attitude in
courts ooncerning the use of secondary boycotts since World War II. 66 The
plai.ntiff Ws a railroad and engaged in hauling lumber and logs for various
mills.

The court upheld the issuance of an injunction when the union picket-

ed the railroad many miles 8Wy from the lumber mills with whom the union
had 8 labor dispute.

This oase is interesting because it was the first time

that a California court recognized the rights of the general public as a
narty in interest when a union uses the secondary boycott.

It should be

emphasized again that California has always been extremely liberal 1n its
attitude toward the use ot secondary boycotts.
the faot that unions are

cu~ently

The regre!sion may be due to

strong enough without such a tactic and

may be a view that will be nationally accepted one day.

66 Northwestern Paoifio Railroad Co. v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers
Union, 1$9 Pac. (2) 277 (Cal), 1948.
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CHAP1':'Im IV

A SOCIAL ANALYSIS

or

LEGISLATION TO THE WAGNER ACT

A review i8 necessary setting forth the course ot modern labor hiatory trom the beginning of the twentieth century and the philosoph7 behind
the new legislation due to changes in the economy.

At the turn ot the

twentieth century, many employers became alarmed at the increasing strength
of the labor movement.

Such emoloyer's organi?8tlons as the National Aasoc-

ietion ot Manufacturers, the National Metal Trades Association and the
American Anti-Bo.ycott Association spearheaded drives to maintain open shops,
blacklists, assisted employers engaged in industrial disputes and opoosed
legislation soonsored by labor.

Public opinion wae successfully molded agains,",

the union movement, as was the present day attitude.

Under such pressure, one

cen rationalize decisions exemplified by the Danbury Hatter's ease. With
World War I, conditions became tRvorable to the growth of unions and the
membership increafled rapidly.

tabor had agreed not to use strikes and boy-

cotts and the wedding was conroleted when employers permitted union organization and collective bargaining.
at a historical peak.

Following World War I, union membership was

However, the rising coat ot living, lagging wage rates,

a tendency of some employers to withdraw their recognition of unions end the
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general reconversion from a wartime to
rest.

11

peaoetime economy caused social un-

There was a changed public attitude toward the unions, related in

pert to the fear of communism from 1919 to 1921. 1 By 1923, union membership
had dropped due to such factors as technological improvements, the growth ot
!DB!!S

production and giant corporations, an increase in real wages and the

velfare nrograms conducted by cap1 tal.

The courts, and in perticular the

injunction iesued by them, accelerated the union disintegration.
NeverthelesB, there was one industry in which the unione were aid.ed
and abetted by the federal government.

In 1926, the Railway Labor Act, due

to the political power of railway unions in the vest and the cooperation of
the

railroad industry,

was

made the law of the land and emphasized collective

bargaining without governmental regalation. 2 The law encouraged colleetive
bargaining, union organization and protected union members, being the forerunner of Section 7 <a' of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the
Wagner Act.
The Great Depression started in 1929 and unemployment grew.
employed vere i.nsecure
result, there
system.

wae a

and

there

widesnread

was

lo~s

a declining standard ot living.

Those
As 8

of confidence in the free enterprise

Many experts felt that an increase was necessary in consumer ourc!1as-

ing nower before increased production and employment could be sustained.

1

Millis & Montgomery, Organized Labgr, Vol. III, 140-149.

2 44

u.

S.

stat.

577.

It
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sO, then unions had to be supported and collective bargaining promoted to
equalize the power attained by large corporations.

Thus, a new governmental

policy was incorporated whereby the use of the labor injunction was restricted, 'Positive rights of organization were granted, collective bargaining was
promoted, which, finally, resulted in a great increase in union membership.
The depression led Congress to pass the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act
in 1932.' For the first time there was a federsl labor policy which permitted full freedom of association for workers and freedom from interference
when organizing.
issue injunctions.

The Aot severely limited the power of federal courts to
A labor dispute was broadly defined thus, in effect,

permitting strikes, boycotts and picketing; safeguards were provided limiting
the issuance ot temporary restraining orders; union liabUity for damages
was limited; and "yellow-dog" contracts were no longer enforceable.

The

Norris-LaGuardia Act became necessary because the substantive law, initially
provided by the Sherman Anti-Trust laW', had not been changed by the Clayton
Act of 1914.

The previous restrictions plaoed upon boycotting activities was

removed as enunciated in Section 4.

Section 13 def:1.ned a labor dispute in

broad language so that the use of the labor injunction was prectically at an
end.

By 1943, many states had anti-injunction laws oosed upon the Norris-

LaGuardia Act including Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,

3 47 U. S. Stat. 70.
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utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. 4
The secondary boycott was no longer subject to injunctive procedure
in most of the heavy industrial states.

Among the reasons advanced for per-

mitting the secondar,r boycott were:
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

s.

The well-being of society depended upon the economic condition
of the working class and consequently labor must be given every
available means to achieve success.
The good accomplished outweighed the evil effect.
Restricting the us. ot the boycott would only cause its continuanee in defiance of the lav when there wa III a real need. As an
example, prohibition did not stop drinking and greater social
problems arose.
Prohibiting boycotts, when peacefully conducted, deprived labor
of a human right guaranteed by the constitution.
The union is generally at a disadvantage should it call a strike
beasuse men are easy to replace, unfavorable publicity, 108s of
wages by union members, etc.
The em,loyer used suah weapons as labor spies, blacklists, lockouts, and other devices so that labor was in need of s strong
counter weapon.
Many enrployer's associations such as f.M National Association
of Manufacturers, whose 80le purpose was to stop the growth of
unions, were financially powerful in waging educative programs
and legislative campaigns so that the secondary boycott became
a necessity as a counter measure.
~ny of the so-called neutral employers were directly int.ereeted in the primary dispute when contracts were sublet b.Y a
primary employer during e strike.

Many felt that the use of the secondary boycott

~hould

be permitted, among

them being Professor Commons, a foremost authority from the University of
Wisconsin. 5 However, much of the case presented in favor of the boycott as

4 Millis & Montgomery, OrR!!nized tabor, Vol. III, 593.

5

~,596.

indicated above, was questionable.

The blacklist vas a weapon which had been

discarded by management, secondary boycotts received a8 much or more unfavarable publicity than a strikeJ it not used conservatively, the secondary
boycott would hinder collective bargaining; and the public would sutfer in
_ny instances.
The decisions rendered under the Norris-LaGuardia Act with respect
to the permissability of the secondary bo1Qott are in conflict. The majority
held that secondary boycotts came within the meaning of a "labor dispute tt6
although others held that such action did not constitute a "labor dispute"
so that injunctive relief vas permitted. 7 When the United States Supreme
Court decisions interpreted the law, it became clear that labor vas finally
treed trom lIl8D7 restrictions placed upon them b,y the older legal interpreta-

6 Taxi Drivers Local Union Bo. 889 v. Yellow Cab Operating Co.,
123 Fed. (2) 262, 1941.
InterDStional Ass'n. of Bridge Workers v. Pauly Jail Building
Co., 29 F. Supp. 15, 1939.
Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F. (2) 948, 1939.
Cole v. Atlanta Terminal Co., 15 F. Supp_ 131, 1936.
United Packing House Workers Union v. Wilson & Co., 80 F. Supp.
563, 1945.
!mal. Ass. ot street etc. Railway EMployees v. Dixie Motor Coach
Corp., 170 F. (2) 902, 1948.
7 Fehr Baking Co. v. Baker's Union et aI, 20 F. Supp. 691, 1937.
Gomez v. Ottice Workers Union, 73 F. Supp. 679, 1947.
Communication Workers of America v. Mountain state Tel & Tel Co.,
81 F. Supp. 397, 1948.
Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 90 F. Supp. 640, 1950.
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tions such as round under the anti-trust laws and statutes. S
One test applied to determine whether an injunction should be
granted by the court was whether there was

fA

"labor dispute".

In Bakery

Sales Drivers Union v. Wagshall, the court found that the picketing was being
carried on to force a restaurant owner to pay a debt which, it was clalmed,
bBd already been paid. 9

It appears that a bakery had requested to change

the time of deli'9'ery of bread trom the lunch hour ot most employed people to
8

more suitable time.

Because of the inability to oomply with the request,

deliveries were stopped.

The union's agent then visited the proprietor and

demanded payment for the bakery goods already delivered.

The bill had been

paid directly to the bakery concern and payment to the business agent vas
refused.

The court said that there was not a "labor dispute" and issued an

injunction.

In another case, a union whose members were on strike in New

York cit,., against the operator of a dance hall, picketed the dance studio
opersted by the plaintiff in Wsshington, D.C., to facilitate matters. 10 The
court held that there was no labor dispute because the only connection between
the washington studio and the New York employer was that they vere both

8

91, 1940.

taut v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 US 323, 1937.
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 311 US

9 333 US 437, 1948.

1947.

10 Gomez v. United Office

& Professional Workers, 73 F. Supp. 679,

.
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operated under the 88me name by' a different partY' and there was no affiliation betveen the tvo except that the right to operate the studio was given
by the Nev York proprietor to the nlaintiff.

The court held that the Norris-

LaGuardia Act did not apply because there wasn't a "labor dispute" and the
court could issue sn injunction.
The "unity of interest" theory, already discussed, is also important when requesting an injunction.
there i8
secured.

If there is a "unity of interest", then

"labor dispute" and neither an injunction nor damages can be

8

If the court does not find a "unity of interest", then injunctive

relief is in odder.
Another criteria apnlied is whether the means used cannot be condoned.

Generally, the courts viII enjoin secondary picketing vhen violence

is used. 11

After the election of 1932 upon a national level, a new philosophy
was

presented wherein labor attained great favor.

The National Industrial

Recovery Act became the law in 1933 and agreements were permitted between
emoloyers to promote the public welfare

80

that the protection of organized

labor became a necessary corollar,.. 12 Thus, Rl8D7 ot the heavy industries

11 Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 763 v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, 312 us ~7, 1941.
12 48

u. s.

Stat. 195.

were organized, a heretofore unknown phenomerl1!l.

On the other hand, many

company unions were organized, believed permissab1e under Seotion 7 (8) b.r
exPerts in the field. 13 A Nations1 I.abor Board was established to settle
disnutes and eventually assumed the quasi-judioia1 function of interpreting
section 7 (a).

The Board experienced great difficulty beoause it had no

means of obtaining comp1ianoe with an order exoept to remove the Blue Eagle.
Public Resolution Number 44 allowed the President to establish boards to
investigate any controversy arising under Section 7 (8) which obstruoted
interstate commerce.

Thereafter, a National Labor Relations Board was estab-

lished oonsisting or three full-time members.

In 1935, the NRA was deolared

unconstitutional because of en unlawful delegation of legislative powers to
an administrative board. 14 Then, the National Labor Relations Aot became
the lew of the land. 15 Although the National Association of Manufacturers
vas extremely active in promoting opposition to the Wagner Act, there was

surprisingly little controversy in Congress, undoubtedly due to the gravity
of the economio situation and the uncertainty accentuated by the unoonstitutione1ity of the

NRA.

Prior to the passage of the bUl, Senator wagner

had

testified that it was necesssry to include all persons in the definition of a

13 Millis-Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley, Chioago, 1950
22.

14 Scheohter Poultry Co. v. U.
15 49 U.

s.

Stat. 449.

s.,

295 US 495, 1935.

labor dispute, regardless of whether the participants stood in the proximate
relationship of employer and employee. 16 Section 2 (9) of this Act incorporated this attitude stating:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controverg,y concerning
terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
One of the most important results of the Wagner Act was the effect
upon state labor legislation, the federal laws almost always seem.ing to set
the fashion for the states. A few

·Ba~

Wagner Acts followed the federal

legislation and guaranteed employees the right to organize and bargain collee
tively_

And with the legislation ce.. a shift in previous legal philosoph)"

and early statutory thought concerning boycott activity. What should be
emphasized is that most of the comprehensive laws shifted the initial determination in a labor dispute from a court and were now under the control of
administrative agencies which had been created and assigned specialized duties
in the field of labor. 17 As previously noted, courts of law, often formalistic and with little knowledge of labor history, caused difficulty in promoting industrial -peace and collective bargaining.

1827.

To have experts, chosen

16 Legislative History of NatioD!l Labor Relations Act, II, 1935,

17 Harry A. Millis &: Harold A. Katz, ttA Decade of State Labor
Legislation, 1937-1947", University or Chicsm Lay Reviey, xv, 1947-1948, 282.

so
for merit in the field of labor law and relations, is a great improvement.
It would be naive to assume that only the most qualified vere chosen to man
the boards as most are political appointees and "to the victor belongs the
spoils" still

8p~lies.

But at least, the basic thought was there and many

excellent boards funotioned, such as in the State ot New York.
With the advent ot World War II,

mBrly

states began prograq design-

ed to regulate union activity. What is surprising is that most ot the
regressive regulatory programs were not found in the east and middle west,
where industry is heavily concentrated, but in the so-called non-industrial
areas of the United states.

Undeniably, the reason for such seemingly unnec-

.ssary legislation was that if unions could be kept out, industry would be
attracted to such areas.

The history of the organization of the Textile

Workers Union is filled with the movement of industry from the east to the
southern geographio portion of the United states and the subsequent inevitable
organizational drives. Farmers and business men can generall;y be expected to
join the anti-union drives causing considerable labor difficulty 1n areas
that are now inviting industr,.. A review will be made of state attitudes as
expressed by legislation in the following chapter, concerning the effect of
World War II end the Taft-Hartley.

•

CHAPTER V

THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
A, DIlOuB.iops in tne United State. Congre.,
The testimony presented prior to the 1947 amendments to the Wagner
Act was voluminous, repetitiye, sometimes prejudiced and unnecessary.

By

noting the name of the person presenting evidence or the organization which
he represented, one could be positive without reading the testimony as to
whether he was for or against the proposed secondary boycott provisions.
Although such biased testimony is definitely desirable, the complete lack of
opinion by impartial observors vas evident with the exception of Mr. Ludwig
Teller, a labor expert trom. the city of New York.

The cost of preparing

labor legislation is enormous and the consequences are graye.

Yet, little or

no attemnt was made to get the opd.nions of persons who could be classified as
exnerts.

For exsllple, when Mr. Green of the AFT... or Ph!lip Murray of the CIO

testified, both now deceased, one can be assured that the serious consequence.
and the use of the secondary boycott will be

minimi~ed.

When representative,

of employers' appear, by the same token, one can be certain that the abuse by
labor in using the secondary boycott will be overemphasized.

But the so-

ealled expert and impartial witness, with a knowledge and understanding of
labor law and labor economics, was m.issing.

Sl

:11

Iii'

illl

I,

I~

Iii
illl

li"

II'

I

As previously noted, the evidence and testDaony was lengthy and
often without purpose.

To grant equal weight to the claiJDs of both labor and

management, the highlights of the material will be presented and classified
in accordance with the views expressed by management, unions, public officials

and the lonely Mr. Teller.
1t

Abuses Noted

by

1t!lnagement

Robert S. Edwards, President of the National Electrical ManufacturerIe Association, testified of instances of abuse in the use of the secondary
boycott prevalent in the construction trades and associated industries. 1
The AFt International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, New York, completely
controls the labor market in the installation of electrical equipment of all
types.

The union had refused to install e1ectrioa1 gadgets unless they were

manufactured by the I. B. E. W. members in the manufacturing plants.

Upon

occasion should the employees of the manufacturer choose to affiliate with a
union other than the I. B. E. W., the market was taken away from the employer
though the latter had nothing to do with the choice of his employees.

Mr.

Edwards felt that the use of the boycott, in moat instances, was for jurisdictional purposes
drives.

8S

the CIO and .AFt were engaged in cOJll1)8titive membership

The objective of these boycotts were illegitimate, Mr. Edwards said,

1 "Hearings Before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare", U.
§!nate, 80th Congress, First Session on S. 55 and S. J. R. 22, 176-204.

s.

8S

the purpose did not affect hours, wages and working conditions •. Mr.

Edwards further noted that the CIC was actively engaged in an organi7Btional
drive during the year 1934 and Local Number 3 of the I. B. E. W. in New York
City wanted to chenge

affi~iation.

Manufacturers in New York city were told

to influence their employees to remain affiliated with the AFt.

(This

evidence, incidentally, appears to be erroneous as the CIC was not officially
organized in 1934.) Another example was the products manufactured by the
General Electric Company and Westinghouse concern as their equipment could
not be installed in New York because the employees were members of a CIC
union.
Some of the information given concerned the Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Company in Chicago whose employees voted for CIO representation.
This concern sells lighting fixtures throughout the United States and the
I. B. E.

w.

threatened a nationwide boycott on the products made by the

Benjamin Company unless they agreed to have their fixtures wired by an electrical contractor (generally, wiring ie done by the manufacturer) who employed
I. B. E. W. labor.

For a time, the company complied with the union order.

However, the electrical contractor designated to do the wiring by Benjamin
could not meet production quotas and a request was made by Benjamin for permission to do some of the wiring at his factory.

The I. B. E. W. refused.

As a result, the company lost many orders and revenue when it notified dealers

throughout the country that fixtures could not be supplied with I. B. E. W.
labels.

..
84
Mr. Edwards contended that such boycotts (really jurisdictional

disputes) make for higher prices, emnloy~es lose their right to choose a
representative for collective bargaining purposes, men are laid off because
orders cannot be filled containing certain union labels, and the manufacturer, though complying with the provisions of the Wagner Act, looses business
because of the inter-uniol'l squabbles.
Senator Pepper, in questioning Mr. Edwards, asked if the eleotrical
manufaoturers themselves did not ohannel nroduots through certa in wholesale
distributors, thus oreating a monopoly.
Mr. Edwards.

A definite answer was not given by

Sell8tor Pepper mentioned that the electrical manufacturers were

also found guilty of violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in the case of
Allen-Bradley v. Local Union No.3. 2

The ex-eongressional representative

trom Florida then asked if the abuses l'lOinted out by Mr. Edwards could not be
corrected b,y strengthening the anti-trust laws since union monopoly is often
due to industrial monopoly.

In the Allen-Bradley oase, the United states

Supreme Court found that both the
to restrain trade.

manur~oturers

and the unions had oons.,,1red

The court f'urther said that had the union acted alone, the

Sherman Aot would not have been violated under the Clayton and Norr1sLaGuardia provisions.

Mr. Edwards was not briefed on a proper reply to

Senator Pepper's query.
statements were presented by Roland Rice and Sen R. Miller of the

2 32S US 797, 1945.

-
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American Trucking Association .3 to the effect that secondary boycotts should
M outlawed because of the damage done to innocent th:1.rd perties and the pub-

He.

Because of the strategic position of the trucking industry, an "unfair"

ban can be placed upon any employer and the truckers union will not nermit

the delivery of materials or merchandise to the secondary employer.

The

point was made that if an employer is prohibited by law from compelling his
employees to join a union, then, b.Y the same token, the unions should be
orohibited from trying to force him into an illegal aot.

It also appeared

that the trucking unions had notified emp1a,rers with whom they have contracts
that they no longer will interchange bUsiness with other freight lines whose
employees were not unionized.

When the Machinist's union left the AFt, the

Teamster's had attempted to organize their members which added to the strife.
John R. Van Arnum., Seeretary, National League of Wholesale Fruit
and Vegetable Distributors, Washington, D.C., stated that the Joint Council

of Teamsters, No. 40, and the COlBlllission House end Produce Drivers, Local 944,
of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, undertook to organize all people buying and
delivering though they were self-employed with no employees (street peddlars). 4 Theae unions had a contraot with the fresh fruit industry wherein
the former had agreed to allow the delivery of fresh fruits and vegetables •

.3 ·Hearings Before CODmlittee on Labor and Public Welfare·,
Senate, JS.3-.3S9.

4

n14"

494-497.

Us

g,

They violated the agreement and boycotted all: members to the contract in
their organizational efforts.

Supl)Ort vas obtained from the other locals in

the city so that the unloading and handling of perishable items which were
struck in Pittsburgh were reconsigned to dealers in other cities such as
Philadelphia and CincilU18ti.
In Indianapolis, Indians, the teamsters local Number 23.3, AFt, had
undertaken to organize the truck drivers, helpers and other employees of
wholesale produce dealerse

Because not more than twenty-five percent of the

emolo.yees concerned belonged to the union, employees were ordered not to load
or unload any merch.indlse to or trom Indianapolis.
Local 929, AFt, Teamsters, Philadelphia, demanded certain conditiona before signing

8

contract with jobbers in the produce market.

To exert

pressure so that the union demands were met, car lot receivers on the rsilroad lines were beycotted when refrigerator cars were not unloaded, even
though they were not a perty to the dispute.
Because of the perishable quality of foods not canned or frozen,
labors most effective weapon to gain its demands is the boycott, especially
when the transportation is controlled.
In Kaness City, milk producers had been sending their product te
market b,y contracts with independent haulers. 5 Some of the truckers were

-

5 lh!d., 1644-1647. statement by Charles Holman, Secretary, National Coouerative Milk Produoers Association.

also milk produoers, picking un milk belonging to their neighbors.

Local

207, TeaMsters, Aft, Kansas, undertook to organize these truckers.

To aid

the union drive, employees of dairy companies were instructed to refuse te
unload milk brought in by inde'!)endent truekers.

The result was a great milk

spoilage because the independents had to retlll'n the milk to the .farms,
causing great loss.

Thus, the losers were milk producers, with ,,,hom the

union had no dispute.
The Walker-Gordon Company, New Jersey, produoed and bottled oertified milk commonly prescribed
invalids.

~

physic tans for infant feeding formulas and

The Teamsters, Local 680, requested that the o01lpany make the

union bargaining representative tor the men emoloyed on the farm.
pany refused to eomnly with the union demand because of
of the law.

8

The com-

possible violation

In retaliation, the unions in distributing plants refused to

handle the milk processed b.y the Walker-Gordon Company and drivers of trucks
were not a lloved to haul the

It

contra band" •

Fentries Hill, President of the Northern Redwood Lumber

Co~ny,

Korbel, California, told of 'Oicketing in California, hundreds of miles from
the scene of a strike, those projects using redvood lumber because of dis-

obeying a boycott against the products of the struck plantse 6 Supposedly
eighty pereent of all carpenters in the United states, belonging to the
Carpenter Brotherhood, AFL, had agreed not to use wood cut b.r concerns whose

6 lhW"

Ins.

.. gg

employees were not members ot the Brotherhood.
A written document was made a part ot the record, submitted by
Charles Wilson, President, at that time, ot the General MOtors Corporation. 7
The essence thereot was that secondary boycotts should be prohibited because
tree enterprise was hampered.
The Chamber ot Commerce ot the United states S and Harold stassen,
former governor of Minnesota, oollege

~resident

and currently on the exeou-

tive staft of President Eisenhower, 9 contended that jurisdictional disputes
should be outlawed as should the picketing of innocent third persons.
Ira MOsher of the Executive Committee ot the National Association

of Manufacturers emphasized the taot that seoondary boycotts destroy collective bargaining and are partioularly harmful to smaller companies.

When

secondary bo)rcotts are oombined with tndustry-wlde barge ining and closed
shops, a few men and unions have the power to '01&y havoo with the entire
nation. 10 The general counsel tor the N. A. M., in a prepared dooument,
alleged that unions justify the use of secondary boyootts as a means ot quarantining substandard labor oonditions.

However, the unions then beoome the

judge of what substandard oonditions are and oonsequently seoondary boyootts

7

Ibid., 485-486.

8 l!!£., 538·540.
9 Ibid., 568-569.
10 .ill£., 935-936.

should be made il1elB1. 11
2,

Labors Position

The following contains the evidence submitted b.Y unions, their
leaders and attorneys to substantiate the contention that the secondary ba.ycott was necessary to American unions and were not harmful to the national
economy.

G. L. Patterson, general counsel for the United Rubber, Cork,

Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, CIO, stated the secondary boycott
1s a legal weapon necessary, in many instances, to attain a legitimate end. 12
He

emphasized that b07cotts become necessary against emoloyers who engage in

the operation of a plant under sweatshop conditions, selling upon a competitive market with other emplo7ers whose emplo;rees are organized.
Walter R. Batezal, editor of the Progressive Labor World, stated

that some secondar7 boycotts were justified. 13 ae made specific reference
to the Drinting industr7 where work is often sublet to non-union shops.
William Green, former President of the AFt, was naturally tor the
continued legitimacy ot the secondary bo7oott. 14 He alleged that in many
instanoes, it was impractioal or impossible to establish decent work standards

11

Ibid. J 1814.

12 Ibid., 1552-1553.
13 n!!l., 1938.
14 Ibid., 9g1-992.

save by pressure brought to bear upon customers of the unfa ir employer.

He

stated that the AFT. was against boycotts where another union had been certified by the Na tionB.l La bor Rela tiona Board and when boycotts are oonduoted
merely beoause carta in products are produced in another a·rea.

However,

SO",,,,,uu.T

sry boycotts are otten necessary to alleviate sweatshop conditions.
Philip Murray, until recently President of the CIO, presented s1milar evidence.

15 He added that less than one peroent of the workers involved

in strikes during 1946 engaged in seoondary boyootts.
used in jurisdictional disputes, the AFI"

unions should

~nter

Where the boyoott was

the CID, and other inde'Dendent

into agreements and solve their own difficulties.

It 18

interesting to note that a member representing labor openly admitted that the
jurisdictional boycott was

8

-problem.

The president of the 011 'Workers International fJnion, CIO,

Mr.

O. A~'

bight, stated that if' compa117 A 1.s struck and company B 8hips gasoline to A,

then

n can

be picketed sinoe he 1s no longer

8

disinterested party. 16

A. F. 'Whitney, president of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
.'Ye testimony upholding the view preeented by Mr. Murray_

He was against

,lD'il!ldietlonal disputes and the secondary boycott as associated therewith.

he felt that it would be an error to meke all secondary boycotts

15 lh,!$!., 1114-1115 and 1157-1159.
16

lbiq., 1496-1497.

17 Ibid., 2117-2118.

Mr. Harvey W. Brown, International President

ot the International

Association ot Machinists, presented an interesting view. 18 He stated that
a distinction should be made between boycotts that definitely operate agains
the best interests of the public and a boycott about which there is a reason
able doubt as to its value to society.

Boycotts against goods made by

"outside firms" (those not manutactured within a given area) should be made
illegal and is consistent with the purpose ot the anti-monopoly laws even
though the union concerned was acting without the aid of a going business.
Evidently, Mr. Brovn had the Allen-Bradley case in mind.

His reason vas tha

unions were not organized to increase prices.

3. The Congressional Outlook
The views ot those representing the public wlll now be reviewed.
In a minority report submitted b;y Senator Thomas of Utah, he clearly stated
that new legislation was necessary to ban unjustifiable torms of labor
abuse. 19 Although some forms of secondary ba,ycotts should be made illegal,
others were necessary.

The jurisdictional disputes should be outlawed but

secondary boycotts intended to protect wage rates and working conditions
should not be nrohibited.

The appropriate goal he indicated was legislation

which prohibited secondary boycotts in pursuance of unjustifiable objectives

18 Ibid., 1614-1616.
19 "Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act", I,
!enate Minoritl Report Number 105, Part II, on S. 1126, 80th Congress, First
SeSSion, 1945, 481-482.
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but did not impair the unions right to preserve its own existence.

He

further added that the law, as proposed, was contusing snd failed to take
cognizance of the trend in courts of law.

The judiciary were beginning to

turn from the practice of considering secondary boycotts in terms of the
old common law conspiracy doctrine and were determining the 1ega1it7 of
particular factual situations on the basis of the tort doctrine.

Using such

an approach, there was a growing acceptance of certain forms of action
directed against parties who are not immediately involved in a law dispute
where there was a "unity of interest" beween such
employer.

8

party and the disputing

Evidently, Senator Thomas felt tbet the doctrine enunciated in

Goldfinger v. Feintuch 20 was sound and necessary to promote legitimate
unionism.

The Senator from utah felt that the leg1.slation proposed would

reverse the trend indicated above. A refusal by one union to handle a
product made by other non-union labor would be an unfair labor practice and
Section 8 (b) (4) as prepared (and eventually enacted) should be more pre-·
cise17 defined and limited.
Mr. Gerald

w.

r..andie of Indiana presented another view. 21 He

felt that the secondarT ba,ycott throws many innocent people out of work and
many disinterested parties were deprived of the necessities of life.

He

20 276 N. Y. 281, 1937.
~

21 "Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act",
Senate Minority Report Number 105, 583-584.

stated thBt the lettuce strike at Salinas in 1936 caused a loss of 2,000
ears of lettuce because of a secondary boycott.

In LosAngeles in 1946,

20,000 pllons of "hot milk" 'Were dumped in front of the city hall.

"Hot

milk" here refers to a secondary boycott against the deliyery of any milk
in 'Which the union involved thought that union milkers should be employed
or the truckers delivering should be union members.

Mr. Landis felt that

the secondary boycott has hurt the innocent farmer badly since non-union
trucks are threatened a8 are the dairY men themselves should they attempt to
do their own hauling.
He referred to a situation in Philadelphia when Local 929 of the
Teamster's attempted t. organize the female clerks of wholesale produce
dealers and the dealers 'Were powerless before the union demands.
SeDBtor Ellender submitted evidence that a CIO union 'Was certified
as bargaining representative of the employees neon sign manutacturers. 22
When these signs vere distributed in various states, the AFt craft union
members refused to install the signs because they bore CIO labels. When the
CIO attempted to organize the cannery workers in Calitornia, the haulers
belonging to the AFt allowed the fruits and vegetables to vaste in the fields
the teamsters retusing to carry them.

In Oregon, Washington and California,

CIO longshoremen refused to unload lumber carried in ships manned by AFt

22

Ib;td ., 1054.

seamen.
Senator Robert A. Taft noted unions failed to submit any evidence
of when a secondary boycott vas necessary and for the general benefit of the
communit7. 23
. Senator MOrse from Oregon felt that the purpose of Sec ion g (b)
(4) vas to clog the federal courts vith petty litigation, havi.ng no objeot
but that of veakening the labor movement. 24

Mr. Pepper, then a Senator from Florida, stated that not only
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the secondary boycott outlawed by the propesed legislation but that there
was added the arbitrary and mandatory requirement that,. National Labor

Relation Board Regional Attorney, upon nothing more than what he considered
reasonable cause, seek an injunction. 25

Senator Pepper thought this un:f'air

because a similar requirement was not put into the law when an employer
commits an unta ir labor nraotice under Section g(a).
The United States Secretary ot Labor at that time, Schwellenbach,
stated that when an industrial organization violates the law and commits an
unfair labor practice, the use of the secondary boycott should be legally
permis88ble. 26 Other forms of enumerated justifiable aecondary boycotts
,~

23

1h!!1.,

24

llU4., 1370.

25

nJ4.,

26

ItHearings Before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare", U, §.

hDate, 1959.l960,

-

1106.
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vould allow, as an example, carpenters on construction jobs to refuse to
install any millwork made by nonunion labor working for lover vages.

He

yould also permit the picketing of a retail store selling products of an
unfair employer providing the placards carried by the pickets refer only to
the prod.ncts in which there is a labor dispute.
4.

The Expert Vi!Vp2int

Ludwig Teller, attorney from Nev York, arbitrator and labor relations consultant, felt that secondary boycotts should be regulated and
innocent third parties should be protected. 27 However, protection should
not be given to those who aid employers during

8

labor dispute.

He felt

that any retailer, purchasing merchandise with the knowledge of a labor disnute, is no longer an innocent third party but becomes a person in interest
eoonom.lcally and the union should be permitted to proceed against the
retailer selling the unfair product providing banners are carried enumerating
only the unfair employer or struok plant.
,.

A SJa!1!817

A rew general observations can be safely made that would cover the
entire proceedings prior to the passage of the 1947 additions.

27 Ibid., 254-256.

The most

obvious point concerns the difference in preparation between those representing management and thoae "oarrying the ball" for labor.

lI.s.nsgement definitel

advanced a far better argument than labor by citing enumerable examples of
unnecessary, unscrupulous and indefensible secondary boy-cotta. Labor on the
other hand was unable to offer more than "there are good and there are bad
boyootts". Yet, even then, most of the evidence subm'tted in behalf of
Section 8(b)(4) concerned the jurisdictional boy-cott which is not the only
tyPe of secondary boyoott.

The handwriting was already on the 'W!lll a8 labor

diffioulties were aooentuated due to the end of the war, rising prioes,
searoe materials and a general reconversion to a peaoetime economy.

By

being veIl prepared and offering legislation against those asnects receiving
the MOst unfavorable publicity, unions might have been able to avoid the
restriction of all secondary activity-.
Due to the press and radio publicity, the atmo8f)here of the entire
hear1.ng definitely faTOred managements point of view.

Rere

failed miserably by not having adequate public relations.

1!lgllltn,

labor

Men in Congress,

dependent upon votes for future nopularity and reelection, only eXPressed
that which vas Itfashionable" shortly after '\ITorld War II.

It is interesting

to note that when President Trum-n vas given the Taft-Hartley bill for
approval, George Ge.llu-o, director of the Ameriean Institute of Public Opinion, conducted e poll amongst the voting population consisting of while
collar Yorkers, laborers, farmers, professionals and business people. 28

2S Iron A.gI, Vol. 159, Part III, June 5, 1947, 123.

•
The majority of those polled wanted

t~e
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Presiaent to sign the new lawe

However, manual laborers, skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled wented the
President to veto the bill.

By

party denom.ination, thirty-five percent of

those considering themselves as Democrats were for the bill, forty-nine
percent wanted the legisll!!tion. vetoed and sixteen percent had no opinion.
Of those professing Republican affiliation, sixty-three percent of those
polled wanted the President to sign the bill whereas only twenty-three
percent desired that President TrumBn veto the Act.

Only fourteen percent

were non-commltt.a1.

As prev-:1ously mentioned, the jurisdictional dispute received a
great deal of adverse 1')ublicity. Yet, in 1946, jurlsdicUoll8l disputes only
accounted for 3.5% of the total number of work stoppages and only

.$% of the

totsl number of idle man-hours. 29 An analysis of th:h important issue discloses that the jurisdictional dispute falls into two claes1f'1cations.

The

first problem involves the existance of craft unions and the limited jurisdiction of workers with definite occupations, usually of a highly skilled
craft and often found in the
billty of devising

e~haustive

~onstruetlon

trades.

Because of the Impossi-

job classifications, duty designations and the

terseeability of industrial changes, there are always areas of' uncertainty
and

overlap~lng.

In the buildIng industry, thera are many squabbles over

which trade shall attach metal trim, etc. The dispute is generally between

29 :t;?nthlY

-

tal:>or

Revtew, Vol. 64, May, 1947, 795.

•
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two creft unions, eech claiming control over the ~rticulsr task to be oerformed.

The second nroblem involves s conflict between two unions over the

right to sct as the colleetive bargaining representative for a specifio
groun of workere.

Despite the overlapping between the two types of eo-called

jurisdictional dis?utes, there were different methods available for settling
each.

In the first, an administrative action vas necessary since no method

vas available by which workers could exoress their views.
was possible to settle the dispute b.Y having the N. L. R.
eleotion.

In the second, it

a.

conduct an

It should be noted that a jurisdictional row is not necessarily

a secondary boycott, es defined.
Again one should note the lack of impartial and expert testimony
with the exception of Ludwig Teller.
80th Congress must share the blame.

For this, lebor, management and the
Because they are renresenting the

publiC, t.he congressional committees should have been .far more selective and
requested more impartial experts to nresent views before passing laws

desi~-

ad to effect the entire nation.
Dr

The Con!tltut19D81 Asp.et
When the Taft-Bertley was enaeted, many authorities doubt.ed the

constitutionality of several of the provisions contained therein. Whenever
the constitutional question of Section g (b) (4) vas raised before the
respecti.e Courts of Appeal in various circuits, s11ch e8

th~

issuance of a

"99
temporary injunction under Seotion 10 (1), 3q or upon the Boards petition
for a review or enforcement of orders under Seotion 10 (e) and (t), 31 the
courts oonsistent1y upheld the secondary boycott provision against the
argument that the curtailment ot the right to pioket violated the First
Amendment of the United states Constitution.
TdOng before Section 8 (b) (4) reached the Supreme Court, the question of the oonstitutiona1 protection of tree speech when
10'88

"batted" about.

B

union picketed

In the 8iboney CBse, the court upheld the right of a

state to regulate picketing when used in an attempt to achieve a result in
confH.ot with the nub1ic po1:1cy of a state as enunciated in a statute. 32
Here, the union had picketed a supplier ot ice to compel him, contrary to
the Miss6uri Anti-Trust Law, to sell ice only to those drivers who were
members of the union and to stop the sale to the non-union drivers or independent contractors, whom the union was trying to orgsni.ze.

The Court

specifically st$ted that the United states constitution cermot be used as a
shield to break

8

state law. There was nothing in the constitution under

the First Amendment granting a union the right to

ex~ress

itself contrary to

30 Printing Snecisltie. & Paper Converters Union v. LeBaron (Sealright), 171 F.(2) 331, 1948.
United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Sperry (Wadworth), 170 F.
(;2) 363, 194f~.

31 NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Eleotrioal Workers (Langer)
181 F.(2) 54, 1950.
Local 74, United Brotherhood of Cementers (Wadsyorth), 194 F.
(2) 60, 1950; certiorari den1ed 341 US 490, 1949.
32 Giboney v. Empire storage &: Ice Co., 336 US 490, 1949.

II
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public policy.

Although the Ritter. Cate case 33 had also restricted the

union picketing, many felt that these situations were confined to the
specific factual cases end that the basic right to picket, unrestrained,
remained unchanged. 34 In a fiYe to four decision, the court, in the Ritter
case, upheld the issuance of an injunction to prevent the picketing'ot
restaurant by a union whose only grieY8nce was that the owner had let

8

8

con-

tract to a non-union contractor to construct a building which was in no way
connected with the restaurant business.

In the Wohl case, a state court had

enjoined the picketing of suppliers of independent peddlars with whom the
union had a dispute. 35 Union members distributing bakery goods had attempted to induce independent peddlars to work six daY's a week a nd to hire an
unemploY'ed union member one daY' a week.

The union picketed the customers

purchasing from the peddlers because no other means were available.

The

Supreme Court held that there was no unconstitutional invasion because of the
right of tree speech granted to unions and others.

The Ritter and Wehi O8se.

could be distinguished on the theory that the former inyolved .econdary
"picketing of a different industry than that with which the union was engaged
in a labor dispute whereas the Wohl case concerned

industry.

8

diapute in the same

It can readilY' be seen that the issue was subject to doubt and the

33 315 U. S. 722, 1942.
1942.

34 Carpenterts & Joiners Union Y. Ritterts Cate,

315 US 722,

35 Bakery 8£ Pastry Drivers Union v. 'Wohl, 315 US 769, 1942.

II
I

.101
effect of these decisions upon Section (8) (b) (4) plaoed the outlawing of
the secondary boyoott in the speculative area.
With the decision rendered h1 the Supreme Court in Thornhill v.
Alabama, 36 the expert in the field of labor law felt that picketing was
entitled to protection 8S a right of tree speech although there was considerable doubt 8s to the extent to which this right could be limited.
Later, the Supreme Court rendered decisions in three cases definitaly setting forth the doctrine that picketing was something more than free
speech and

iii

state could regulate picketing whenever it was contrary to

reasonable public policy ss enunciated by court decisions or statutes. 37

As s result of these decisions, the United States highest court's opinion
determining the constitutionality of Section (S) (b) (4) csme as an anti-

climax.

In the Langer esse, 38 the court discussed the contention that

Section (8) (b) (4) violated the constitution h1 citing the Giboney, Hanke,
Ga zzam and Hughe8 cases.

If picketing vas proscribed in furtherance of an

unlawful object, then the guarantee of tree speech did not apply to the
present 1.8ue.

36 310 US g8, 1940.
1950.

37 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 US 470,
Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 OS 532, 1950.
Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 us 460, 1950.

38 I. B. E. W. v. NtRB, 341 US 694, 1951.
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Although the right of tree speech snd Section S (e) 39 is a subjeet apart, mention is made herein a8 unions had contended that Section 8
(b) (4) and Section

~

(e) must be considered together.

Unions argued that

conduct which merely consisted of peacefully persuading or inducing action
was not a violation of Section 8 (b) (4) providing that the requirements of

Section 8 (c) were complied with.

However, the courts have consistently

held that Congress did not intend that Section 8 (b) (4) should be subject
to the "free speech" clause. 40 The reasons given were that to exeJlll>t
neaceful secondary picketing from the prohibitory clause of Section 8 (b)

(4) would in effect permit secondary boycotts contrary

to the intent of

Congress and the door would be opened to customary secondary means of enlisting the support of "disinterested" employees in use prior to the present Act
to bring eoonomic pressure to besr on employers, contrary to the legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley.

Therefore, the nurpose of Section

~

(c) was to

protect non-ooereive speech in the furtherance of a lawful object and was
not intended that it be extended to unfair labor practices.
In contrast to the constitutional protection which had been granted

39 Sec. 8 (0), "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion,
or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual
torm, shall not constitute or be evidenoe of an unfair labor practice under
any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of
reprisal or force or promise of benefit."

us

40 NLRB v. Denver Building Trades COuPeil (Gould & Preisner), 341

675, 1951.

I

I

II

I

•
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to picketing as an exercise of the right ot tree speech, the right to strike
is not protected by common law nor the federal constitution. 41

No argument

has been advanced that the prohibition of strikes as enunciated in Section g
(b) (4) was unconstitutional.

HoweV'er, in the Rice Milling O8se, 42 the

court noted that Congress did not intend to outlaw the primary strike when
conducted for legitimate labor goals.

g. the Aot and Its InterPretation
The interpretive problems regarding seoondary boycotts oonfronting
the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts are many and
varied.

An explanation of the procedural questions is necessary before the

sub~tantive

law is analyzed and reviewed.

The Act, in Seotion 10 (e), 43 oontains the necessary oonstitution-

81 nroV'isian which provides for court review after

8

deoision is rendered by

the Board and such determinations are enforced uPon petition to the Court of

41 Dorcby' v. Kansas, 272 US 306, 1926.
42 NLRB

y.

International Rice Milling Co., 341 US 665, 1951.

43 Section 10 ee) ••• ltehall be subject to review by the 8'Ppro'()riate circuit court of appeals if application was made to the district
court as hereinaboV'e proV'ided and by the Supreme Court of the United States
UPOn writ ot certiorari ••• ".

I,
',I

Appeals in the proper anpellate district.
tory for

~he

Seetlon 10 (1) 44 makes it manda-

Regional Attorney of the Board to secure

8

temporary injunction

in a United States district court when there is reasonable cause to believe
that Section 8 (b) (4) (A), (a) or (C) has been violated after a preliminary
investl~tion

has been conducted.

The Board is charged with the interpretation and enforcement of
Section 8 (b) (4) and issues of constitutionality are to be determined b.1
the courts alone. 45 The re,orte and recommendations of the Examiners are
final under Section 10 (c) unless a disputant files an exception within
twenty days after the opinion by the examiner is officially rendered. 46 It
should be noted that opinions rendered by Trial Examiners are only of value

I

II
I

I
I

until the Board or the federal courts have passed upon the exaot question in
issue.

A

SOl~ce

of confusion concerning the substantive provisions of

Section a (b) (4) lies in inconsistent court deci"ions and BoArd rulings
betl,Teen various jurisdictions and individual eases.

As already indicated,

44 Section 10 (1). "Whenever it is charged that en1 person has
engaged in en unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph .4 (t),
(B), or (C), of Section 8 (b), the preliminary investigation of such charge
shall be made forthwith and giTen priorlt7 over all other eases except •••
If, after such investigation, the officer or regions.l attorney to whom the
matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe suoh charge is true
and thBt a oomplaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition
any distriot oourt of the United states ••• n •
45 Rite-Form Corset Co., Inc., 75 NLRB 174, 1947.
46 Section 10 (c). " ••• and if no exoeptions are filed within
twenty days after servioe thereof upon such narties, ••• n.
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the Regional Attorney, under Section 10 (1) :fa required to seek a temporary
restra ining order when there is suffic ient ev:i.dence available d !sclos ing a
union violation of the secondary boycott provisions.

As a result, federal

district courts frequently peas upon issues which the Board has not yet
decided.

The Board has taken the position, with good reason, that decisions

rendered on petitions for temporary injunctions are not binding upon the
Board and are not res adjudicata. 47 The Gould and ?reisner case, which will
be subsequently discussed, went to the Supreme Court and the position advanesd by the Board was upheld since a petition for an injunction is not decided

upon a full hearing nor are all the merits and arguments presented.

However"

all other decisions are binding upon the Board.

I,

1

1.

The Jurisdictional

A8P!C~

1

I
1

, I

Concern:i.ng jurisdiction, the mAD decides the iRsue on a "case to
ease" basis and it is not bound by the determination of the General Counse118
Under the Wagner Act, the power of the Board to hear disputes involving the

47 Denver Building Trades Council (Gould & ?reisner), S2 NLRB
1195, 1949.
19M~.

83

NT~B

Denver Building Trades Counsil (Grliuman), S2 NLRB 9.3, 1949.
Le Bus v. Pacific Coast Marine Association, 23 LRRM 2027 (ta.),

Evans v. T. T. n., 76 F. SupP. 881 (Ind.), 1948.
GrahaM v. Boeing' Airplane Co., 22 tRRM 2243 (Wash.), 1948.
48 Retail Clerks International Association (A-1 Photo Service),

564, 1949.

walter J.Mentzer, 82 N1RB .3S9, 1949.

.

oonstruction industry wae never constitutionally tried.

106
Prior to the 1947

ohanges, the B08rd had deolined to take ,jurisdiction over disputes 1n the
building industry beoause of limi.ted resources and faoilities.

However, with

the passage of the 1947 amendments, the Board exeroised jurisdiction in the
construction trades.

The Board took jurisdiction in a case involving an

electrical contractor, the total value of the services and materials being

$325.00, because suopliers of material from another state were involved. 49
In the Gould and Preisner case, interstate oommeroe was affeoted where the
subcontractor against whom the union activities were directed purchased
sixty-five peroent of
rini~hed

it~

raw materials outside of the stete and most of the

products, though purchased within the state, were also

outside the state.

~rodueed

Interstate commerce vas further affected where two union

carpenters and one sheet-metal worker left a job three days nrior to com~letion. 50 When the caee went to the Court or Anneals, the issuance of an

injunction by the lower court was upheld because the drive-in theatre
business involved lBrge sums of money though the individual contributions
vere slRBll.
The Board issued a series of decisions to serve as a guide when

49 I. B. E. W. Local 501 (Langer), 23 LRRM 1661, 1949.
50 Shore v. Building & Construction Trades Council, 173 F (2) 678
(Pa.), 1949.
'I'

I

I,
I.-
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jurisdiction would be taken. 51 Under the crJteria cited, a good portion ot
the building industry would not meet the requirements spelled out and there
is serious doubt that Congress intended such standards.

The Supreme Court

in 341 U.S., at page 684 52 clearlY' held that the Board can refuse to take
jurisdiction though there is a substantial effect upon oommerce if the Board
states that the policies ot the Act will not be effected.

However, in spite

of suoh forceful language, a reoent 08se before the Court ot Appeals reversed
the Board deoision on the question of jurisdiction because of congressional
intent. 53
2.

A

fAbor Organi.l!.ation Defined

Section 2 (5) detines the type ot labor organization covered by

51 WBSR, Ino., 91 NLRB No. 110, 1950.
Local Transit Lines, 91 NLRB No. 96, 1950.
The Borden Co., 91 NLRB No. 109, 1950.
Stanislaus Implement & Hardware Co .. , Ltd., 91 m:,RB No. 116,
1950.
Hollow Tree Lumber Go., 91 NT~B No. 113, 1950.
Federal Dairy Co., Inc., 91 NLRB No. 107, 1950.
Dorn'~ House ot Miracles, Inc., 91 NIP-B No. g2, 1950.
The Rutledge Paper Products, Inc., 91 NLRB No. 151, 1950.
Memphis Cold storage Warehouse Co., 91 ~TLRB No. 219, 1950.
Willard, Ino., 2 NLRB 1094, 9aF (2) 244, 194A.
52 DenverBul1ding Trades Council (Gould & Preisner) v. NLRB.
53 Joliet Contractors Association v. NLRB, 193 F (2) e33, 1952,
(Ill.).

1,1,

the Taft-Hartley. 54 The Board, in the case -involving the Di Giorgio Fruit
Corporation,55 ap~lied Section 2 (3), 56 and held thnt
agricultural employees was not

8

8

union composed of

labor organization under the Act eno, as

result, incapable of violating Section 9 (b) (4).

8.

However, a separate local

of Teamsters ",hose membership included truck drivers of other emo1oyers as
well as those employed by Di Giorgio vas hold to be a labor union eanable of
com.m1.tting a secondary boycott under Section

~

(b) (4).

A question arose as

to whether a Dolltica1 subdivision, e Board of Education, came under the
jurisdiction of thp.

NJJRB.

57

The Board held that

the Act

excluded govern-

mental agencies.

J. The TYpe of Induc,ments Not Proscribed
Should inducements be !lisde by a unton to a supervisor, 58 or an

54 Section 2 (5). "The term tt1abor organ:1.Y..ationtt means any organization of any kind, or any agenoy or employee representation committee or
plan, in which employees pertioipate and which exists for the puroose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers ooncerning grievances, labor dis ...
putes, wages, rates of nay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. U
55 International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Di Giorgio Fruit Corp.)
87 NLRB 720, 1949.

56 Section 2 (3 ).. It ••• , but shall not include any individual
emnloyed as an agricultural laborer ••• n •
57

A1 J. Schneider, Inc., S9 NLRB 221, 1950.

58 Arkansas Express, Inc., 92 NLRB 255, 1950.
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emple,er, 59 or a single employee, 60 the Act is not violated.

An individ-

us1 union member cannot commit an unfair labor practice unless acting as an
agent tor the union concerned.

In the Gould ease, the Board held that the

withdrawal ot services ot one man was not a strike since there wasn't a
concerted stoppage

8S

required by statute.

Presumably, a consumer's boycott

is not proscribed, even it involving employees ot the secondary employer,
because the concerted refusal must be in the course ot employment. 61
/.. A,encI
An

agent ot a union is detined in Section 2 (13) and incorporates

the common law doctrine ot agency_
tactual question as to whether the

Thus, when presented, there is always a
~r8on

instituting the boycott had express

or implied authority to commit an unfair labor practice, whether the acts
committed were within a union agents apparent authority or whether the agents
action, it not within his position scope, was ratitied by the union.

It

becomes obvious that a mere union member, not an otticial nor baving administrative powers, cannot ordinarily involve a union in an unfair practice.
To date, the agency problem has not been considered by the Board in a ease

59 studio Carpenters v. Loews, Inc., 182 F(2) 16A (Cal.), 1950.
60 Denver Building Trades Council (Gould & Preisner), 82 NLRB
1195, 1949.
61 NLRB v. Service Trade Chaufteurs, 191 F(2) 65, 1951.

arising under Section 8 (b) (4).

However, the question ot agency 1s not

peculiar to the secondary boycott and the Board has reviewed this problem
in oth.r cas.s. 62

5,

The Independent Contractor

Whether the conduct with which the union is charged constitutes a
secondary boycott depends upon the relationship between the two employers
and the control exerted by the primary employer over the "neutral" business.
It the relationship is

80

close that one may be regarded as the "all,- ot

the other, picketing or other secondary activity is permiesable during a
legitimate labor dispute.

Generally, the relationship ot contractor and sub-

contractor is not sufficiently close, as evidenced in the construction
industry, to call the two employers "allies", nor are the employers "allies"
when one deals almost exclusively in the products of the other, where the
ownership is entirely separate snd distinct.

In the Schenley case, 63 the

union had struck several distributors of Schenley products and ita members
employed by other distributors had refused to handle Schenley product. in an
effort to compel the primary employer to settle

8

strike in one of its sub-

62 Sunset Line & Twine Co., 79 NLRB 1487, 19M~.
Smith Mfg. Co., Inc., 74 NtRB 544, 1947.
Perry Norv,ll Co., 80 NLRB 225, 1948.
The Great A & P Tea Co., 81 NtRB 880, 1949.

63 NLRB v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, 178 F. (2)
584" 1949.

sidiary plants.

The court rejected the unionJs contention that there was a

sufficient identity of interest between Schenley and the distributors to make
them "allies" since the distributors were independent contractors who merely
market large quantities of SChenley products.
The construction and need1e.trade industries bave always subcontracted work and the question arose vhether Congress intended to protect an
employer who sought to avoid the etfects of a strike by subcontracting to
other firma.

The mere tact that the tvo employers ere nalliea" in the sense

that the term is used in the business world is no detense against a secondar
boyoott charge.

There needs to be some degree of control exercised by the

primary employer oyer the

so~a11ed

neutral employer.

In the construction

industry, it is ve11 knovn that subcontractors are constantly employed and
there appears to be little dispute vith decisions holding that union picketing of

8

subcontractor hired by a general contractor is a secondary boycott.

In the needle trades, subcontracting is only prevalent during the seasonal
'Oeriods.

To avoid a labor dispute, it vould be a simple matter to merely

subcontract
union drive.

88

lIueh of the vork as possible, thus avoiding the effects of

8

Here, an equitable solution becomes difficult.

The Ebasco case vas one of interest and concerned the independent
oontractor problem.

64 A CIO union, composed of architects, engineers and

technicians called a strike against the Ebasco Services, Inc.,

8

company

64 Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supn.

672 (N. I.), 1948.

engaged in engineering design projects as con.sultants.

Part of the work of

this concern was sublet to the Project Engineering Company, with Fbaseo
supervisors closely inspecting and handling the work performed by the second
ary eDtployer.

Aiter the strike was called, Ebasco increased the amount of

work subcontracted to the Project concern.

The Regional Attorney,

8S

re-

quired b7 Section 10 (1), sought an injunction whioh wes denied by the
District Court because of an identity of interest between the two employers.
The court felt that Project Engineering was not an innooent third pllrty
because of the close supervision exercised over the employee. of the former.
This decision seems in line with the intent of Congress which was expressed
by Senator Taft prior to the passage of the Act.
This provision makes it unlawful to resort to • secondary boycott
to injure the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned

in the disagreement between an employer and his employees. 65
A similar result was reached in a case involving a suit for damages. 66

6,

Suits for Dama us

In Gerry v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 67 the
court nroperly denied the petition of a private party for injunctive relief

65 93 Congressional Record 4323, April 29, 1947.
66 Mills v. Plumbers Union, 23 LRRM 2559 (MO.), 1949.
67

21 tRRM 2209 (Cal.), 1948.

under Section )0) (b). 68 Section 303 permits suits for damage. b.Y private
persons in courts and not before the Board.

The substantive rights provided

b.Y Section )03 and the remedies at Section g (b) (4) are identical.

The

ditference is only one of procedure since Seetion 8 (b) (4) require. the
Regional Attorney ot the Board to a.k for en injunction and Section 303 permits suita b.1 private parties for damages.

A number of cases tested the

jurisdictional requirements under Section 303 (b).

Section 301 (., provides

for suits in violation of contracts and Section 303 (b) provide. tor suite
to be brought in the United State. Distriot courts nwitbout respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties n •
The Southern District of New York held that Section 303 creates a new tederal
right and there i8 no requirement of diversity. 69 On May 1, 1950, the Court
of Appeals tor the Ninth District held that there was no requirement for
diversity of citizenship in a suit under Section 303, reversing a lower court
opinion. 70

68 Section 303 (b). "Whoever shall be injured in his business or
property by reason or any violation of subsection (a) may sue therefor in any
distriot court of the United States subject to the limitations and provisions
ot Section 301 hereof without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any
other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages
by him sustained and the cost of the suit."

69
(H. Y.),

Baumer Mfg. Co. v. United Furniture Workers, 25 LRRM 2498

1950.

70 26 LRRM 2136, 1950. Certiorari denied by the U. S. Supreme
Court, 26 LRRM 2611, 1950.

Private suits for damages under Section 30) have Beldom been
brought to court considering the nUDlber of charges being rUed under union
unfair practices.

However, the recent decision in the Juneau case may change

managements inertia. 71 The trial court awarded three-quarters of a million
dollars in damages and the Supreme Court upheld the verdict in a jurisdiotional dispute.

The union had contended that the National Labor Relations

Board must make a determination under Section 10 (k) 72 before a private
person could sue for damages.

The court held that Section )0) is a separate

remedy and a determination was not necessary by the Board before damages are
sought in a court of law.

7.

Ie There a strike?

The Board must often determine whether the action the union 18
charged with constitutes a strike in violetion ot' Section a (b) (4).

Section

501 73 covers the question of strikes or whether the activity constitutes the

71

International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342

US 237, 1952.

72 Section 10 (k). " ••• , the Board is empowered and directed to
hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall
have arisen •• ,ft.
73 Section 501 (2). "The term ·striken include. any strike or
other concerted stonpage of work b.1 employees (including a stoppage b.1 reason
ot' the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement) and any concerted
slov-down or other concerted interruption of operations by employees,-
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exeroise of the right to seek other employment.

Section 502 permits an

employee to quit his job in accordanoe with the oonstitutional prohibition
of involuntary servitude. 74 The Watson Speoia1ty Store case first faoed
this problem. 75 Here, the members of the Carpenter's union ceased work one
day prior to the erfeotive date of the Taft-Hartley and the court held that
there was no evidence i.ndioating that the workers intended to quit their
jobs.

In the Osterink oase, 76 the Board found that the union oal1ed a

strike in violation of Seotion 8 (b) (4) (1) when tva men were removed trom
a job.
8

job

In the Gould & Preisner decision, the Board said calling one man off
\188

not a strike. 77 While the deoisions rendered in oases involving

V8lkouts by one person or by tva or llOre have determined whether a plant is
"struck", the approach appears to be unrealistic.

The question is whether

a strike 1s intended and not whether one or two men are involved.
When 114 from

8

total of 115 union members quit their jobs within

a short period or time, the Board held that the employees had engaged in a
I

I

74 Section 502. "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to require an individual emplo16e to render labor or service without his consent,
nor shall anything in this Act be construed to make the quitting of his
labor by an individual employee an illegal aot; ••• ".
75

22 teRM 2247, 1948.

76 Briok1ayer's Union (Osterink Construetion Co.), 82 NtRB 228,
1949.
77 82 NLRB 1195, 1949.
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strike though the unions attempted to disguise the walkout. 78 Here, the
Electrical Workers Brotherhood was unable to dissuade the corporation
managing the atomic energy plant at Oak Ridge from letting an electrical
contract for certain repairs to a non-union contractor who had submitted the
lowest bid.

The union members, in protest, resigned their jobs individually

or in groups within several days. When the Regional Attorney secured an
injunction, the em:ployees who had "quit" their job returned. 79 '!'he union
had contended that the employees had quit for personal reasons but this view
was rejected b,y the Board.
S.

Section

a !bl

(4) (Al

Although Section 8 (b) (4) contains four subdivisions, the last
(D), applies to jurisdictional disputes and will not be reviewed SO since
such proscribed activity does not constitute a secondary boycott as defined.
The activities forbidden by Section 8 (b) (4)(A), (8), and

Co)

will be dis-

78 Hatter of Electrical Workers (Roane Anderson Co.), 82 ILRB 696,

1949.
79 Styles v. Local 760, I. B. E. W., 80 F. Supp. 119 (Tenn.), 1948
80 Section 8 (b) (4) (D). "forcing or requiring any employer to
assign particular work to employees in a particular labor or8&nization or in
a particular trade, craft, or class, unless such employer 1s failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining
representative for employees performing such work".

cussed.
Most problems have arieen under (A) 81 whieh ".. designed to stop
the use of economic coercion or pbJsical force upon any eap1..,er of 8elfeaployed person.

In the Schenle,. Distiller,. case, the union was involved in

a pr11tsr,. dispute with stagg, a manufacturing subsidiary of SchenleY'. 82
The union refused to handle products of the SchenleY' distributers
af economic coercion.

8S 8

method

An unfair labor practice charge was made by Jardine,

a distributor of Schenle,..

The union contended that Jardine was not a

tral distributor, haYing an interest in the SchenleY' products.

MU-

The Board

said tbet the facts dittered trom tbet in the Ebesca case (previousl,. discussed) because there was no tinancial or other relationship that would
indicate eontrol by Schenle,. over its distributors.

The Circuit Co\U"t sub-

sequently affirmed this .iew, 83 and other Board decisions have to11ovecl
suit. 84 Welther the Board DOl' the courts have shown a117 tendeno,. to follow

81 Section 8 (b) (4) (A). "foroing or requiring any employer or
se1t-e.,loyed person to join al'l7 labor or employer orpDi2lllltlon or any emplo,.
er or other person to cease using, selling, handling, traDsporting, or otherviae dealing in the products ot any other producer, proce.sor, or manutacturar, or to cease doing business with any other person.82 Wine, LiqUGr &: Distillery Workers, 78 NLRI 504, 1948.
83
1949.

NLRB v. Wine, Liquor

& Distillery Workers, 178F.

84 Metal Polishers Union (Climax Machinery Co.),

1949.

(2)

584, C1-2,

86 NUtS 1243,

latio,.l Union ot Marine Cooks (Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co.), 87

NLRB 54, 1949.

I;
1

:

:.. 1

the "unit,. of interest" rule propounded tv' the New York courts in Goldtinger
v. Feintueh where the two employers are oompletely independent ot one
another.

In the Sohenley case, the union oontended that its aotions at the
warehouse. of the distributerl!J were not d'reoted against the princ!'ple but
resulted from an accUllulation of unresolved grievances at each ot the distributors which eonstituted a primary dispute.

The Board did not 'lind

sutficient evidence to support the unions point of view and the strike at
the distributor. vas intended to attect Schen1ey's.

The Board and Court

said tbat the Act did not require that the picketing of the distributcrs need
not be the sole union motive to be proscribed.
'l'he use of the unfair list

b.T unions

is worthy of speoia1 mention.

The Grauuan ea.e held that merely placing a primary em.plO1er on an unfair
list vas not a violation of subsection (A) and is similar to direct picketing
even though one of the efteots of such a listing might well be that some
employees would withhold their servioes from the aeeondaryemployer. 85

In

the Oat.rink O8se, previously decided, the Board held that placing the name
of the primary employer on an untair ltst vas a violation of Section 8 (b)

(4) (A) 86 and the Grauman deei.ion speoifioally reversed this ruling.

8S Deuel' Building &: Trade. Council, 87 NtRB 755, 1949.
86 Bricklayer's Union (O.teriDk Construction Co.), 82 NtRB 228,
1949.

Unions are also forbidden to make attempts to torce an employer
or selt-eDlployed person to become a member ot an employer's association.
This provision was intended to outlaw trade associations which act as oolleotive bargaining agents for its .embers thereby imposing unitorm contract
prOYisions on an industry- wide basis or by locality. S7
In the Western Express Company decision, the union had instructed
an employee 01' the secondary employer not to unload a trailer received
a

rrem

trucker with whom the union had a dispute. gg In detense, the union

alleged that it only issued suoh instruotions to determine whether the
secondary emplo,yer's use ot the trailer contlicted with a olause in the
union's contract with the neutral, which reserved to the union the right to
accept freight bound tor struok establishments.

The Board held that the

object ot the unions conduot was to toree the seoondary emplo.yer to cease
doing business vith the struck firm until the applicability of the clause
in the contract was determined.

Such action was a temporary- boycott and

Ii

violation ot Section 8 (b) (4) (A).

ff7 Barker v. United Brotherhood ot Carpenters &: Joiners, 21 LRRM
2406 (Ala.), 1948.
Le Baron v. Printing Special ties It Paper Converters Union,
F. SUpPa 67g (Cal.), 1948.
Sperry- .... United Brotherhood ot Carpenters It Joiners, 21 LRRM
2244 (Kansas), 1948.
Douds v. Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 75
F. Sup~. 414 (Nev York), 1947.

7'

88 Local 294, International Brotherhood at Teamsters, (Western
Express Co.), 91 NtRB 340, 1950.
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The Board has determined that a uniPn does not violate (1) when it
pre'ftlils upon customers, who are also supervisors, to abstain trom purchasing
the employer' 8 produots. ~

Often, the Board is ca lled upon to determine

what is "induoement or encouragement. ot employees so as to tall within the
proscribed activity_

,! inducement

In a pertinent case, the Board held that there was

or encouragement" when a union agent had his secretary oall uniun

members employed at various meat markets to inform them that a specific wholesale meat dealer had been plaoed on an "unfair" list. 90 The union relied
upon the Grauman case which held that the activity vas primary when the union
within its own councils claseified a primary employer as unfair.

The Board

rejected this view because relaying the information b.1 telephone to the
employees at the place of business of the secondary employer was tantamount to
a specific instruction to cease work.

In a recent Board case, union members called a strike when they were
required to work on shingle. produced 1n a Canadian mill whioh did not bear a
union label. 91 The union contended that since the product was foreign made,
the action was pr1-.ry so that the "inducement and encouragement" was not the

89 Local 878, International Brotherhood of Tea_ters (Arkansas Express), 92 NLRB 255, 1950.
90 A_lga_ted Meat Cutters, Local No. 303 (Western, Inc.), 93 N'IBB

336, 1951.
No.

91 Washington-oregon Weavers Council (Bound Shingle Co.), 101 NLRB
203, 1952.

«

type proscribed b.y the Act.
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.

The Board, in effect, said, although it did not

have jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer, it did have the power to
remedy unfa ir pre ctices of unions in this country and the secondary employer
and the violation occurred within the Board's jurisdiction.
The Board, in another oase, found that

~A)

was violated when union

members, employed b.y the trucking compan1es, refused to handle merchandise
Bought to be delivered or picked up at their employers t premises by other
concerns unless the driver attempting the delivery or pickUp was a member of
the sa_ union. 92 In addition, the union was guilty of an unfair labor
praotice b.r preventing nonunion orews of the visiting concerns from performing
services upon equipment belonging to the trucking companies because the union
objective was to force the two employers to sever business relations.

9.

§eetion 8 (b) (4) (a)

Section 8 (b) (4) (D) forbids a union from forcing another employer
to bargain with a union which has not been certified. 93 This vas designed to
prevent

8

empl.,..ees

union in one plant trom boycotting some other employer for whose
8

92

union has not been certified.

Thus, it appears that synlpathy

Teamsters, AFL, (Irvin J. Cooper, Jr.), 101 NLRB 10. 215, 1952.

93 Section a (b) (4) (a). "forcing or requiring any other employer
to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his
IDlployees unle •• such labor organization has been certified as the representltive of such employees under the provisions of section 9H •

..
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strikes, which haYe as their "object" the use of force upon the unrelated
employer to recognize er bargain with an uncertified union, is proscribed.
However, a syapsthy strike, which has some "objeot" other than the one previous1y stated or where the labor organization which it sought to compel the
unrelated employer to recognize or bargain with has been certified by the

NLRB, is permisssble under the Aat.
In a dispute involving members of the Teamsters unien, a local

department store was picketed to force a parcel delivery service, which had •
contract with the department store, to recognize the union as the bargaining
agent. 94 The Board held that

fa) ws violated.

In the Kanawha Coal case,

subsequently cited, the Board held that the union violated (D) when it sought,
by seconda17 pressure,

to compel certain independent dealers to join an

employer's association with which the union bad a olosed shop agreement.

Had

the union been successful, the lumber dealer would have become subject to the
union's contract and would have to reaognize the union without it being certified.

.Bringing pressure on an em:p1oyer almost two years after the right to

represent the employees had been taken awy by s petition for decertification
violated

fa).

95

94 International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Howland Dry Goods Co.),
85 NtRB 1037, 1949.
95 Construation taborers Local 320 (Armco Drainage & Metal Products,
Inc.), 93 NLRB 751, 1951.

10. §ection 8 (b) {4}

(cl

Section 8 (b) (4) (C) torbids a union to use its eoonomic powers
to torce an eaployer to bargain with one union when another has been certified
a8 the bargaining representative ot his eaployees.

96 Due to the organiza-

tional drives b;y the CIO and Aft, lDI!Uly labor disputes with e."l.,.ers were
undertaken to gain greater meRlbership and power tor the union attempting the
venture.

It the employer intervened prior to 1947, there ws a good pGsslbU-

ity that he would have been guUt,. ot an unfair labor practioe.
nothing, the employers business suttered.

It he did

Another reason for banning sueh

aotivity oaD be found in state court decisions represented b.r Florshe1m Shoe
Company v. Retall Shoe Sale8men's Union 97 and Swenson v. Central Labor
Counoll, 98 vhich forbad union activity in similar situations vherea!! sueh
oonduct ws 1'8rmissable in some eases in the federal oourts because ot the
Norris-LaGuardia Aot.

In the Florshe1m case, the Nev York state Labor Board

had certified an AFL union after holding an election.

A cro affiliate con-

tinued to 'Picket the Florsheim COl!rp8ny after the eleetion.

The New York Court

96 Seotion 8 (b) (4) (C). "forcing or requiring any employer te
reoognize or b!!1rgain vith a particular labor organization as the representative of his employees it another labor organization has been certified 8S the
representative ot such employees under the provisions of Section 9".
97 42 I. E. (2) 480 (I. Y.), 1942.
98 177 Pac (2) 873 (Wash.), 1947.
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ot Appeals upheld the issuance of an injunction by the lover court and restra ined the pioketing as being contrary to public policy.

In the Swenson

opinion, the court tollowed the ruling in the 'lorsheim esse when a union
had been certified by the tabor Relations Board although no contract had been
signed between the certified union and the employer.

lbwever, opinions ren-

dered :in federal courts, in situations similar to that found in the cited
cases, had denied injunotions beeause of the constitutional fllarantee of fre.
speech, 99 and the Norris-LaGuardia Aot. 100 By reviewing the testimony a8
presented In the beginning portion of this chapter, the purpose of Congress
becomes clear in enacting (0).
In a recent ease, a minority union struek against an eaployer who
had contracted with a formally certified union to eomnel the emnloyer to adjust
101
the grievances of the members of the striking minority union.
1'he Board
held that (0) was not violated If the desired adjustment was not contrary to
the oontract between the employer and the certified union and, more important,

99 Csfeter:ht EMPloyers Union, Loesl 302 v. Angelos, 320 US 293,
1943.
Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 US 769, 1942.
AFt T. Swing, 312 US 321, 1941.
100 Yoerg Brewing Co. v. Brennan, 591. Supp. 625 (Minn.), 1945.
Fur Workers Union Loeal No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union No. 2123S,
105 F (2) 1, 1939.
101 Perry Norvell Co., SO NtlB 225, 1945.
Eleetron~.es Equi"ment Co., 94 NLRB 62, 1951.

as long as the striking union did not seek to toroe reoognition of its nunit"
renresentation ot enmloyees who torm part of the berge ining unit represented
by the Bl8jority as oertified.

The union sought to act a8 a representative

for employees to exereise the right of individU81 ad.1ustment ot grievances
whioh the Aet

8

ssures to every employee and is perm is sa ble. 102

should the minority union seek to

re~resent 88

However,

a unit employees forming

8

nert of the bargaining unit represented by the certified union, as distinguished from the agency for the adjustment of individual grievances,
a violation of the Act.

th~re

is

103

In the Oppenheinl-CollinJr, Department store opinion in New York, the
union whieh had been the bargaining agent, hed not complied with the tUing
requirements contained in Section 9 (f) (g) and (h), so that it wes not
placed Oft the ballot when aft election was held.

104 As a result, another

union was elected ana the former bargaining agent picketed the lremises of
the employer.

The picketing union contended that the purpose of the picketing

weB not to force the employer to recognize or atrga in with it but rather to

nersUl!lde the empl.yer to reinstate certain members of its local union.

102 Douds v. Retail
(2) 764, 1949.
103

Sec-

& Wholesale Department store Workers, 173 F.

Hwnpbrey v. International Brotherhood of Team.sters, 85 F. Supp,

473, 1949.

104 Douds v. Loea1 1250, Retail, Wholess1e Department store Union
(Op-oenhe1m-Col11ns), 23 LRRM 2424, 1949.
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tion 9 (a' permits employees to 'llresent thel~ grievances and the Court of
Appeals upheld the union position.

A union is prohibited, under (C), from engaging in primary strikes
or boycott activities to force an employer to bargain with a partioular labor
organization as the re'llresentatives of his employees if another union has
been certified. 105

It should be noted that SUbsection (C) bars primary

activity when another union has been certified and Is not a secondary boycott
as generally definea.

The Board heard s case in which a union oontinued to

pioket a pIant after another union had been certified. 106 The facta disolosed that the union

c~11e" 8 ~tr1ke

and another union was officially recog-

nbed by the Board during this interim.

The Board held that the activity was

secondary and therefore proscribed.
D.

pttmarI or Secqndarx §olcott
On June 4th, 1951, the United states Supreme Court rendered deci-

sions in four CBses concern5ng the secondary boycott provisions of the N.t.R.A.
as

amended thBt offered an opnortunlty to clarify the nrimery, secondary situs

problem.

Considering that the o"lnions 1n three of the four cases were unan-

imous and that only two justices dissented in the fourth CBse it might be
reasonably

e~cted

l~

thRt the conflict at long last would have been decisively

See foot, note 96 ••

106 Retail Clerks tocal 1179 (Western Auto Sup'll1y), 93 NtRB 1638,
1951.

settled.

Unfortunately, the Court rendered

~pinions

concerning issues ot

whioh there was already little doubt, but left unanswered the fundamental
question of the primary situs doctrine.
Before discussing the decisions rendered by the United states
Supreme Court, a review is necessary of the administrative and court opinions
conoerning similar problems.

In the Ryan case, 1(17 construction had been

undertaken by the Ryan Construction Company at the Bucyrus Company's plant.
For sake of convenience, a spec:1al gate had been placed in the fence surround
ing the Bucyrus firm to be used by the employees of Ryan.

When the employees

of Bucyrus went out on strike, the union picketed the plant including the
special gate which had been erected for the use of Ryan's employeese

The

Board held that such activity was not a secondary boycott as the picketing
was primary and the 1947 amendments only intended to outlaw union action whic
sought to enlarge the economic ares beyond the premises of the primary employ
ere

In the Montgomery Ward opinion, log the company had promulgated a rule

requiring business agents to receive a pass when visiting the shipping dock.
In protest, the union patrolled the trucking entrance to Wardts and instructe
truck drivers, who were union members, not to make any pickups or deliveries.
The Board held that such union activity was primary 'because the employees wer

1('17 U. E. W. (Ryan Construction Corp.', 85 NtRB 417, 1949.
108 87 NUlB 972, 1949. Another issue was whether there was a
·labor dispute K under Section 2 (9). The Board said there was a bona fide
dispute because the parties need not stand in the proximate relationship ot
employer-employee.

•
only told to stay away trom the premises of

~he

128

primary employer.

In the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation case, 109 the Teamsters union

had picketed an unorganized employer for the purpose ot being reoognized as
bargaining agent.

The Board held that the picketing was primary even though

emplo,yees not covered b.1 the Aot refused to cross the picket line because the
acti'Vit,. was restricted to the area ot the primary employer.

A Kansas Dis-

trict Court made a similar finding in 1948 when it refused to issue an injunotion where the Building Trades unions and
picketed the construction site

th~

Carpenter's organization bad

ot a non-union builder and members of the

Teamsters union had refused to cross the picket line. 110
In the Sealright case, 111 one of the most difficult problems was
in issue.
plant.

Sealright employees struck and a picket line surrounded the entire

When seTeral truokl of an independent concern crossed the picket line

hauling Sealright's produotl out of the plant, two strikers followed in a car.
'When the truck arri'Ved at destination A, the str:l1cers picketed at the tan
ga tes of these trucks and managed to persuade the employees ot A to refuse to

unload the trucks.

The NLRB held that the picketing was secondary and 'Vio-

lated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act.

109

The Diltrict Court enjoined the

International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Dt Giorgio Fruit Corp.)

87 NLRB 720, 1949.
110 Sperry 'V. Building Trades Council of KanAs City, 23 LRRM 2115,
(Kansas), 1948.
111 Printing Specialties Union 'V. La Baron (Sealright), 171 F (2)

331, 1948.

I
• I

picketing and was affirmed on appeal.

It can be seen that the problem of

~eterm1ning the situs of the primary labor dispute becomes more complicated

when the business opera tions ot the primary employer are not confined to a
fixed area but are of a transient nature.
The Schultz decision concerned a similar problem. 112

In 1948,

Schultz moved his terminal from New York City to Slackwood, New Jersey.

When

Schultz'. contract with the Teamster's union in New York expired, the company
made a contract with a New Jersey local.

In retaliation, the New York team-

sters picketed the trucks at Schultz every time a delivery or pick-up was
attempted in New York City at the situs ot neutral customers.

The Board held

that this picketing was primary and distinguished it from other cases beoauae
the primary employer's premises vas in New Jersey and no other means of
picketing vas available.

In addition, the picketing only took place while the

trucks were being loaded and unloaded.

To ests biish a picket line in New

Jersey would have been useless since the primary employer's business was oonduoted in New York city.

The dissenting members of the Board contended that

even though the union oonfined its picketing aotivities to the employer's
trucks, it was imDI:lterial as Section 8 (b) (4) (A) does not require that.
secondar,. boycott to be unlawful must completely disrupt the business ot the
secondary employer and the union's picketing was conducted upon the premises

112 International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Schultz Refrigerated
Service), 87 NLRB 502, 1949.

•

.
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in the 80le possession of the secondary employer.
In the Kanawha Coal 08se,

m

the Board found that the situs of the

dispute with a specUic tmHrman, who produced timber for mine use vas at the
sawmill ra ther than a t the mines where trucks of the lumberman were making a
delivery.

The picketing at the mines vas a secondary boycott, although the

signs advertising the dispute rererred to the timberman, the nicketing vas
not confined to the period when the trucks were present.
In a case similar to the Schultz Refrigerated Service decision, the

District Court ot Southern New York issued an injunction. 114 Sterling Beverages, Inc., had its central office in ltassachusetts, holding a contract with
the Teamsters union in Massachusetts.

'!'he firm vas an exclwdve distributor

for Rupperts and sent trucks to the warehouse in New York City for merchandise
Members ot the Massachusetts local drove the truoks to the New York border
where the teamsters belonging to the New York local took over.

The M8ssachu-

setts Teamsters union demanded the right to have its members drive the
trucks in New York city.

Sterl1n~

When refused, the Massachusetts local picketed the

entrance to Ruppert's in New York

C!~

whenever a Sterling truck appeared.

The Court granted sn injunction, admitting that the purpose of the picketing
was

to induce the e1RPloyee. of Sterling not to move trucks about Ruppert·s

11.3 Union CODstruction Workers (Kanawha Coal Operators Ass.), 94

NLRB 17.31, 1951.

114 Douds v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Sterling Beverages), 85 F. Supp. 429, 1949.

property but held that Section S (b) (4) (A) ·was violated because the net
result was that the employees of Ruppert's refused to load or unload Sterling
trucks, causing Ruppert's to stop doing business with Sterling.

The Board

stated that this case differed from the Schultz opinion because the primary
emoloyer's trucks were, upon occasion, beyond the area patrolled by the
picket and the publicity was not restrioted to the trucks but to the areaway
of the neutral employer.
The Santa Ana LUl11ber case discussed the folloving of trucks belonging to the primary employer to note the names of his cus"tomers. lIS The union
did not picket any ot the customers who were to be contacted at a later date.
The Board held that there was no picketing end the mere trailing of the lumber
company's trucks could not by itself be interpreted as an inducement or encouragement of the customers employees.
Many

of theee oases discussed are contrary to the earlier decisions

or cannot be satisfactorily reconciled with later rulings made by the Board,
baving developed since the Pure Oil opinion.

In the Pure 011 case, the NLRB

set the precedent for another series of cases which held that picketing of the
primary employer at his main location was not a secondary boycott though the
purpose of such picketing was to force other employers to stop doing business
with him by inducing their employer to strike or a "refusal to handle". 116

115 Lumber

&

Sawmill Workers Union (Santa Ana Lumber Co.), 87 NLRB

937, 1949.

1949.

116 Oil Workers International Union (Pure Oil Co.), 84 ILRB 315,
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Both the Pure Oil CoJll?8.l'lY end the standard 011 COlIpsny operate petroleum
refineries that adjoin each other.

Standard Oil held a lease for the use of

the dock facilities end operated the surrounding premises with its employees,
handling shipments for themselye. end the Pure Oil Company.

The union involv-

ed bad been certified a8 the representative for the Standard Oil and Pure 011
elllployees, although se'f)8rate locals were used.

Due to a prospective strike

inVolving their em:plo,..ee., Standard 011 gave the Pure Oil ComTllny the rlght
to operate the docking facilitle., Pure Oil to operate the premis•• with its

ow employees.
but an agreement

Pure 011 sought permission trom the union to operate the dock
\I8S

not reached.

When the strike involving Standard OU

began, the union placed pickets at the dock.

In addition, the crew of a tank-

er refused to load the Pure Oil cargo wes. the loading was under the directtion of a Standard 011 fore_n.

Later, the union notified the NatioD8.l Ms.ri-

time Union representative of the dispute with Standard Oil and the ruel
belonging to the Pure
dock.

011 Company became "hot cargo" as soon as it reached the

Evidence presented diaclosed that the union had requested the employees

of the Pure Oil Company to strike.

'!'he General COUDsel, during the hearing,

contended that the picketing of the dock vas an unfair labor practice because

it induced the employee a of Pure Oil to reruae to handle the product of their
tlllployer so that the Pure Oil Com:paDY would be forced to atop all business
dealings with the Standard 011 Company.

The Board held that the picketing

vas confined to the primary situs and, as a result, the lav was not violated

linee all picketing vas in the i1lmediate vicinity of Standard Oil pro:perty.

The Ganenl Counsel further alleged that the 'letters to the N8.tional Maritime
Inion had enoouraged the maritime emnloyees on the tanker to discontinue
business relations vith the Pure Oil Company.

The Board held such action vas

an integral nart of the unions right to take primary action in support of the
demands made on Standard Oil and the right to publicize - there was nothing
more than a request to honor a pioket line at the place of business or the
primary employer.

The Board recognized that the union's pressure on the

primary employer may bave had a seoondary efrect, that or induoing and encottr'aging the employees of the Standard all Company to cease doing business.

Yet,

to hold otherwise than that the action was primary, would in erreot outlaw
every strike.

In the Moore

Dry Dock opinion, 117 the Board followed the rule

enunoiated in the Pure Oil case.

Here, the union had a dispute with the owner

of a ship with a roreign registry.

The ship had been tied up at an American

,ard so that it could be converted.

The union wented to picket the ship to

secure the customary rate of pay for the seamen attached to the vessel.

First,

the union requested permission of the shipyard to pioket the ship at the dock.
When refused, the union stationed piokets at the entrance to the shipyard after
ninety neroent of the crew were on board.
Darning the ship only

813

being unfair.

Signs were oarried by the piokets

The Board held the -picketing to be

1950.

117 Sailors Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dook Co.), 92 NLRB 547,

Iii
'1,'

I:.,

primary beoause it was limited to the situs of the dispute loeated on the
secondary employer's premises at the time the primary employer was present;
the pioketing was limited to plaoes reasonably elose to the situs of the dispute (where the ship vas tied to the dook); the pr1m8ry employer, at the time
of the pioketing, was engaged in its normal business at the situs; and the
banners carried by the pickets clearly disolosed that the dispute vas with the
primary elllployer.

The Board here reoognized that the problem vas one of

balancing the right of a union to pioket at the site of the dispute a8 against
the right of the seoondary employer to be free from picketing.

When the

secondary employer is being harbored by the primary employer, neit.her the righ1
of the union to picket nor the right of the secondary employer to be free from
pioketing is absolute.
The oertinent facts in the four cases whioh reaohed the United States
Sunreme Court will nov be set forth.
Milling Company,

ll~

In the case of NLRB v. International Rice

the union sought to organize the employees of a cluster

of rioe mills surrounding the town ot Crowley, Louisiana.

One portion of the

organizational drive was direoted at the Kaplan Mill and the Teamsters' union
established a pioket line.
in the pioketing.

None of the employees at the Kaplan mill took part

A truok driver employed by a customer sought entrance at

the mill and vee persuaded by the piokets not to oross the line,

Subsequently,

the truok returned w1.th the vice president of Kaplan's and the pickets stoned

11S 341 US 665, 1951.

.

the truck as the driver attempted to cross the picket line.

1.35
The ;ffiRB held

that Section 8 (b) (4) (A) vas not violated because the union's picketing
had been restricted to the situs of the dispute vith the primary em.ployer. 119
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the NLRB and held that Section 8
(b) (4) (A) was violated.

The Appellate Court felt that the union activity

became secondary when the strikers attempted to induce and encourage the
employees of the neutral

e~loyer,

even if at the primary employer's plant,

espeoially vhere there is violence. When the case came before the Supreme
Court, the direct and most important problem was the primary situs doctrine.
The Court could have clarified the situation Qy following the legislation as
written and reiterated earlier decisions or it could have endorsed the primary
situs doctrine as developed by the Board end made the theory binding upon
lower oourts and the Board.

II~tead,

the court selected a novel ground that

did not appear in the briefs as prepared by the contestants nor found in the
earlier decisione.

The court held that the union pieketing and violence to

induce two men on e single truck not to cross the nieket line vas net inducing
the concerted activity proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) (A).

This section,

contemplated the court, was intended to induce or encourage to some concert of
action greater than that evidenced by the pickets request to a driver of
single truck to discontinue his trip into the pioketed mill.

8

The limitation

of the picketing to the primary employer's mill vas held to be significant but

itI,

~lce

....

119 In re International Brotherhood ot Teamsters (International
Milling Co.), 84 NLRB .360, 1949 •

not conclusive.

Thus, it appears that a union's inducements reaching the

individual employees of a neutral employer only as they happen to approach the
pioket line of the nrimary employer's plaoe of business are not aimed at oonoerted, as distinguished trom individual, coDluct b.Y such employees and is not
banned by Section g (b) (4) (1).
In the Rice Milling case, the court neither affirmed nor rejected
the primary situs theory.

The decision only seems to hold that the inducement

of tvo employees in a single truck at the sit'lS of the nrimary employer is not
the type of oonoerted activity forbidden b,y Seotion g (b) (4) (A).

It is not

clear that such action if induced elsewhere than at the primary situs is proseribed.

Nor is it clear what activity must be induced to constitute a vlola-

tion.
In the Gould oase, 120 the Denver Building Trades Council and the

associated unions struck 8gflinst a general contractor who was subletting work
to

8

non-union contractor.

The general contractor and all of the sub-contraot-

ore, with the exceT)tion of Gould and Preisner, employed union members.

vThen

Gould insisted that he complete the electrical work after being requested not
to, the Council posted

8

picket at the building site and, in accordance with

the Council by-laws, all members were informed that work was to be stopped.
'!'he nieketing continued for !leveral weeks until the general contractor terminated his contract with Gould and Preisner. When unfair union practice charges

120 NtJ1B v. Denver Building Trades Council (Goulc
US 67l), 1951.

&

Preisner), 341

..
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vere fUed, the NLRB General Counsel in the Denver region petitioned the federal district court for injunctive rel:i.of under Section 10 (1).

The court re-

fused to issue an injunction because the activities vupposedly ,-iola ting the
lav were not in interstate commerce
When the ease was heard

~

80

that the court lacked jurisdiction.

the NtRB, it decided that the building was in inter-

sta te commerce and the union had viola ted Section 8 (b) (4) (A). 121 Upon
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the court ruled
that the Board had jurisdiction but reversed the decision of the Board on the
theory that the complaint and evidence merely established a primary- boycott
which did not violate the spirit of the secondary boycott provisions. 122 The
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the union had engaged
1n secondary activity proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4)

CAl.

Justices Reed and

Douglas, in dissenting opinions, indicated that in the oonstruction inc.hlstry,
conflict is usually confined to the construction site, the only place where a
union can effectively object to the hiring of non-union labor.

In addition,

the secondary boycott provisions were designed to protect those persons wholly
disinterested in a dispute and the two dissenters felt that

8.

sub-eontractor

and contractor are not disinterested parties.
In the ease concerning the electrical workers, the Giorgi Construction Company, Port Cheater, New York had signed a contract to construct a

121 82 NtRB 1195, 1949.
122 Denver Build ing Trades Council v. NLRB (Gould & Pre isner ), 186
J'. (2) 326, 1950.

private dwelling in Greenwich, Connecticut.

~lthough

the general contractor

in question had employed union men in the past, the electrical installation
was subcontracted to Samuel Langer, whose office was in Port Chester, New York
and who employed non-union labor.

Local 501 of the I. B. E. W. picketed the

building site and workers a1read,. on the job left.
ar:y injunction in New York under Section 10 (1).

The JiLRB secured a tellpOrThe Board

th~n

decided that

an unfair practice had been committed violating Section 8 (b) (4) (A) 123 and
the decision was affirmed by the Court of Anpeals. 124 The S1lpreme Court
upheld the Board and the Court of Appeals. 125
The Watson case concerned the Carpenter's Union when a private home
vas remodeled and refurnished near the city of Chattanoo~, TAnnessee. 126
The Watson ooncern operated a department store in Chattanooga and Local 74 of
the Carpenter's union had been attemoting to

organi~~

this firm.

A contraot

had been let to remodel and renovate the home and Watson's vas the only store
in the locality carrying a "particular tyoe of wall and floor covering that
vas desired. When Watsonts non-union men attempted to install the covering,
the carpenters on the .'ob left at the request of the union.

123
1950.

...

~2

tMB

124 I. B. E. W., Local 501 v. NLRB (Langer),
125

1951 •

I. B. E. W., Local 501 (Langer),

51 Ate 67A, 1951.

The Regional

l02~,

l~l

1949.

F. (2) 34, OA-2,
"-

126 United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB (watson), .341

us 7m,

Director of' the Nr~B sought an injunction under Section 10 (1) and the request
was denied bec"luse the alleged unfair

~)rsctice

occurred prior to the rsssage

. of the raft-Hartley so that the conduct com,lained of, at that time, was not
unlawf'ul. 127

The NT...RB, however, issued a "cease and desi8t" order alleging

that Section g (b)

(4) (A) had been violated. l2S On appeal, the Court of'

A!)peels unheld the :UJ{B 129 and the Supreme Court followed suit.
In a fifth ease, a writ of' certiorari was denied by the Supreme
Court in a decision involving the building and construction industry. 130
Here, a union had attemoted to force a union building contractor to stop doing
business with a manufacturer of' prefabricated houses who employed non-union
labor.

The NLRB and the Court of' Appeals held that the union was guilty of' an

unf'air labor practice because it had placed the contractor on an unfs 1r list,
placed a picket at the building site and withdrew a union member from the job.
To properly evaluate the decisions rendered by the United States
Suureme Court, it is neoessary to recapitulate.

Shortly after the N1.,RA was

amended, the geographical situs of the strike or the place of picketing was

127 Styles v. Looal 74, U. B. C. & J. (Watson), 74 F. Supo. 499,
1947.

128 In re United Brotherhood of' Carpenters (Watson), 80

NI~RB

533,

194~.

1?9

Loeal 74, U. B.

130

u.

1950.
B.

c. & J.

c. & J.

v. NLRB (Watson), lSI F (2) 126, CA-6,

v. NtRB (Wadsworth), 2~ tRRM 2132, CA-10, 1951

im.mater1al so long as there was an effect upon a secondary employer. 131

It

is important to note that nowhere in Section ~ (b) (4) (A) is there any
language indicating that the situs of the aotivity was of any importanoe in
considering whether s080ifl0 union practioes should be exempted trom the
seoondary boyoott provisions.

deoisi~n

However, starting with the

the Pure Oil oase in 1949 and continuing to the

~resent,

given in

the Board has renderec

opinions based upon the oonstantly developing primary situs doctrine.

The

decisions urior tc the Pure Oil oase cannot be reconciled with the subsequent
ouinions as they are definitely in conflict.

The Board is currently exempting

from the effects of Seotion 8 (b) (4) (A) all activities at the sUus of the
dispute with the primary employer though such practices may have as an object
the forcing of an employer to cease business with another.
In the Langer, Gould and Watson

C8.S9S,

the Supreme Court gave opin-

ions on cases that were interpreted by the NLRB prior to the Pure Oil decision.
In each of these cases, the Board had applied Section g (b) (4) (A) literally
and held that violations had existed though the strjke or picketing took place
at the situs where the employees of the priIuBry employer was located, discoverlng a definite secondary intent.

When the Langer and the watson cases came

before the Court of A'Opea1s jn the Second and Sixth Circuits, reepective4r,
the dec is ione of the Irr.RB were upheld.

However, when the Gould ca se came

131 Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers (Schenley), 78 NLRB 504, 1948.
Los Angeles Building Trades Council, 83 NTJRB 477, 1949

-

I.

. before the Court of Appeals in Washington, D.c., the Board was reversed.

Dur-

ing this interim, the Board had decided the Pure OU and R,an Construotion
cases which developed the prima17 situs theory.
Gould case

\l8S

When the opinion in the

written by' the Court of Appeals, the Pure Oil and R,an Construo

tion cases were discussed.

B)r applying the primary situs the017, the Court of

Appeals reversed the Board in the Gould case and concluded that an unf'air
union 'P1"8ctice had not been cODllldtted by' union.
When the Langer and Watson cases were reviewed by' the United states
Supreme Court, the decisions of the ItBB were upheld, thus cont1naing the
rulings of the Board made prior to the Pure Oil case. When the Gould case
came before the Supre. Court, the decision of the Court of Appeals

\l8S

re-

versed and the NIBS was upheld, the court stating that the union had violated
Section 8 (b) (4) (A).

It would appear that the Supreme Court agreed with the

opinions rendered bJ the HLRB prior to the Pure OU case, but it should be
noted that none of the decisions rendered in the Langer, Gould and Watson
cases referred to the Ryan Construotion or the Pure OU oases.
The Supre. Court deoisions oan be justitied by' acoepting the premis
that the intent of Congl"ess vas to onlJ outlaw action sp8c1ticallJ directed
against a neutral emplOJer.

It does not seem that CODgl"ess sought to prohibit

priM17 activit,.. 1.32 Although there are mall1 indications that the proponents
of the 1947 Act and the lobb,yists behind the scenes would have great1,. desired

132 93 Congressional Record 4321-4323, 1947.

the .limination ot the primary boycott as w.ll

8S

the secondary actiTit,., such

,action was not pr.ss.d because ot the constitutional question.
initial decisions construing Section g (b)

In these

(4) (A), the Supreme Court refUs.d

to adopt a ... iew that would have an .ttect ot limiting prillBl'7 'Pick.ting
because ot a secondal'7 ett.et.

B.1 reading Section 7 ot the Act, which pro-

tects the right to engage in conc.rted pr.ssure, and Section 13, which grants
the right to strike, except as specitically prohibited by' the Act, it beco..s
obvious that Congress only intend.d to outlaw the secondary boycott.

The

ultimate blame tor the uncertainty which prevails over the interpr.tation ot
(A) lIUst be placed upon those who dratted the provision.

S.ction 8 (b) (4)

(A) was so poorly .xpr.ssed that a straighttorward reading ot the provisions
would ha.... l.d to

8

restriction ot 'Drimery activity.

Th. NtRB and the Supr...

Court sought an interpretation which would avoid the result ot hind.ring
pr1marr boycotts and a t the sa_ time k••p the area D8rrow when th.re is
economic conflict betw••n the primary .mp1oyer and a union without dir.ct
If the .mp1oy.r's plac. ot business is

injury to the secondary employer.

statioD8ry and geographica11,. r.mo....d

trOll

the premises of any oth.r .mp1oyer,

the test or the primary situs is merely wh.ther the pressures are confined to
the situs ot the labor dispute.

Obviously, there is a difficult problem ot

interpretation when there is no geographic separation betwe.n the premise. ot
the primary .mployer and those ot

8

n.utra1 tirm.

In such common situs cas.s,

the Board has d....eloped the use ot the to11owing crit.ria tor determining
secondary actionl

·143
1. Did the union 'PUblicise the dispute a8 inTolving the primary
employer exclusively or did the banners indioate that the dispute extended to
the secondary emplo,er?
2.

Has the union indicated that the direct and immediate object

was to twce neutral employers to cease doing business with the primary
empl07&r or was the union activity designed to curtail the pr1ary employer's
business?

3. Did the union attempt to induce employees ot the neutral employer to refuse to perf'orm services tor their own employer rather than merely
ref'use to render only such services tor the secondary employer as assist the
prinBry employer?

4. 'Was the picketing restricted as closely as practicable under the
cirouutanoe. to the immediate situs ot the primary dispute'

5. Did the UIlion bave another ettective means available rather than
the picketing action which was UIldertaken at or close to the ..condar,. employer?
'Without considering the legal alJl)8ct, a word of' caution is necessary
concerning the construction industry, which was 1.nYo1ved 1a three ot the tour
cases ruled upon by' the SuJ)!'e.. Oourt.

rhe construction industry presents a

UIlique problem when discussing the legality ot a bo)"Oott.

Men eap10yed in the

construction trades _y be hired by ditterent pneral contractors every day ot
the week.

lJntil World War II, and the post-war building boom, a great percent...

'li. 1

1

age ot workers without education or training to move elsewhere, were unable

., 144
to do better than work on a part-time besis.· As non-union men are hired,
those belonging to unions stand less chance of being employed at union rates
when there is a slack in the demand for building in the large industrial
centers.

When a union member refuses to work alongside non-union labor, it

is not necessarily striking a8Binst the so-called secondary employer but
against all other contractors for allowing non-union SUbcontractors on the
job.

This is espec:1ally true if the picketing is limited to the

8itUS

of the

construction job.
When a general contractor engages both union and non-union help, he
has created a situation which causes dif'ficulty to union members.

As partners

so to speak, the general contractor and the various subcontractors, become
allied tor the lite span of that construction job.

Legally, each nartner

remains independent because of the lack of control b.Y the general contraotor
over the emplo;yees ot the subcontractor.

In actual practice, the general

contractor is a busy person so that each sub-contractor supervises a portion
of the total project because of more experience in one phase and as a reliet
trOll the daily headaches

ot the construction site. The general contractor

still exercises control at any point b.Y the simple expedient of not letting
work to the sub-contractor on future jobs should he become displeased.

And

if the union picketing is limited to the site of the construction job, there
appears to be a question
arrived at b7 the courts.

8S

to the independent contractor solution so easily

Unquestionably, the war and the reconversion to a peacetime

econo~

plus the influence of the N.L.R.A •• as amended, paved the way for state legislation which restricted union activity to a great extent.

Undoubtedly, there

was a necessity for regulator,r legislation and the secondary boycott, never a
tactic high in public tavor, bad to be controlled. Delaware and Minnesota
provided for injunctive relief upon petition of the injured party and permitte
suits for damages. 133 Massachusetts, Colorado, Pennsylvania, Utah and
Wisconsin provided for the bringing of specific boycott oharges before an
administrative agency with court enforcement after a hearing and a finding and
order b7 the state labor board. 134 However, none of these states provided
for the mandatory or discretionary injunctive relief upon the petition ot the
Board or ettorney charged with prosecuting unfair union practices as provided
in Section 10 (j) and (1) in the federal lew.

Massachusetts outlaws strikes

and boycotts when used to force an employer to coeit an unf'atr labor practice
or to bargs in with a union whioh the employees rejected in an election conducted by the state Board.

The Minnesota provisions covers a multitude of

133 Minnesota laws, Chapter 195, 1949.
Delaware Laws, Chapter 196, Sec. 2, 6, and 10, 1947.
134 Massachusetts Acta, Chapter 150A l Sec. 4 (A) (2) (a), 1947.
Colorado stat. Ann. (Midue Supp.), Chapter 97, Sec. 94 (6) (2)
(a) el) (g), 1946.
Penn. stat. Ann. (Purdon), Tit. 43, See. 211.1, et. seq., 1941.
Wisconsin stat (Brossard), Section 111.01, eta seq., 1951.

. labor sins.

The states ot Alabama, Georgie, 'Idaho, and Missouri passed legis-

lation specitying what activities constitute secondary boycotts and made the.
misdemeanors. 13'

The Iowa lav provided tor injunctive reliet on the petition

ot an aggrieved part,.. 136 North Dakota holds all bo1'Cotts and s,.nrpatbJr
strikes to be against public polic,. and permits injunctive reliel and
damages. 137 Oregon and California have "hot cargo" statutes which prohibit
. the refusal by persons not directly involved in the labor dispute to work
upon or retuse to handle non-union materiels or suppliers. 138
The constitutioDBlity

courts.

ot severel state statutes have been tested

in

The California Act was held to be unconstitutional because of aD

unreasonable restraint upon the freedom of speeeh, press and 8ssembl,. and the
,law failed to set up sufticient standards tor conduct that could be termed
unlawful. 139

103, 1940.

The Idaho law was held to be constitutional. 140 Here, the

135 Alabama Code, Title 26, sec. 336, Title 14, See. 57, 101 and
Georgia Laws, Ch. 54, 1947.
Idaho Code, Ch. 44, Sec. SOl to S03, 1948.
Vernon's Missouri Ann. Stat., Ch. 295, 1947.

136 Iowa Code Ann., Ch. 7331 to 7336, 1947.
137

North Dakota Laws, ChI 34, Sec. 0001 to 08(17, 1947.

138 Oregon Compo Laws Ann., Sections 102,

~05,

1940.

Deering's CalH'ornie Codes, tabor I, ChI S, 1947.
139

In re Blane,.,

140 State

'Y.

184 Pac (2) 892 (Calif.), 1947.

Casselman, 24 IBRM 2056 (Idaho), 1949.
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union contended that the statute was unconstitutional because the term "labor
dispute" was not detined, and the right ot tree speech was infringed because
picketing wal prohibited except
Another statute had been

~saed

1>7 the employees ot the pr1ma17' employer.
at the same time which detined

8

"labor dis-

pute" and both laws, held the court, could be read together.
The trend has been definitely established and the evidence tends to

indicate that the seconda17' boycott in labor disputes will be even more
strongly controlled

1>7 the state legislation and court orders

in the tuture.

OHAPTm VI

AN EVALUA'fION OF SOLOTIONS TO 'l'fIE
smOIDARY BOYOOTT PROBLEM

Any solution proposed to remedy the secondary boycott laws and
decisions will be a cOllpromise measure at best.

'the equities in favor of the

public and employers must be balanced with those of labor and admittedly all
concerned may be treated unfairly on any particular occasion.

However, it

cannot be denied that injury to the public through the use of secondary boycotts bas been slight as e01ll'P8red with injury suffered from direct strikes.
'or example, the recent strike in the steel industry had a strong effect upon
the national safety because ot the wartime, peacetime emergency.

The priM

question to be answered in arriving at a:n;y solution is whether collective
bargaining w111 be promoted

80

that eventually the forlMl regnlation of indus-

try and labor w11l be cast aside in favor

ot informal control

by the partici-

pants. As already indicated, the answer is not simple.
It one believes in strong unions, there would be little quarrel with

the continued outlawing ot such aotivities proscribed by Sections 8 (b) (4)
(B) and (0), undertakings generally distasteful to the public and often
associated with other more fSvorably received secondary action such as that
condueted for organizational purposes.

In addition, a small percentage of the

cases arising under Section g (b)

(4) come within the forbidden activity ot

CB) end (e). During the fiscal year 1949, eighty-nine charges were tiled
under (D) and thirty under (C), 1 During 1950, eight7-r1ine violations were
claimed under (D) and thirty-tour under (e). 2 For the year 1951, sixtT
cb9rges were made under (B) and only twenty-two under (e).:; Compare these
with the unhir labor charges WAde under ~I), 247 for 1949, 2.38 for 1950, and
14.3 for 1951, and the entire question appears to be ot little importance.
The most difficult issues are Section g (b)

(4) (I) on a tederal

level and those state levs which outlaw the secondery boycott proper so that

the balance ot this chapter will be devoted thereto.
Union18t~

have strongly argued that all secondary boycotts in turth-

erenee ot legitimate labor di8putes
tully conducted.

~hould

be legslly sanctioned, if peace-

They argue that to permit union men to work upon non-union

materials and products would eventuall,. result in an undercutting ot union
standards.
extension of

Historically, the secondary boycott had
un~.on

8S

its -primary ourpose the

control as was indicated in the Duplex Printing ease -

unions attempted to t.<.11(:e work avay

frO.1!I

non-union yorkers.

Labor leaders

today emphasize that the need for the boycott 1.s principally to enlarge its

1 Fourteenth Annual Rel)ort of the National tabor Relations Board,
'or the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 194.9, 'fable 3 (0', 160.
2 Fttteenth AM-l Repgrt ot the I!tiol\!l tabor Relations Board,
For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1950, Table .3 (0), 222.

3 Sixteenth Annual Report ot the national Labor Relations Board,
For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1951, Table .3 ~05, 294.

do_in.

There is some evidence available which would bear out the position

taken 'b7 labor leaders.

Industr7 has been invited to the south and southwest

geographic portions of the United States with an implied promise that unions
will be kept out or at lea8t sharply regulated.

statistics already available

indicate that mo8t of the regulatory type of labor legislation has been prollOted in the south and southwest.

ot a total of .366 charges filed under

Section 8 (b) (4) during the year 1949, only thirty of the total vere tiled
in the East North Central Distriot which includes the states of Ohio, Illinois
Michigan and Wisconsin. 4 The Middle Atlantic territory c0'9'8ring New York,
New Jersey and Pennsylvania totalled aeventy-six charges.

The Paci1'ic area

including Washington, Oregon and Calitornia disclosed f'itty-six boycott
violation claims.

All of the areas enumerated include the MOst industrialized

sections in the United States.

'!'he balance ot the charged violations occurred

in regions that vere of little comparative importance, industrially wise.

A

total of' .361 charges vere filed throughout the United States during 1950. 5
The East North Central area totalled thirty-nine charges, the Middle Atlantic
disolosed sevent7-four compla ints and the Pacific territory had sixt7-f'iTe
claims, the balance occuring in the relatively unimportant business areas.

1951, the East North Central district only bad nineteen charges filed, the

4 Fourteenth Annual Report ot the National Lalzgr Relatiop8 Bgard,
Table 4, 161.

5 fifteenth AMUt!l ReRon ot the National Jt!bgr RIlations Board,
Table 4, 223.

In

~

lSl

Middle Atlantic titt.y-tour and the Pacitic territory disolosed thirt,r-nine
troll a total ot 225, the balance occurring in areas attracting new business. 6
Thus, the unions may have a POint, especially true since state and tederal
legislation and court decisions have become more restrictive to labor since
World War II.

Should there be a general business depression and unions tought

br industry with such tactics evident prior to the Norris-LaGuardia and the
Wagner Acts, then the secondary boycott may have to be legalized, trom a
soeisl point ot view, to equalize the power between industry and labor and to
generall,. increase the purchasing power ot the mas. consumers.

Toda,., in

mo.t instances, unions are 'POVertul and the blanket approval ot all secondary
activity seau unnec....ry.

ot 1... importance is the claimed need tor the secondary boycott
during collective bargaining disputes.

Here, the need is onl,. crucial wh.n

the .mployer. cannot be "bargained with" brllOre direct and acceptable methods
Admittedl,., statistics to prove either point ot view is oomplet.ly lacking.

I

cannot be said how -IV" strikes would have been lost but tor the secondary
boyoott nor how many tailed since the B.L .. R.!. was amended and made the law ot
the land because ot a union's inabilit,. to rely on the teolmique.
the economic realities must be weighed.

Once again,

Business conditions, in general,

remain excellent at the present date and Mione are getting a good share ot tb
vealth accruing to the nation as a vhole tor the benetit ot their members.

6 Sixteenth AMUIll ReP9rt ot the National Labor RelatiOn! Board,

'fable 4, 296.

Thus, there isn't any need to legalize the secondary boycott to aid a union
during a period of negotiation.

Should industry faU and, the national income

drop sharp17, the ba,ycott could become necessary to promote the cause of
unionism and collective bargaining.
A. case could be presented for permitting action, admittedly- second-

ary, in specific industries because ot peculiar problems.

The ditf'icult

aspect ot class legislation and constitutionality would be presented and the
outcome of
industry,

8

court decision doubtM.

8S 8

For example, although the construction

clase, represents a small portion of the wealth ot all of the

industries in the United states, a large percentage of the total number ot
unfair labor practice chargee tUed was against unions in the construction
trades. 7 Since ID8!J1' ot the court decisions concerning the construction industry spplies to the independent contractor problem, it may be advisable to

legalize boy-cotts when coDtined to the area of the situs of' the building and
the activity is directed against non-union tradesmen present on the same job.
The independent contractor theory is a legal fiction in many instances and

subcontractors emplo,yed are often closely allied with the general employer,
more so than courts will admit.
Another proposed solution to the boycott problem is to permit

7 Fourteenth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board,
TIl ble 5, 162.
11tte.pth AM.l Report of the National Labor Relations Board,
'l'a ble 5, 224.
Sixteenth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Bg!rd,
Table 5, 226.
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secondary picketing when the Dr1mary strike is legally conducted.

Should the

United Auto Workers call a strike against a comoany for higher wages, not in
violation ot a contract, secondary activity would be permitted against those
who deal in the products ot the primary employer.
situation would be the prime factor.

Again, the general economic

With unions strong, it is a question

ot balancing the equities and many small business men could be damaged should
unions be permitted to engage in secondary activity.

With unions powertul,

as they are today, other methods ot economic pressure are available without
using secondary picketing.

In periods at weakened and harrassed unionism, the

secondary boycott might be necessary.
Some argue that secondary strikes and picketing should be permitted
for organizational purposes.

A few contend that the secondary boycott has

never been ettecti.... to organize large industrial groups and the observation
seems correct since

mBD,y

ot the basic heaT,Y industries never entered into

collective bargaining agreements prior to the Wagner Act.

However, IIlOst at

the large industries are unionized today so that permitting organizational
boycotting must be justified tor another reason.

Actually, the organizational

secondary boycott is a strategy necessary today to organize the non-union
fringes which are important to la bar to ma tnta in standards and to continue t.
better the general living conditions ot the masse..
boycott is the only tactic that is etteetive.

Otten, the secondary

An argument against permitting

organizatioll8l boycotting is that emnleyees may be coerced into joining unions.
The contention is rather weak, providing the union is chosen b.r a majority at

~
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those employees within the proper birgaining. unit, since _ny non-union
elllployees have ga!ned through the efforts made by' unions in behalf of their
members, and as a beneficiary of such union 1')ressure, those preferring to
reJDBin individualists should be made to contribute to the cost of organizational programs.

In addition, both the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley

additions bave recognized the social desirability of the positive promotion
o! unions and collective bargaining so that there is some merit to this point
o! view.
A strong argwnent can be presented in favor of tl8rmitting union members to refuse to work upon or otherwise refuse to handle material from
"struck" companies.

If the ftstruck" .terial is forced upon union labor, they

are, in a sense, aiding the primary employer.

Yet, whether no work should be

permitted upon those articles made by' companies currently engaged in a labor
dispute remains debgtable.

Turning the tables about, the secondary employer

would become the ally of the union engaged in the dispute should the secondary
activity t>e permitted and the boycott could cause great business damage to the

I
'i !

,II
,1,1

secondary employer.

'I
I

Another solution is the "unity of interest" theory developed by' the
New York Courts in such opinions represented by Goldfinger v. Feintuoh.

8

Thus, a retail store which serves as an outlet for non-union products might,
under certain circUlllStances, be pioketed.

8 276 N.Y. 281, 1937.

The problem here is whether the

legitimate union interest extends from an ore. mining concern to the retail
automobile dealer or from the Pillsbury Flour Mills to the 8BIlII grocery store
In a few words, where does the interest end.

As indicated in a previous cbtip-

ter, the original "unity ot interest" theory ad'V'8nced by Goldfinger v. Feintuch has been extended by the New York courts to where the primary and
secondary employer need not be engaged in the same type ot business.

Such a

solution would be difficult to apply to factual situations and would invite
administrative and court intervention, a factor not conducive to the advancement of collective bargaining.

Possibly, a8 a solution, picketing could be

permitted where the greater pert of the secondary emplO1er's business is with
the priBulry concern.

There, a definite "unity of interest" could be estab-

lished.
Where a subsidiary of a large corporation is involved in a labor
dispute, many argue that the legel fiction of distinct and separate entities
be cast aside and picketing of the parent corporation permitted since an

inde-pendent relationehip does not exist in tact between the two com'Pflnies.

To

permit the establishment of subsidiaries is within the statutory purview of
each individual state.

The separate entity theory is nothing more than the

legal permission to establish separate corporations as an aid or attraction to
bUSiness corporations.

Secondary activity should be permitted against either

the parent or subsidiary company.

There is a definite "unity of interest" to

8ay the least, and directors appointed to look atter the "child" are otten
controlled by the 1')8rent company.

It i8 questionable vhether the primary employer should be permitted
sdministrstiTe or legal recourse against a union guilty of a seoondary boycott.

The employer vould clam that since he is suffering business dallllge

because of the secondaI"YactiTity, he has

8

direct interest in the union

action and should be giTen a right of redress.

Unions claim that MOst second-

ary boycott 8Uits and charges are filed by the nrimary employer who is the
cause of allot the ditticulty.

On

ma~

ocoasions, unions clsa tbBt the

nrimary employer is subsidizing litigation since there are known incidents
when fund. are made aT8ilable to the secondary eIJl1,'Jloyer for oourt action, a
!,raotioe frowned upon by the judiciary.

The employer has

8

d.finite interest

in seoondary union actlTity beoause ot business damage and he should Mve the
right to ftle a suit tor damages or netition an administrative ageDeY tor
relief in specific oircumstances.
A tew contend that the unions shl')uld be P8nitted to us •••condary
boycotts :l.t the eurployer is guiltY' of an unfair labor practice.

Sinoe the

eft!ployer has sinned, he 111 seeking reI let without the nec....ry "clean hands"
and thus the boyeott should be oermitted.

The diffieulty with this type of

philosophy, admittedly one of "eye for eY'e,. i8 that the publio will eventually lose thereby a!1d the law of the jungle wUl l)l"n-aU.

In addition, the

courts will be burdened with litigation and the use ot the injunction maY' be
increased.

TVo wrongs are not

8

right and it is better to forbid the union

and employers the us. of questionable tactic..

In addition, to equalize .uch

a clause, it would be neoessary to permit an employer to commit an unfair

i.57

labor 'Orectice if the union was found guilty ()f violating any portion ot
Section S (b) (4) and this unions would condemn.
In the garment industry and a few others, it is a common '!lractice

to sublet orders during the busy season to small concerns created for that
~urpo...

Perhans secondary boycotts should be permitted when work is let

during a labor dispute because a union strike could be broken thereby.

Here,

unions can nresent acceptable evidence in favor of permitting secondary
activity baeause the contractor is not a person wholl,. unconcerned.

The

suggestion could be tempered b.r permitting all boycotts unless the subcontraoting is

8

normal occurrence within the industry and no more work has been let

during a labor dispute than is the customary procedure.
Undeniably, the Taft-Hartle,. secondary boycott substantive and
cedural provisions should be amended.

~ro

'I'he wvrding in Section 8 (b) (4) is

ambiguous and tar too restrictive if literally applied.

The decisions already

discllssed under the pri..'!lary situs doctrine is due, in part, to the poor
phraseology ot the Act and the NLRB and courts ot law ha",e had to circumvent
the real issues in order to arrive at an equitable solution, a device which in
effect turns the courts and the Board into legislative bodies
nwrit~

law.

8S

they are

'I'he requirement under Section 10 (1) that the Regional

Attorney secure an injunction when there is sufficient evidence of a labor
violation should be stricken from the records completely or equalized
granting the ssme relief to unions.

~

The most obvious reason is that a similar

provision was not written into the lav when an emplo.yer violates the Act.

I
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Then, courts of law with legalistic

approech~s

and little training in labor

relations should be left out of labor disputes whenever possible.

Personnel

i8 needed trained in the industrial relations field with sl')8cia1 qualifications in labor history, economics end labor lew.
be understood in their nroper persnective.

Only then will the problems

•
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